Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket Nos. 99200 and 99463; Published
Judges Danhof, Hood, and Tahvonen; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 181 Mich App 419; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Disqualification for Intentionally Suffered Injury [§3105(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
This unanimous per curiam Opinion written by Judge Tahvonen resolves an issue of first impression dealing with the "intentionally caused injury" exclusion set forth in §3105(4) of the Act. This section states that accidental bodily injury is compensable with no-fault benefits, but an injury is not accidental where it is "suffered intentionally by the injured person." The court held that a person who attempts suicide by running out in front of moving automobiles is not necessarily excluded by §3105(4) where the plaintiff, as a result of mental illness, lacks the mental capacity to formulate a rationale intent to do the self-injurious act.
In this particular case, the plaintiff was a 21-year old man who was suffering from severe psychotic disturbances on the day of the accident. He was delusional, hallucinating and was having great difficulty communicating in a rational manner. A psychiatrist who examined the plaintiff on the day of the accident recommended that he be committed to an institution. The plaintiff was then taken to an emergency room of a hospital and, while awaiting admission, slipped out of the door and ran out into traffic where he was struck by an automobile and suffered a severe brain injury. Several months after the accident, the plaintiff acknowledged that he had attempted to take his life and denied suffering any delusions or hallucinations. Plaintiff’s psychiatrist testified that he was most assuredly delusional and hallucinating and was decidedly psychotic. The case was tried before a jury, and after the close of all proofs, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant, finding that, as a matter of law, plaintiff intentionally caused the acts which resulted in his injury and was therefore precluded from recovering benefits by §3105(4).
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiff was capable of formulating the requisite intent to injure himself. The court stated:
"In the case now before us, the link between hurling oneself in front of moving cars and injury is obvious and necessary — to the rational mind. But the statute calls upon us to consider only Gregory Mattson's mind, and the evidence is plain that his was not a rational
mind on February 20, 1983. . . .The testimony of the three psychiatrists, viewed in a light
most favorable to plaintiff could support a finding by a reasonable juror that Gregory Mattson, on that day, was so profoundly mentally disturbed that he could appreciate neither the nature of his acts nor their probable consequences. That being so, a reasonable juror could have found that Gregory Mattson did not intend to bring about his injuries or death when he threw himself in front of several automobiles."
The court would not, however, go so far as to say that mental illness, standing alone, precludes a finding that a person cannot intend to bring about his own injuries or death. In this regard, the court stated:
"Counsel for plaintiff invites us to hold that Gregory's mental illness precludes a finding that he intended to bring about his own injuries or death. We decline the invitation. Although mental illness, more particularly psychosis and any of its myriad manifestations, is relevant in establishing intent, it is not dispositive. Those who are insane may ‘intend' to write, to sleep, to die. The issue for purposes of the no-fault statute is not the source or motive for the intent, but merely its existence. We need say no more than our colleagues said m Allstate v Miller, 175 Mich App (1989), 'when a person cannot form an intent to act because of insanity, he or she has not acted intentionally as that term is used in insurance policies."'
Based upon the foregoing, the court concluded that the jury should have been permitted to decide the question of whether plaintiff was capable of formulating the requisite intent to injure himself, and, as a result, a directed verdict was improper.
