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Rossmann v Titan Insurance Company, et al; (COA-UNP, 05/15/12; RB #3259)

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Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #302720; Unpublished
Judges Murphy, Stephens, and Riordan; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation:  Not applicable; Link to Opinioncourthouse image


STATUTORY INDEXING:    

Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]   
Exception to General Priority  for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]

TOPICAL INDEXING:    
Not applicable


In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Order granting summary disposition in favor of third-party defendant Bristol West Insurance Company on the issue of whether defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) was the insurer of highest priority under MCL 500.3115 for the payment of no-fault benefits arising out of the injuries the plaintiff, Ian Rossmann, sustained when he was struck by a motor vehicle while walking as a pedestrian.  Notably, Mr. Rossman did not have his own automobile insurance at the time of the accident.  Therefore, the priority issue was dependent on whether for purposes of MCL 500.3114(1) and MCL 500.3115(1), Mr. Rossmann was domiciled at his father’s house who was insured under an insurance policy issued by Bristol West Insurance Company.  The trial court determined Mr. Rossmann was not domiciled at his father’s house at the time of the accident.  However, the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that Mr. Rossmann was domiciled at his father’s house, because, even though Mr. Rossman stayed at his father’s house sporadically leading up to the accident, he used his father’s address as his mailing address, he maintained some of his possessions in his father’s house, he used his father’s address on his driver’s license and other documents, and that an area in the basement of the father’s house was available for Mr. Rossmann’s use, which Mr. Rossmann’s father described as “pretty much an apartment” for Mr. Rossmann. 

As further explained in the Court’s Opinion, there are complicated facts regarding Mr. Rossmann’s living situation at the time of the accident, which occurred on January 20, 2009.  In summary, Mr. Rossmann grew up in his father’s house and in the few years prior to the accident, he continued to sporadically live at his father’s house.  When he was not living in his father’s house, he was either living a transient/homeless lifestyle, living with friends, or serving jail time, and, at the time of the accident, he was living at a place called Leonard House, which was described as a transitional housing facility for drug rehabilitation.  Despite that Mr. Rossmann was only staying at his father’s house on a sporadic basis, he continued to use his father’s address on his driver’s license, his voter registration card, his general mailing address, his jailings, his bills, etc.  Furthermore, through the date of the accident, Mr. Rossmann maintained various possessions at his father’s house and he was always welcome to stay at his house when wanted.

The trial court ultimately concluded that at the time of the accident, Mr. Rossmann did not have a true place of domicile.  Rather, he was living at Leonard House but did not intend to stay there for purposes establishing domicile. Therefore, the trial court concluded that as the Assigned Claims insurer, ACIA was responsible to provide no-fault benefits to Mr. Rossmann. 

In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals first acknowledged that under the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in People v Dowdy, 489 Mich 373 (2011), every person must have a domicile.  The Court of Appeals then openly questioned whether the phrase in MCL 500.3114(1) of No-Fault Act, “domiciled in the same household,” requires a court to make a finding of a domicile at one place or another consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dowdy.  However, the court ultimately held that regardless of whether it was compelled to determine a domicile for Mr. Rossmann, the court was able to determine that his father’s house was his place of domicile, given the various facts regarding Mr. Rossmann’s connection to and usage of his father’s house.  In this regard, the court stated:

“We find it unnecessary to resolve whether Dowdy or [Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228 (1897)] have any application here, where, under a straightforward analysis of the traditional factors recited in [Fowler v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 254 Mich App 362 (2002)], we find that Rossmann was domiciled in his father’s household. In other words, assuming that a domicile need not be identified, we nonetheless hold that Rossmann’s domicile was his father’s house. A person may be considered domiciled in a household even though he or she is “not actually living in the . . . household.” [Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983)]. Examining the various factors, there was evidence that Rossmann used his father’s address as his mailing address, that Rossmann maintained some possessions in his father’s house, that Rossmann used his father’s address on Rossmann’s driver’s license and other documents, and that an area in the basement of the house was available for Rossmann’s use, which area the elder Rossmann described as “pretty much an apartment.” Fowler, 254 Mich App at 364-365. Although Rossmann moved around quite often and did not view his father’s home as a permanent abode, the fact is that his father’s house remained the one constant in his life and his father’s house is where Rossmann returned to repeatedly through his young troubled life. We note that, with respect to the factor touching on a person’s intent to remain “indefinitely” in a household, it should not be given too much weight as to children, especially young adults, where most children do not intend to reside indefinitely with their parents. We acknowledge that not all the factors support Auto Club’s position, e.g., Rossmann’s father provided no financial support, but overall the factors support a conclusion that Rossmann’s domicile at the time of the accident was his father’s house.”

The court then discussed the Court of Appeals decision in Dobson v Maki, 184 Mich App 244 (1999), a case of similar facts regarding the domicile of a transient adult son.  The court ultimately concluded that based upon Dobson and the other case law regarding the domicile factors under the No-Fault Act, Mr. Rossmann was domiciled at his father’s house at the time of the accident and, therefore, Defendant Bristol West was responsible for providing no-fault insurance benefits to Mr. Rossmann. 

Decision year: 2012