Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 129388
Opinion by Justice Taylor; 4-3 (Justices Kelly, Cavanagh, and Weaver dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 478 Mich. 178, Link to Opinion 
Link to COA Summary
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Obligation of Claimant to Submit to Physical Examination [3151]
Good Cause Requirement for Court Orders [3159]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 opinion by Chief Justice Taylor, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a no-fault claimant must submit to a defense medical examination (DME) under MCL 500.3151 and that conditions cannot be imposed on the examination under MCL 500.3159 unless good cause is shown.
The plaintiff in this case was injured in a motor vehicle accident which occurred in 2002. State Farm, the plaintiff’s no-fault insurer, denied her claim for personal injury protection benefits and plaintiff sued. During litigation, State Farm demanded an unconditional DME under §3151 of the No-Fault Act. Plaintiff refused, asserting that conditions could be imposed on the examination under MCR 2.311(A). The trial court issued an order allowing conditions on the exam and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In reversing, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that although Court Rules control matters on which the No-Fault Act is silent, the Court Rules do not control matters that are specifically addressed by the Act. Here, under §3135, the Act specifically covers independent medical examinations. Therefore, MCR 2.311 is inapplicable to independent medical examinations in regard to the No-Fault Act. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated:
“While the court rules control matters on which the no-fault act is silent, they do not control matters specifically addressed by the act. Here, where the act covers independent medical examinations, it is entirely antithetical to the Legislature’s desired approach to argue that §3151 does not give the insurer the right to include a policy provision allowing it to choose the examiner or even insist on the examination itself. . . . Thus, we conclude that the no-fault act comprehensively addresses the matter of claimant examinations. Accordingly, MCR 2.311 is not applicable to such examinations. . . . Contrary to Muci’s assertions, good cause may only be established by ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’”
The Supreme Court then rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she had demonstrated good cause under §3159 and could, therefore, obtain an order imposing conditions on the examination. The plaintiff argued she had demonstrated good cause because physicians hired by the insurer were adversarial agents and wrote their reports accordingly. The court disagreed, noting physicians are presumed to be bound by the methodologies of their profession and by principles of professional integrity. Only upon demonstrable evidence that the medical examination will cause the claimant annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression can plaintiff rebut this presumption. If plaintiff does not rebut this presumption, no conditions can be imposed. In this regard, the court stated:
“Physicians are presumed to be bound by the methodologies of their profession and by principles of professional integrity. Only with demonstrable evidence that the discovery order or medical examination will cause the claimant annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression can a claimant rebut this presumption. Until this presumption is rebutted, a court may not impose conditions on an examination under §3159.”
