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Dairyland Ins Co v Mews, et al (COA – PUB 7/20/2023; RB #4610)

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Dairyland Ins Co v Mews, et al (COA – PUB 7/20/2023; RB #4610)
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #359855, 361345, 361348, 361351, 361357; Published
Judges Patel, Boonstra, and Rick; Authored by Judge Patel
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Forthcoming; Link to Opinion


STATUTORY INDEX:
Catastrophic Claims Association: Creation and Membership [§3104(1)]
General/Miscellaneous [§3104]

TOPICAL INDEX:
Jurisdiction in PIP Cases 


SUMMARY:

In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Patel and dealing with multiple consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a lengthy decision in which it held that for purposes of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6), the lawsuit filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court filed by medical providers, ICM and Diversified Home Health Care (“Diversified”), was the proper case through which to litigate the common issues regarding Dairyland Insurance Company (“Dairyland”) responsibiities to pay no-fault benefits owed to an injured person, Cameron Mews, because the Wayne County case was the first of the three lawsuits filed. The Court of Appeals further held that the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) does not provide a cause of action against the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association’s (“MCCA”), because the MCCA is not a ‘public accommodation”. The Court of Appeals also held there was no factual basis to support claims against the MCCA for tortious interference with a business expectancy.

On October 14, 2010, Mews was in a motorcycle accident in which he sustained neck inuries that rendered him a tetraplegic and require constant care and assistance. Mew received some care services through ICM, which was a business founded by Mew’s mother, Rebecca Mews. Mews also received some care services from Diversified. Mews ended up having disputes with Dairyland regarding the payment of various no-fault benefits. On October 22, 2020, Dairyland filed a declaratory action Mews, in the Oakland County Circuit Court, in which Dairyland sought a ruling that it was not responsible to pay Mews attendant care and nursing care benefits because Mews has not complied with Dairyland’s requests that Mews undergo medical evaluations and go through home inspections, and because Mews had failed to provide reasonable proof in support of his claims. Mews filed a counterclaim against Dairyland to recover payment of his denied claims. Mews also added the MCCA as a defendant alleging that the MCCA committed tortious interference with a business expectancy. Mews further alleged that the MCCA violated ELCRA by denying or reducing Mew’s attendant care rates on the basis that he is an African-American. The trial court ended up granting summary disposition in favor of the MCCA on the basis that the MCCA could not be held liable under ELCRA and that the MCCA did not commit conduct that constitutes a tortious interference of a business expectancy.

Dairyland and Mews proceeded to settle Mews’ claims but only through July 31, 2021, so the lawsuit remained pending in Oakland County Circuit Court. As the Court of Appeals further explained, on October 6, 2021, Dairyland moved to amend its complaint to limit

“Damages to claims incurred on or after August 1, 2021 and to add ICM as a defendant. The proposed amended complaint sought declaratory relief that (1) no amount was due or owing because Mews had failed to provide ‘reasonable proof’ of the amount of loss to recover PIP benefits; (2) the no-fault auto insurance reform legislation applied to Mews’s claim for attendant care at home health-aid or skilled-nursing levels, as well as case management and other benefits, including the 56-hour limit for in-home care and the statutory rate reductions; (3) that Dairyland properly calculated the rates for Mews’s providers, including ICM; and (4) Mews was entitled to 40 hours a week of skilled-nursing care at $36.50 an hour, two hours of case management each week at $36.50 an hour, and ICM is not entitled to any more than $14 an hour for home health-aid level care. Mews opposed Dairyland’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, arguing that a new lawsuit should be filed ‘[i]f additional issues arise[.]’ ”

On October 12, 2021, before the hearing on Dairyland’s motion to amend its complaint, ICM and Diversified filed separate complaints against Dairyland in the Wayne County Circuit Court. The Court explained these lawsuits as follows:

“ICM indicated in the complaint that Mews had “assigned his rights to ICM, with respect to the amounts that are past due and owing from” Dairyland. ICM alleged, on behalf of Mews, that (1) Dairyland breached its statutory duty to provide ICM payment for Mews’s attendant-care services from August 1, 2021, forward, (2) the MCCA tortiously interfered with a business relationship by leveraging its position as a reimbursement agency to reduce the rates paid for Mews’s care, and (3) both Dairyland and the MCCA violated the ELCRA by denying or reducing Mews’s claims because ICM is an African-American-owned company not entitled to the same rates for the same or similar service as a white-owned company providing the same services.”

In lieu of responding to Dairyland’s amended complaint in the Oakland County case, ICM moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Oakland County case should be dismissed because it involved the same relevant parties and issues as the Wayne County case and because the Wayne County case was filed before Dairyland filed its amended complaint. Meanwhile, in the two Wayne County cases, both Dairyland and the MCCA moved for summary disposition in lieu of answering. Dairyland argued that the Oakland County case was the only one in which to properly litigate the common issues across the three cases because the Oakland County case was pending at the time the Wayne County cases were filed. The MCCA argued that ICM and Diversified had no cause of action against it under the ELCRA because it was not a ‘public accommodation.’ Ultimately, the Oakland County Circuit Court denied ICM’s motion for summary disposition, and the Wayne County Circuit Court denied both Dairyland’s and the MCCA’s motions for summary disposition in both ICM’s and Diversified’s lawsuits.

The Court of Appeals consolidated the various appeals arising out of the aforementioned rulings by the two trial courts. First, the Court of Appeals held that the Wayne County Circuit Court was correct to deny Dairyland’s motions for summary disposition, and that the Oakland County Circuit Court erred by denying ICM’s motion for summary disposition. The Court agreed with ICM’s contention that “the relevant question was not whether there was another pending action involving Mews’s claims, but rather which case between the parties was first to be filed.” In this case, it was undisputed that the Wayne County case was filed before Dairyland amended its complaint to add ICM as a defendant in the Oakland County case. The Wayne County case prevailed, in other words, irrespective of the fact that Dairyland filed its suit, dealing with the same claim and issues, first.

“Although the Oakland Circuit case was filed before the ICM Wayne Circuit case, ICM did not become a party to the Oakland Circuit case until after the ICM Wayne Circuit case was filed. The fact that ICM was central to Dairyland’s request for declaratory relief in the Oakland Circuit case, participated extensively in discovery, and would be affected by the outcome, does not make it a ‘party’ to the original action as that term is used in the court rule. MCR 2.116(C)(6) does not merely require that a prior pending action exists involving the same claims; it unambiguously requires that ‘another action has been initiated between the same parties involving the same claim.’ (Emphasis added). There was no pending case between ICM and Dairyland at the time that the ICM Wayne Circuit case was filed. And there is no dispute that both cases would require adjudication of the same issues.”

In the alternative to its motion for summary disposition in the Wayne County cases, Dairyland had requested a change of venue to Oakland County, which the trial court also denied. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Dairyland’s request because it was predicated only on the fact that the Oakland County case was already pending—not on the relevant factors for changing venue like whether “it would be inconvenient and burdensome to duplicate the significant discovery and extensive motion practice . . . that ha[d] already occurred in the Oakland Circuit case.”

“In this case, Dairyland claims that it would be inconvenient and burdensome to duplicate the significant discovery and extensive motion practice in the Wayne Circuit cases that has already occurred in the Oakland Circuit case. Dairyland, however, did not raise this argument in the trial court; it simply argued that a pending case already existed, which justified the change of venue. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that Dairyland failed to meet its burden of making a persuasive showing of inconvenience or prejudice. Because the Wayne Circuit cases will consider Mews’s entitlement to PIP benefits from August 1, 2021, forward, any additional discovery will not be duplicative of that already conducted in the Oakland Circuit case that addressed benefits incurred up to July 31, 2021. Moreover, because we conclude that ICM is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) in the Oakland Circuit case, there will be no dual track litigation. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dairyland’s to transfer venue in the Wayne Circuit cases.”

The Court of Appeals then turned to ICM’s and Diversified’s claims against the MCCA, holding that the trial court erred in denying the MCCA’s motions for summary disposition because the ELCRA does not, in fact, apply to the MCCA. In order to state a claim under the ELCRA, “ a plaintiff must establish ‘(1) discrimination based on a protected characteristic (2) by a person, (3) resulting in the denial of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations (4) of a place of public accommodation.’ ” The Court concluded that the ELCRA claims against the MCCA failed because the MCCA did not fit within ELCRA’s definition of “public accommodation”. The Court reasoned that even though the MCCA’s , mission to reimburse insurers may have an incidental public benefits, the MCCA’s primary purpose was not to serve a public benefit. Rather, the Court explained that based on Supreme Court precedent, the MCCA is deemed to serve a private benefit, as opposed to a public one.

“The MCCA is an unincorporated, nonprofit association, the purpose of which is to reimburse or indemnify member insurers for PIP losses they incur in excess of “catastrophic” levels. MCL 500.3104(1) and (2). The primary purpose in creating the MCCA was to “protect smaller insurers from the potentially severe financial repercussions of the no-fault act.” League Gen Ins Co, 435 Mich at 350. In view of this purpose, the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the MCCA is a state agency with a public function; rather, the Court has deemed the MCCA to serve a private benefit, as opposed to a public one. Id. at 350-351.

Given that the MCCA is an association of member insurers that serves a private benefit, it cannot be said the MCCA fits within the definition of ‘public accommodation’ under the ELCRA. Indeed, by definition, the MCCA does not provide or make available services or privileges to members of the public; rather, it solely provides reimbursement to member insurers for catastrophic claims. That the MCCA’s mission may have an incidental public benefit does not bring it within the definition of ‘public accommodation’ for purposes of the ELCRA. Accordingly, we conclude that ICM and Diversified failed to state a claim that the MCCA violated the ELCRA and thus the trial court erred by denying the MCCA’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).”

Decision year: 2023