Injured? Contact Sinas Dramis for a free consultation.

Baker v Automobile Club of Michigan, et al (COA-UNP, 03/06/12; RB #3246)

Print this case summary (opens in a new tab)

Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #295812 and #296340; Unpublished
Judges Shapiro, Wilder, and Murray; 2-1 (Judge Shapiro concurring in part and dissenting in part); Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation:  Not applicable; Link to Opinioncourthouse graphic Link to Opinioncourthouse graphic


STATUTORY INDEXING:                
Requirement that Benefits Were Overdue

TOPICAL INDEXING:               
Collateral Estoppel


In these two consolidated appeals, in an unpublished 2-1 per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order denying Automobile Club of Michigan’s (AAA) motion for summary disposition on the issue of whether the findings in the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation lawsuit collaterally estopped the plaintiff from arguing that his condition arose from the subject motor vehicle accident for purposes of his claims for no-fault benefits.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Order that AAA was liable for plaintiff’s attorney fees under MCL 500.3148.

The injured person in this case, David Baker, suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident that occurred while he was in the scope of his employment.  Mr. Baker’s injuries included a serious head injury that resulted in a serious psychological condition that caused Mr. Baker to engage in self-destructive behavior, including cutting and burning himself, and an attempted suicide.  As a result of this condition, Mr. Baker required inpatient residential treatment and care.

On behalf of Mr. Baker, a lawsuit was filed against Auto-Owners Insurance Company, the insurer responsible to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage to Mr. Baker.  Another lawsuit was also filed on behalf of Mr. Baker against AAA to recover no-fault benefits for Mr. Baker’s care and treatment needs.  Apparently, in both lawsuits, the payment of Mr. Baker’s residential care was at issue.

In the no-fault case, AAA argued that Mr. Baker was collaterally estopped from arguing that residential treatment was sufficiently related to his motor vehicle accident injuries, because the workers’ compensation magistrate determined in the workers’ compensation case that the treatment was not sufficiently related to his injuries under the Workers’ Compensation Act, MCL 418.101, et seq.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Order denying AAA’s motion for summary disposition on the basis there is a different causation standard that applies under the Workers’ Compensation Act than the causation standard that applies under the Michigan No-Fault Act.  Specifically, MCL 418.301 states there is coverage for mental disabilities, if those disabilities were “contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner.”  On the other hand, MCL 500.3105 of the No-Fault Act states that an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury “arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. . . .”  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court did not err in denying AAA’s motion for summary disposition based on collateral estoppel because the magistrate in the workers’ compensation proceeding did not find that Mr. Baker’s condition did not arise from the motor vehicle accident.  In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated:

“Here, the magistrate in the workers’ compensation proceeding never found that Baker’s condition did not arise from the car accident. Instead, the magistrate’s findings included:

 

I find that these [pre-existing psychological problems] combined to be the overwhelming significant cause and produce[d] the eventual mental state and conditions including plaintiff’s self-destructive behavior such as attempted suicide and cutting . . . .

 

I find that plaintiff did suffer a serious closed head injury, but that while it may have been the last straw or event which pushed plaintiff’s emotional/mental illness over the top, in comparison to the above noted [pre-existing issues], it was . . . not a significant contributing factor/cause of his ongoing mental state and mental illness. [Emphasis added.]

 

These findings do not foreclose a conclusion that plaintiff met the no-fault standard of causation.  Even though the accident may not have significantly contributed to his current condition, that does not preclude a finding that his condition did not merely arise from the accident. Thus, because this particular finding did not foreclose on finding that Baker’s condition also “arose from the car accident,” collateral estoppel was not applicable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying AAA Michigan’s motion for summary disposition based on collateral estoppel.”

The other issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees, pursuant to MCL 500.3145, as well as costs and expenses.  The issue with the trial court’s attorney fee award was that the court awarded attorney fees based on there being an unreasonable denial of Mr. Baker’s residential treatment.  However, for some unclear reason, when the case went to trial, the question of whether PIP benefits were overdue was submitted to the jury, but only in relation to work loss benefits.  The majority held that because plaintiff did not pursue any claim at trial that PIP benefits for Mr. Baker’s residential treatment were overdue, attorney fees were not recoverable under MCL 500.3148 with respect to the residential care expenses.

With respect to the trial court’s award of costs to the plaintiff, the majority held that it was improper for the trial court to award these costs because the plaintiff only sought these costs based on MCL 500.3148, which does not provide that costs are recoverable as part of an attorney fee award under this provision.  Notably, the plaintiff did not pursue costs under MCR 2.625, so the majority did not address whether costs should have been awarded on that basis.

In his partial concurrence and dissent, Judge Shapiro concurred with the majority’s denial of summary disposition on the issue of collateral estoppel and a remand for a determination of taxable costs.  However, Judge Shapiro dissented from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s decision to grant attorney fees under MCL 500.3148.  Judge Shapiro reasoned that neither the statute nor court rule provide that the issue of whether payments were overdue cannot be made post-verdict by the court where the fact finder has not been asked to make that determination.

Decision year: 2012