The Michigan No-Fault Act was adopted in 1973, and since then, there have been over 4000 Michigan appellate court opinions regarding the law. Sinas Dramis Law Firm has written case summaries regarding virtually all these opinions and continues to do so at the present time. The Michigan Auto No-Fault Law Digital Library is a compilation of all the case summaries from Sinas Dramis Law Firm. The case summaries are freely provided to further our goal of educating the public about the Michigan Auto No-Fault Law.
The Digital Library is fully searchable. Therefore, searching by case name or relevant terms is a good way to find the case summary and opinion. There is also an indexing system that allows you to find a case through a statutory index, topical index, alphabetical index, or chronological index.
To make it easy for the public to understand the latest developments in the law, the recent case summaries are listed below.
Recent Cases
Beaumont Health v Progressive Mich Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 6/29/2023; RB #4602)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Beaumont Health’s (“Beaumont”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”). Beaumont’s patient, Riley Holtslander, was involved in a motor vehicle accident while operating an uninsured motorcycle. The Court of Appeals held that Holtslander was a constructive owner of the motorcycle at the time of the accident under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), and thus barred from PIP benefits related to the accident pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b).
Root, et al v Palmer, et al (COA – UNP 6/29/2023; RB #4603)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Therese Root’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Falls Lake National Insurance Company (“Falls Lake”). The Court of Appeals held that Root committed a material misrepresentation on her original application for coverage, entitling Falls Lake to rescind the policy it issued to her.
Smith, et al v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 6/29/2023; RB #4604)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Wanda Smith’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the equities weighed in favor of rescinding the subject no-fault policy with respect to Wanda Smith, an innocent third-party thereunder.
Flint Region ASC, LLC, et al v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 6/22/2023; RB #4600)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Flint Region ASC, LLC and Michigan Clinic Neurosurgery, PLLC’s (“the plaintiffs”) claim for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the patient at issue, Kennies Bush, required surgery as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2017—at which time he was insured by Progressive—and not solely as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2018—at which time he was insured by Everest National Insurance Company (“Everest”).
Wallace, et al v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – PUB 6/22/2023; RB #4601)
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Parie Wallace’s action for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held (1) that at the time Wallace filed her action, she was not the real party in interest with respect to claims she had assigned to her medical providers, and (2) that Wallace and her providers’ attempts to mutually revoke the assignments after Wallace filed suit—which they did because the providers could no longer pursue the claims, themselves, due to the one-year-back rule—did not reinvest Wallace with the right to pursue those claims in her existing suit.
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, et al v Sentry Cas Co, et al (COA – PUB 6/22/2023; RB #4599)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Gleicher, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s (“ACE”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Frankmuth”) action for declaratory judgment regarding priority. The Court of Appeals held that a commercial truck, primarily registered outside of Michigan but with apportioned registration in other states—including Michigan—through the International Relations Plan (“IRP”), is not “registered” in Michigan for purposes of MCL 500.3114(3), and is not required to be covered by Michigan no-fault insurance if it is operated in Michigan for less than 30 days in any calendar year.
Mathis v DeHayes, et al (COA – UNP 6/15/2023; RB #4598)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motion for summary disposition, in which Allstate sought dismissal of Plaintiff Justin Mathis’s action for underinsured (“UIM”) motorist coverage under his automobile insurance policy. The Court of Appeals held that Mathis was barred from pursuing UIM coverage under his policy because he failed to comply with the policy’s requirement that he obtain consent from Allstate before settling with the owner of the vehicle that caused the subject motor vehicle collision.
Brockway-Guidry v Auto Club Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 6/15/2023; RB #4596)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Thalia Ann Brockway-Guidry’s action for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that Progressive was not in the order of priority for payment of Brockway-Guidry’s PIP benefits, and that, despite reimbursing Auto Club for half the amount Auto Club initially paid in PIP benefits to Brockway-Guidry, Progressive made no enforceable promise to Defendant Auto Club Group Insurance Company (“Auto Club”) that it would pay half of Brockway-Guidry’s PIP benefits in perpetuity.
Estate of Harris v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (COA – UNP 6/15/2023; RB #4597)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Terry Harris’s automobile negligence action. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding—following a Daubert hearing—that Harris’s treating doctor’s testimony was based on sufficient facts and data for purposes of MRE 702. The Court further held that a question of fact existed as to whether Harris’s injuries were caused by the subject motor vehicle crash.
Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 6/15/2023; RB #4595)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), which filed an equitable subrogation against Defendant Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Esurance”). The Court of Appeals held that a balancing of the equities under Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390 (2018) weighed in favor of rescinding the subject Esurance no-fault policy with respect to Daniel Moore—a bicyclist who was injured when a motor vehicle insured by Esurance crashed into him, who subsequently applied for PIP benefits through the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”) and had his claim assigned to Nationwide.
Edison v Allied Gen Ins Co of America, et al (COA – UNP 6/15/2023; RB #4594)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Felicia Edison’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Nationwide General Insurance Company (“Nationwide”). Approximately one and a half months after Edison was injured in a motor vehicle accident, she developed atrial fibrillation unrelated to the accident. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Edison’s work loss and need for replacement services following her diagnosis of atrial fibriliation were attributable to the injuries she sustained in the accident, or whether they were attributable to her atrial fibrillation—in other words, whether Edison’s atrial fibrillation was an “independent superseding disability that extinguished her eligibility for PIP benefits” pursuant to MacDonald v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 419 Mich 146 (1984).
Wolverine Mut Ins Co v Van Dyken, et al (COA – UNP 6/8/2023; RB #4593)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Wolverine Mutual Insurance Company (“Wolverine”), in Wolverine’s action seeking a declaratory judgment confirming the rescission of a policy it issued to Mathew Van Dyken. The Court of Appeals held, first, that Wolverine was entitled to rescind Van Dyken’s policy based on a material misrepresentation Van Dyken made on his original application for coverage. The Court of Appeals held, second, that it was not appropriate to consider whether Wolverine’s decision to rescind Van Dyken’s policy was consistent with Wolverine’s internal underwriting rules. The Court of Appeals held, third, that Van Dyken’s medical providers were not “innocent third parties” to the rescinded contract, such as would require a balancing of the equities in order to determine whether the rescission extended to them.
Ong v Lewis (COA – UNP 6/8/2023; RB #4592)
In this 2-1, unpublished, per curiam decision (Patel, concurring in part, dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Kevin Ong’s automobile negligence action, brought under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals held, first, that Ong’s actions were the proximate cause of a crash that occurred when a SMART bus, driven by Cheryl Lewis, crashed into a bucket Ong was standing in and operating, which extended out from a municipal bucket truck and, at the time of the crash, was situated above the SMART bus’s lane of traffic. The Court of Appeals held, second, that Lewis did not have a heightened duty to notice the bucket when there was no evidence to establish that it was perceivable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals held, third, that Lewis did not commit negligence prior to the crash as a matter of law. And the Court of Appeals held, fourth, that Ong was more than 50% at fault for the crash as a matter of law.
Spectrum Health Hospitals, et al v Farmers Ins Exch (COA – UNP 6/8/2023; RB #4591)
In this 2-1, unpublished, per curiam decision (Markey, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Spectrum Health Hospitals’ (“Spectrum”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Spectrum’s patient, Linda Lockett (deceased), was a constructive owner of the uninsured motor vehicle she was operating at the time of the subject one-vehicle accident.
True Care Physical Therapy, PLLC v Auto Club Group Ins Co (COA – PUB 5/25/2023; RB #4587)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Hood, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto Club Group Insurance Company’s (“Auto Club”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff True Care Physical Therapy, PLLC’s (“True Care”) action for no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that when an insurer bases a refusal to pay PIP benefits on a utilization review, the affected provider is not required to appeal the utilization review to the Department of Insurance and Financial Services (“DIFS”) before filing a direct cause of action against the insurer.
Stanley, et al v City of Detroit, et al (COA – PUB 5/25/2023; RB #4590)
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s orders denying both Defendant National Interstate Insurance Company of Hawaii’s (“National”) and Defendant Executive Car Rental, Inc.’s (“Executive”) motions for summary disposition, in which they sought dismissal of Sheronda Stanley’s no-fault claims against them. The Court of Appeals held, first, that because Executive was a rental car company and not an insurer, it could not be liable for Stanley’s PIP benefits even if it failed to disclose information to Stanley regarding the availability of insurance coverage until more than one-year after the subject motor vehicle accident involving its rental car. The Court of Appeals held, second, that Stanley could not obtain PIP benefits from either National—Executive’s insurer and the highest priority insurer with respect to Stanley’s claim—or Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”)—the lower priority insurer which was assigned Stanley’s claim by the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”). With respect to National, the Court held that Stanley’s claims were barred by the one-year-notice and one-year-back rules in MCL 500.3145(1); with respect to Farmers, the Court held that the only way in which Stanley would be entitled to PIP benefits from an assigned claims insurer would be if the highest priority insurer (National) could not be “identified” for purposes of MCL 500.3172(1). In this case, the Court determined that National could have been identified by Stanley had she exercised the due diligence required of her under Griffin v Trumbull Ins Co, 334 Mich App 1 (2020).
DLT II v Allstate Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 5/25/2023; RB #4589)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Feeney, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff Danny W. Thomason’s motion to compel compliance with a consent judgment that he entered into with Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) in 2012. The Court of Appeals held that under Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022), Allstate could not apply the reimbursement limitations set forth in MCL 500.3157 to Thomason’s claim for PIP benefits, which arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 1995.
Allstate Ins Co v Johnson (COA – UNP 5/25/2023; RB #4588)
In this 2-1, unpublished, per curiam decision (O’Brien, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), in Allstate’s subrogation action against Defendant Dominique Jamia Johnson. The Court of Appeals held, first, that a question of fact existed as to whether Johnson’s uninsured vehicle had been unlawfully taken—that is, without her permission—by her boyfriend’s father, Melvin Jackson, prior to the subject motor vehicle accident. The Court of Appeals held, second, that since a question of fact existed as to whether Melvin Jackson was barred from PIP benefits by MCL 500.3113(a), a question of fact also existed as to whether Allstate was an “insurer obligated to pay personal protection insurance benefits [to Jackson]” for purposes of MCL 500.3177(1). The Court held, third, that the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s motion to amend her answer to assert that her vehicle was not required to be insured pursuant to MCL 500.3101(1).
Laskos v Maples, et al (COA – UNP 5/25/2023; RB #4586)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Charter Township of Plymouth’s (“Plymouth Township” or “the Township”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Austin Laskos’s automobile negligence action brought under the “motor vehicle exception” to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The Court of Appeals held, first, that a question of fact existed as to whether Jeffery Mark Maples, a police officer for Plymouth Township, acted negligently when his police cruiser crashed into Laskos, a bicyclist. The Court held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Laskos’s injuries were caused by the collision with Maples’s police cruiser or were entirely pre-existing. The Court held, third, that a question of fact existed as to whether Laskos’s alleged impairments satisfied the first and third prongs of the test for “serious impairment of body function” under MCL 500.3135 and McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).
Spectrum Health Hospitals, et al v Citizens Ins Co of America, et al (COA – UNP 5/18/2023; RB #4585)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Spectrum Health Hospitals’ (“Spectrum”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of America (“Citizens”). The Court of Appeals held, first, that a question of fact existed as to whether injuries sustained by Spectrum’s patient, Timothy Wolf, arose out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2018, or whether Wolf’s injuries arose out of one of two work-related incidents that occurred in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The Court of Appeals held, second, that Citizens could not refuse to pay Wolf’s PIP benefits simply because Wolf failed to use reasonable efforts to obtain workers’ compensation benefits.
Mutry v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, et al (COA – UNP 5/18/2023; RB #4584)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Theodore Mutry’s action against Defendant, the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Theodore Mutry was a constructive owner of the uninsured vehicle in question, such as would bar him from receiving PIP benefits by way of the MAIPF pursuant to MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), MCL 500.3113(b), and MCL 500.3173.
Djeljaj v American Alternative Ins Corp (COA – UNP 5/18/2023; RB #4583)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Brain & Spine Surgery Center’s (“Michigan Brain & Spine”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant American Alternative Insurance Corporation (“American Alternative”). The Court of Appeals held that Michigan Brain & Spine’s patient, Djerdj Djeljaj, was entitled to PIP benefits for the injuries he sustained when paramedics dropped his stretcher while trying to load him into the back of an ambulance. The stretcher constituted “property being lifted onto the vehicle in the loading or unloading process” for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1)(b)—an exception to the No-Fault Act’s “parked vehicle exclusion.”
Michigan Brain & Spine Surgery Center v American Alternative Ins Corp (COA – UNP 5/18/2023; RB #4582)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Michigan Brain & Spine Surgery Center’s (“Michigan Brain & Spine”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant American Alternative Insurance Corporation (“American Alternative”). The Court of Appeals held that Michigan Brain & Spine’s patient, Djerdj Djeljaj, was entitled to PIP benefits for the injuries he sustained when paramedics dropped his stretcher while trying to load him into the back of an ambulance. The stretcher constituted “property being lifted onto the vehicle in the loading or unloading process” for purposes of MCL 500.3105(1)(b)—an exception to the No-Fault Act’s “parked vehicle exclusion.”
Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich v TheraSupport Behavioral Health & Wellness, et al (COA – UNP 5/11/2023; RB #4580)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Defendant TheraSupport Behavioral Health & Wellness (“TheraSupport”). Plaintiff Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the fee schedule included in the 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act—MCL 500.3157(7), specifically—applied to the no-fault claim of TheraSupport’s patient, Roger Taliaferro, who was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle collision in 1988. TheraSupport moved emergently for a preliminary injunction following the Court of Appeals’ decision in Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022), asking the trial court to order that Farm Bureau continue paying its charges related to Taliaferro’s treatment without regard for the fee schedule. The trial court granted TheraSupport’s motion without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals held that any procedural error by the trial court in doing so was harmless given that the dispositive issue was squarely decided by the Court of Appeals in Andary, and given that the trial court already knew Farm Bureau’s position on that issue full well, it having been fully articulated in Farm Bureau’s complaint.
Harris v Allstate Fire and Cas Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 5/18/2023; RB #4581)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Tawanda Harris’s automobile negligence action against Defendant Arnold Alson. The Court of Appeals held that Harris presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact regarding all three prongs of the test for “serious impairment of body function” set forth in MCL 500.3135 and McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).
Alexander v Kubacki, et al (COA – UNP 5/4/2023; RB #4579)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Matthew Alan Kubacki’s motion for summary disposition, in which he sought dismissal of Plaintiff Shavon Alexander’s automobile negligence action. The Court of Appeals held that Alexander—an Ohio resident who commuted to Michigan for work five days per week in a vehicle that was registered in Georgia and owned by her stepfather, a Georgia resident—was not required to register her vehicle in Michigan for purposes of MCL 500.3101(1), and therefore not barred by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) from pursuing her tort claim for noneconomic loss against Kubacki.
Alshammam v Home-Owners Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4578)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Ahmed Alshammam’s action for no-fault PIP benefits and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage against Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Alshammam’s action as a sanction for failing to comply with its prior order that he attend Home-Owners’ defense medical examinations (“DMEs”).
Cyrus v Lauer, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4575)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Javell Cyrus’s action for no-fault PIP benefits arising out of injuries she sustained while operating a rental car her grandfather rented. The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Cyrus was disqualified under the unlawfully taken provision set forth MCL 500.3113(a) because she operated the rental car without authority from the rental car company. In this regard, the Court of Appeals found that Cyrus took the vehicle without authority because she knew she was not an added driver to the car rental agreement, and because she did not have a driver’s license, which the rental car company required to authorize a person to drive one of its vehicles.
Almaswari v Great American Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4577)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Mary Lychuk’s motion for summary disposition, in which she sought dismissal of Plaintiff Fuad Almaswari’s automobile negligence action. The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Almaswari—who rear-ended Lychuk’s vehicle on the highway—was more than 50% at-fault for the collision.
Willis Jr. v Farmers Ins Exch, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4576)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Arthur Willis Jr.’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmer”) as a sanction against Willis Jr. For failing to attend a defense medical examinations (“DME”). The Court of Appeals held that the factors set forth in Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501 (1995)—factors for determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction in a no-fault case—did not weigh in favor of dismissal in this case.
Cyars-Williams v Skender, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4573)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Angell Cyars-Williams following a jury trial in her automobile negligence action against Defendants Thomas Skender and the City of Detroit. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court’s decision to allow Cyars-Williams’s husband to testify regarding the contents of the UD-10 for the subject motor vehicle crash was harmless error because the defendants failed to show that the contents of the UD-10—and not other admissible evidence—influenced the jury’s damages calculation. The Court of Appeals held, second, that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the issue of whether Cyars-Williams’s mild traumatic brain injury constituted a serious impairment of body function, because Cyars-Williams presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to all three prongs of the statutory test for a serious impairment of body function.
Mapp v Progressive Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 4/27/2023; RB #4574)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Feeney, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of both Defendant Progressive Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition and Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Farm Bureau”) motion for summary disposition, both of which argued that the other insurer was higher in priority for payment of Plaintiff Delisa Mapp’s no-fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the language of the subject Progressive policy could and did offer broader coverage than what is mandated by the No-Fault Act: specifically, the Court held that the policy extended PIP coverage to “resident relatives” of named insureds, not merely “domiciled relatives,” as is required by statute. The Court of Appeals held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Mapp’s daughter, the named insured on the subject Progressive policy, was, in fact, a “resident” in the same household as Mapp at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident.
Johnson, et al v Falls lake Nat’l Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 4/27/2023; RB #4572)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Hood, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Great Lakes Pain & Injury Chiropractic Center (“Great Lakes”), Live Well Health, LLC (“Live Well”), and Red Wing Medical Transportation, LLC’s (“Red Wings”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Falls Lake National Insurance Company (“Falls Lake”). The Court of Appeals held, first, that Great Lakes, Live Well, and Red Wings’ intervening complaint would not relate back to the filing date of Vivian Johnson’s (the providers’ patient/assignee) complaint against Falls Lake. The Court of Appeals then held that although the post-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 applied to this case—because the providers obtained their respective assignments after the effective date of the 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act, June 11, 2019—their claims were barred because they failed to file within one year of the date Falls Lake formally denied coverage.
Spine Specialists of Mich, PC v Esurance Prop and Cas Ins Co (COA – UNP 4/20/2023; RB #4571)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC’s (“Spine Specialists”) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The Court of Appeals held that Spine Specialists’ complaint was timely filed because it was filed within one year of the date Esurance formally denied the claims at issue.
Fisher v Calcote, et al (COA – UNP 4/13/2023; RB #4570)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Erica Fisher’s automobile negligence action against Defendants Chakira Lekeish Calcote and Mark Calcote. After Fisher was rear-ended by Chakira Calcote, the Calcotes’ automobile insurer, Progressive, called Fisher to purportedly negotiate a settlement of any bodily injury claims Fisher might have arising out of the accident. After the call, Progressive mailed Fisher a $1,500 check—which Fisher later cashed—accompanied by a document titled, “Advice of Payment[,]” which stated that the $1,500 payment constituted a full and final settlement of Fisher’s claims against the Calcotes. Given the language in the “Advice of Payment” document, the Court of Appeals held that the $1,500 payment constituted an accord and satisfaction of Fisher’s bodily injury liability claim(s) against the Calcotes, thereby barring Fisher from proceeding with the automobile negligence action.
Lofton v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 4/13/2023; RB #4568)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary disposition, in which State Farm sought dismissal of Plaintiff Shakhary Lofton’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that Lofton—whose No-Fault coverage was coordinated with respect to medical expenses—could not pursue balance bills from two of his providers, because (1) the providers were not allowed to balance bill Lofton under their agreements with his health insurer, and thus Lofton did “incur” the charges which comprised the balances, and (2) because Plaintiff did not comply with the procedural requirements of his health insurance policy—i.e., that which required him to receive pre-approval or a referral before receiving various specific treatments—State Farm, as the secondary payor of Plaintiff’s medical expenses, was not required to pay for those treatments pursuant to Tousignant v Allstate Ins Co, 444 Mich 301 (1993). The Court of Appeals also held that State Farm was not required to pay for the charges Lofton incurred for various prescriptions, because there was no evidence that Lofton or his pharmacists billed Lofton’s health insurer before seeking payment from State Farm. Thus, Lofton failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain reimbursement for those prescriptions from his health insurance before seeking reimbursement from State Farm, as is required.
Robinson v Szczotka, et al (COA – UNP 4/6/2023; RB #4566)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Tiffany Shantel Robinson’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits that she assigned to her providers before filing suit. The Court of Appeals held that Robinson was not the real party in interest with respect to the assigned benefits at the time she filed suit, and that her suit failed as a result. The Court also held that mutual revocations of the assignments—executed by Robinson and her providers, and which stated that the assignments were revoked nunc pro tunc—were effective only as of the date they were executed, and did not operate to retroactively reinvest Robinson with standing to pursue the subject benefits at the time she filed suit.
C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 4/6/2023; RB #4565)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Hood, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in which it dismissed Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that C-Spine was not bound by a judgment against its patient/assignor, Benjamin Moore, in Moore’s separate action against Progressive. That judgment resulted in Moore’s policy being rescinded and voided ab initio, which Progressive argued nullified the assignment C-Spine obtained from Moore, and therefore took this case outside the framework of Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, 509 Mich 276 (2022). The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that rescission is an equitable remedy and that “[t]he fact that the court in Moore’s case granted the equitable remedy of rescission does not affect C-Spine’s rights, because C-Spine was not involved in that case”—in other words, Mecosta still controlled in this case.
Paul, et al v Farm Bureau Ins Co of Mich (COA – UNP 4/6/2023; RB #4567)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in Plaintiffs Jerry Paul and Joanne Paul’s action for uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits against Defendant Farm Bureau Insurance Company of Michigan (“Farm Bureau”), in which the trial court refused to give the jury an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that, given the absence of any actual evidence that the unidentified driver who crashed into the Pauls actually encountered a sudden emergency, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court’s ruling that the Pauls were not entitled to penalty interest under the Uniform Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”), holding that the trial court erred in determining that UTPA penalty interest was unavailable to the Pauls solely because the Pauls failed to specifically cite to the relevant UTPA statute in their complaint.
C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Allstate Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4564)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Markey, concurring), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Relying on C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022) (“C-Spine I”), the Court of Appeals held that C-Spine could sue Allstate for PIP benefits it assigned to various factoring companies, and despite the fact that C-Spine did not obtain counter-assignments from the factoring companies—reinvesting C-Spine with the right to pursue the benefits in litigation against Allstate—until after filing suit. Under MCR 2.201(B)(1), ‘a person authorized by statute may sue in his or her own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought,’ and under MCL 500.3112, providers can assert direct causes of action against insurers. Thus, even though C-Spine filed suit before obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies, it could still sue Progressive for the assigned benefits in its own name, and without joining the factoring companies.
Shaw, et al v Nowakowski, et al (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4563)
In this 2-1, unpublished decision (Markey, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant The Auto Club Group’s (“Auto Club”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiffs Randall Shaw and Hillary Shaw’s action for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage against it. The Court of Appeals held that the driver who caused the subject motor vehicle accident—who had bodily injury liability coverage of up to $300,000—was operating an “underinsured vehicle” for purposes of the Shaws’ policy with Auto Club. The Auto Club policy provided for UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person/$500,000 per accident, and contained a typical exclusion from coverage if the limits of the tortfeasor’s policy exceeded the limits of UIM coverage. The Court held that the $500,000 “per accident” limit—not the $250,000 “per person” limit—was the relevant amount for determining whether the exclusion applied, because both Randall Shaw and Hillary Shaw were “insured persons” under the policy and were entitled to up to $500,000 for the accident. The Court of Appeals held, second, that based on the language of the Shaws’ policy, UIM coverage could not be reduced by any amount paid or payable by the liability insurer of the bar, Defendant Crispelli’s LLC (“Crispelli’s”), which served intoxicating liquor to the driver who caused the accident.
Robinson v Wolverine Mut Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4562)
In this 2-1, unpublished, decision (Swartzle, dissenting), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Benjamin Robinson’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Wolverine Mutual Insurance Company (“Wolverine”). After filing suit against Wolverine—the insurer of the vehicle Robinson was driving at the time of the subject accident—Robinson answered an interrogatory by stating that he had personal No-Fault insurance through AAA at the time of the accident. When Wolverine moved for summary disposition on the basis of Robinson’s answer and MCL 500.3114, Robinson filed an amended answer to the interrogatory and an affidavit claiming that his original answer was incorrect, and that he was not, in fact, insured through AAA at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that Robinson’s amended answer and affidavit should have been considered by the trial court in ruling on Wolverine’s motion, and that they created a question of fact precluding summary disposition.
AdvisaCare Healthcare Solutions, Inc v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/30/2023; RB #4561)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff AdvisaCare Healthcare Solutions, Inc.’s (“AdvisaCare”) motion to re-open its case against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The parties reached a settlement in AdvisaCare’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits, after which they executed a settlement agreement which explicitly provided that certain charges for medical equipment would be excluded from the settlement amount because Progressive had already agreed to pay them. The settlement agreement also said that any disputes regarding the terms of the agreement would remain within the trial court’s jurisdiction under the established case number. AdvisaCare later claimed that Progressive did not pay six of the equipment charges specified in the settlement agreement (Progressive presented evidence that it had, in fact, paid four of the charges), and thus the trial court granted AdvisaCare’s motion to have the case re-opened, and ordered Progressive to pay for all six equipment charges, as well as attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in reopening the case, but that it could not order Progressive to issue duplicate payments on the four charges it had already paid. The Court also vacated the trial court’s award of attorney fees, and remanded to the trial court to recalculate the amount in light of its holdings.
McLaughlin v Tavenner, et al (COA – UNP 3/23/2023; RB #4560)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff Marvel McLaughlin, after finding that Defendant Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”) unreasonably delayed in paying McLaughlin’s work loss benefits and allowable expense benefits, as well as a lien asserted by McLaughlin’s health insurer. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the trial court did not err in finding Allstate’s approximately 11-month delay in paying McLaughlin’s work loss benefits “unreasonable,” where Allstate never communicated to McLaughlin what additional information it needed to process her claim, or even that it did, apparently, need additional information to process her claim. The Court of Appeals held, second, that the trial court did not err in finding Allstate’s 12-month delay in paying a lien asserted by McLaughlin’s health insurer “unreasonable,” where Allstate conceded at a pretrial hearing more than year after receiving notice of the lien that it did not know why the lein had not been paid. The Court of Appeals held, third, that the trial court failed to conduct a ‘fact-specific inquiry’ before determining that Allstate unreasonably delayed in paying McLaughlin’s other medical expenses. And the Court of Appeals held, fourth, that the trial court failed to follow the proper process for determining attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1)—set forth in Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269 (2016)—before determining calculating the fee amount. Thus, the Court remanded to the trial court to conduct the aforementioned ‘fact-specific inquiry’ and to complete the Pirgu analysis before ordering an award.
Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc, et al v Progressive Mich Ins, et al (COA – UNP 3/16/2023; RB #4559)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc. (“Maple Manor Rehab Center”) and Maple Manor Neuro Center, Inc.’s (“Maple Manor Neuro Center”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the treatment at issue was provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center—a licensed health care provider—or Maple Manor Neuro Center—which was not a licensed health care provider and held itself out as merely the billing agent for Maple Manor Rehab Center. If provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center, the services would have been “lawfully rendered” for purposes of MCL 500.3157.
Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc, et al v Allstate Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 3/16/2023; RB #4558)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Maple Manor Rehab Center of Novi, Inc. (“Maple Manor Rehab Center”) and Maple Manor Neuro Center, Inc.’s (“Maple Manor Neuro Center”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether the treatment at issue was provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center—a licensed health care provider—or Maple Manor Neuro Center—which was not a licensed health care provider and held itself out as merely the billing agent for Maple Manor Rehab Center. If provided by Maple Manor Rehab Center, the services would have been “lawfully rendered” for purposes of MCL 500.3157.
Health Partners, Inc v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4557)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Health Partners, Inc.’s (“Health Partners”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against it. The claims at issue all accrued prior to June 11, 2019, and thus, in reliance on Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC v MemberSelect Ins Co ___ Mich App ___ (2023), the Court of Appeals held that the former version of MCL 500.3145 applied to this case, and that Health Partners’ claims were barred thereunder.
Reid v Progressive Mich Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4556)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition, in which Progressive sought dismissal of Plaintiff Krystyna Reid’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against it. The Court of Appeals held, first, that the pre-2019-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 applied to Reid’s claims for benefits related to services she received prior to June 11, 2019 (the amendment’s effective date), and that the post-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 (which introduced “formal denial” tolling) applied to Reid’s claims for benefits related to services she received after June 11, 2019. Therefore, Reid—who filed her lawsuit on November 4, 2020—was barred from recovery on her pre-June 11, 2019 claims by the former version of the one-year-back rule. The Court also held, however, that Reid was barred from recovery on her post-June 11, 2019 claims, as well, because the facts showed that she did not actually submit those claims until after filing her lawsuit, and thus could not avail herself of “formal denial” tolling.
Progressive Mich Ins Co v Centria Home Rehab, LLC (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4555)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Centria Home Rehabilitation’s (“Centria”) counterclaim against Plaintiff Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”), in which Centria sought the difference between what it billed for treatment rendered to Samantha Calhoun, and what Progressive paid for said treatment. Progressive argued that under McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402 (1994) and LaMothe v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 214 Mich App 577 (1995), Centria’s counterclaim had to be dismissed because “the proper method for challenging the reasonableness of an insurer’s payments to a healthcare provider is through a lawsuit brought by the provider against the insured.” The Court of Appeals held, however, that this case was actually controlled by the recent decision in Centria Home Rehab, LLC v Philadelphia Indemnity Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2023), in which it held that when there is a dispute between a provider and its patient’s insurer over the reasonableness of the provider’s charges, the provider does have standing to pursue the balance directly from the provider, especially if the provider is acting under an assignment, as was the case here.
Estate of Bell v Knapp, et al, et al (COA – UNP 3/9/2023; RB #4554)
In this 2-1, unpublished decision (Kelly, dissenting), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Jeffrey Knapp’s motion for summary disposition, in which Knapp sought dismissal of Plaintiff Estate of Omari Bell’s (“the Estate”) wrongful death action against him. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Knapp was negligent in running over Bell, a pedestrian. Knapp testified that he did not see Bell walking on the freeway before crashing into him, but the Court noted that his testimony was subject to a credibility determination by the jury, especially considering two other motorists did observe Bell walking in the freeway and called 9-1-1 before Knapp crashed into him.
Kovach v Citizens Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 3/2/2023; RB #4552)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Kenneth Kovach’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Citizens Insurance Company (“Citizens”). Applying McPherson v McPherson, 493 Mich 294 (2013) to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals held that Kovach was not entitled to PIP benefits for the treatment of a subdural hematoma he developed after a fall. The fall was caused by vertigo Kovach developed after suffering a concussion in a motor vehicle accident, but under McPherson, the Court held that the relationship between the hematoma and the motor vehicle accident was too attenuated for Kovach to be entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3105(1).
Ridenour v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 3/2/2023; RB #4551)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision (Shapiro, concurring), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Zachary Ridenour’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held, first, that although Ridenour was listed as an “additional driver” on his friend, Floyd Layport’s policy with Progressive, Progressive was neither Ridenour’s insurer, nor in the order of priority for payment of Ridenour’s PIP benefits related to the accident. The Court of Appeals held, second, that Progressive was not precluded from raising its priority defense by the “mend-the-hold” doctrine, which Ridenour argued applied because Progressive originally denied his claim based on fraud. The Court of Appeals held, third, that the trial court did not err in denying Ridenour’s motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for promissory estoppel, because Ridenour failed to identify any promise Progressive made to him regarding PIP coverage when it added him as an “additional driver” to Layport’s policy.
Centria Home Rehab, LLC v Philadelphia Indemnity Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 3/2/2023; RB #4550)
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Centria Home Rehabilitation, LLC’s (“Centria”) action for unpaid No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”). Centria provided treatment to Nicholas Randall—Philadelphia’s insured—but Philadelphia paid only a fraction of Centria’s charges. Centria obtained an assignment from Randall and filed suit over the unpaid balance, but Philadelphia moved for summary disposition, invoking McGill v Auto Ass’n of Mich, 207 Mich App 402 (1995) and LaMothe v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 214 Mich App 577 (1996). Philadelphia argued that because it had an obligation to defend and indemnify Randall if Centria ever sued him over his unpaid balance, Randall (or his assignee, standing in his shoes) had not suffered any injury as a result of Philadelphia’s refusal to pay Centria’s full charges, and therefore had no cause of action. The Court of Appeals disagreed, distinguishing McGill and LaMothe based on (1) the fact that those cases did not involve assignments and (2) the fact that in neither of those cases did the healthcare providers, themselves, actually take issue with the partial payments. The Court of Appeals also noted that “the implications of a ruling in defendant’s favor are fraught with peril and uncertainty,” and that to agree with defendant’s position “would be contrary to the purpose of the no-fault act, which is to ‘provid[e] assured, adequate, and prompt recovery for economic loss arising from motor vehicle accidents.’ ” Thus, the Court held that in cases such as this, insureds or their assignee providers can pursue unpaid balances from insurers in litigation, which is vastly preferable to providers suing their patients to settle “reasonable charge” disputes.
Advance Therapy & Rehab Inc v Auto-Owners Ins Co (COA – PUB 3/2/2023; RB #4549)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Swartzle, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Auto-Owners”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Advance Therapy & Rehab Inc’s (“Advance Therapy”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits. The Court of Appeals held that under the “excess medical” provision in Andre Yglesias’s coordinated No-Fault policy, Auto-Owners had to pay for the treatment he received from Advance Therapy—an out-of-network provider which, although covered under Yglesias’s preferred provider organization (“PPO”) health insurance plan, was more expensive to Yglesias than in-network treatment.
Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 2/21/2023; RB #4547)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan’s (“Farm Bureau”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought a declaration from the trial court that Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was the highest priority insurer with respect to David Munger’s claim for No-Fault PIP benefits. After evaluating the factors for determining a No-Fault claimant’s domicile at the time of a motor vehicle accident, set forth in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Munger was domiciled with his parents—State Farm’s insureds—or his girlfriend’s grandparents—Farm Bureau’s insureds—at the time of the subject accident.
Buller v Titan Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 2/21/2023; RB #4548)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting Plaintiff Brandon Buller a preliminary injunction against Defendant Titan Insurance Company (“Titan”), preventing Titan from applying the new No-Fault fee schedule to Buller’s claim for PIP benefits—which arose out of a motor vehicle accident in 1994—during the pendency of the case. Considering its recent decision in Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding a preliminary injunction against Titan, ordering that, for the remainder of litigation, Titan continue paying for Buller’s care at the rate the parties agreed upon prior to the 2019 amendments to the No-Fault Act.
Johnson v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, et al (COA – UNP 2/16/2023; RB #4546)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Samone Johnson’s auto negligence action. The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Ronald Pressley—the driver of the SMART bus Johnson was traveling on—was negligent in rear-ending a vehicle whose driver, Shane Webster, changed into Pressley’s lane, then slammed on his brakes to avoid rear-ending the vehicle in front of him.
C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (COA – UNP 2/9/2023; RB #4544)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC’s (“C-Spine”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). Relying on C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___ (2022) (“C-Spine I”), the Court of Appeals held that C-Spine could sue Progressive for PIP benefits it assigned to various factoring companies, even before (or without) obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies. Under MCR 2.201(B)(1), ‘a person authorized by statute may sue in his or her own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought,’ and under MCL 500.3112, providers can assert direct causes of action against insurers. Thus, even if C-Spine filed suit before obtaining counter-assignments from the factoring companies, it could still sue Progressive for the assigned benefits in its own name, without joining the factoring companies.
Farrar, et al v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp (COA – PUB 2/9/2023; RB #4543)
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation’s (“SMART”) motions for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Focus Imaging, LLC’s (“Focus”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits, as well as certain aspects of Plaintiff Marcel Farrar’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits.. The Court of Appeals held, first, that Focus Imaging, LLC (“Focus”)— Farrar’s treater/assignee, and an intervening plaintiff in Farrar’s action against SMART—could not rely on the filing date of Farrar’s action for purposes of the one-year-back rule under MCL 500.3145, reasoning that Focus Imaging was pursuing the same claims of plaintiff but as a different part, and, therefore, Focus’ complaint did not relate back to the filing date Farrar’s complaint The Court of Appeals held, second, that Farrar could not sue SMART for benefits he had assigned to various other providers because he was no longer the real party in interest with respect to those benefits.
Mauer v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co (COA – UNP 2/9/2023; RB #4545)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiff Beth Maurer, after a jury returned a verdict in her favor in her action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in finding that it was unreasonable for Farm Bureau to withhold Maurer’s PIP benefits. Farm Bureau based its denial on (1) the opinions of two insurance medical examiners (“IMEs”), and (2) the fact that Maurer failed to complete a detoxification program it insisted she undergo, but the Court found the examiners’ opinions dubious—especially in light of the contrary opinions of Maurer’s actual treating physicians—and found no authority in support of Farm Bureau’s argument that it could make payment of Maurer’s PIP benefits contingent on her undergoing a detoxification program.
Hannah v Raspotnik, et al (COA – UNP 2/2/2023; RB #4542)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed (1) the trial court’s denial of Defendant Mason County Road Commission’s (“MCRC”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Dustin Hannah’s automobile negligence action on governmental immunity grounds, (2) the trial court’s dismissal of Hannah’s gross negligence count against Stanley Raspotnik, and (3) the trial court’s denial of Hannah’s motion for sanctions, filed in response to what he argued was a frivolous motion filed by the defendants’ regarding “serious impairment of body function.” The Court of Appeals held, preliminarily, that it had jurisdiction over MCRC’s appeal—brought under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v)—because the trial court effectively denied MCRC’s claim of governmental immunity by finding that a question of fact existed as to whether Raspotnik was negligent in causing the subject accident. The Court of Appeals held, second, that a question of fact existed as to whether Hannah’s oncoming vehicle presented an “immediate hazard” to Raspotnik, such that Raspotnik should have remained stopped at his flashing red light before proceeding into the intersection where the accident occurred. The Court held, third, that even if Raspotnik failed to check his blind spot before entering the intersection, such a failure does not rise to the level of gross negligence. And the Court held, fourth, that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to have found that the defendants’ motion for summary disposition—regarding Hannah’s injuries and the “serious impairment of body function standard” in MCL 500.3135—was not frivolous. The defendants filed their motion despite having spoken to Hannah’s neurosurgeon four months prior—the same neurosurgeon who later executed an affidavit averring that Hannah’s lumbar spine injuries were accident-related. Hannah argued that the neurosurgeon ‘must’ have shared his opinion regarding causation with the defendants during this earlier conversation, but the Court of Appeals held that that was purely speculative.
Reed v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/26/2023; RB #4541)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Harley Reed’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Reed committed fraud when making representations about his injuries to State Farm, and whether State Farm could deny his claim as a result. Notably, the Court of Appeals declined to apply Williams v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 335 Mich App 574 (2021) to this case, because State Farm was seeking to deny Reed’s claim for PIP benefits under his policy, not void his policy altogether. The Court further interpreted Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287 (2020) as standing for the proposition that the Plaintiff’s entire claim for PIP benefits could be denied on the basis of fraud, even aspects of it that are unrelated to any fraud.
Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Pena, et al (COA – PUB 1/26/2023; RB #4538)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Murray, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff Progressive Marathon Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals held that automobile insurance policy, issued prior to July 2, 2020 and providing bodily injury liability coverage up to $20,000 per person/$40,000 per occurrence, were not automatically converted into a policy with bodily injury liability coverage of at least $250,000 per person/$500,000 per occurrence on July 2, 2020, under the amended version of MCL 500.3009. The Court of Appeals reasoned that such automatic conversion did not occur, , just as the various subsections of the No-Fault Act which also provided for coverage changes effective July 1, 2020 (MCL 500.3107c, MCL 500.3107d, MCL 500.3109a, and MCL 500.3135) did not affect policies issued prior to July 1, 2020.
Rodriguez v Farmers Ins Exch (COA – UNP 1/26/2023; RB #4540)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff David Rodriguez’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”). The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Rodriguez committed a “fraudulent insurance act” for purposes of MCL 500.3173a(2), by failing to disclose numerous past injuries and medical events in his application for PIP benefits through the MAIPF.
Al-Hajjaj v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co, et al (COA – PUB 1/26/2023; RB #4539)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Swartzle, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company’s (“Hartford”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Ahmed Al-Hajjaj’s action for No-Fault PIP benefits. At issue was whether an independent insurance agency, Golden Insurance Agency, LLC (“Golden”), was acting as an agent of Al-Hajjaj (insured), or Hartford (insurer), when it facilitated Al-Hajjaj’s purchase of a Hartford commercial automobile insurance policy. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that Golden was an agent of Al-Hajjaj with respect to the transaction, despite (1) 2018 amendments to Chapter 12 of the Insurance Code which the Court noted might, under certain circumstances (none present in this case), abrogate the common law principle that an independent insurance agent is an agent of the insured, not the insurer, and (2) a standard independent insurance agent contract between Golden and Hartford.
Withers, et al v Sentinel Ins Co Ltd, et al (COA – UNP 1/20/2023; RB #4535)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order in favor of Defendant Sentinel Insurance Company Limited (“Limited”), in Sentinel’s priority dispute with Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether Cherisse Withers’s ongoing medical treatment were related to injuries she sustained in either a 2010 motor vehicle accident—at which time she was insured by Sentinel—or a 2012 motor vehicle accident—at which time she was insured by Progressive—or both.
Richardson v Menifee, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4537)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Diana Richardson’s (as personal representative of the Estate of Naomi Richardson) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Integon National Insurance Company (“Integon”), and remanded for consideration of whether Integon should be permitted to amend its affirmative defenses to allege fraud against Richardson with the required specificity applicable to fraud. The Court of Appeals held that Integon failed to set forth specific facts regarding Richardson’s alleged fraud in its affirmative defenses, as is required by Glasker-Davis v Auvenshire, 333 Mich App 222 (2020), but that it should be allowed to move to amend its affirmative defenses.
Flint Region ASC, LLC v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4533)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Flint Region ASC, LLC’s (“ASC”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (“Hartford”). The Court of Appeals held that under Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___ (2022), ASC’s claim was not barred by res judicata, which Hartford sought to invoke based on the fact that ASC’s patient/assignor, Thomas Fields, settled his separate lawsuit against Hartford, releasing Hartford from liability for any past and future PIP benefits related to the accident. ASC obtained its assignment before Fields and Hartford settled Fields’s separate lawsuit, and thus, under Mecosta, ASC could not be said to have been in privity with Fields at the time of settlement for purposes of res judicata.
Centria Home Rehab, LLC, et al v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4536)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Residential Care Solutions, LLC’s (“RCS”) action for No-Fault PIP benefits against Defendant Progressive Marathon Insurance Company (“Progressive”). The Court of Appeals held that under Admire v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 494 Mich 10 (2013), Alonzo White’s rent payments for the ADA-accessible housing he required as a result of the catastrophic injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident were not compensable under the No-Fault Act.
Alkasemi v Auto-Owners Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4531)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Tracy Alkasemi (as Guardian of Hannah Tabroksi, LIP) claim for attorney fees against Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”), and remanded for the Court to properly address Alkasemi’s claim for penalty interest. With respect to Alkasemi’s claim for attorney fees, the Court of Appeals held that Auto-Owners unreasonably delayed in making payment of Tabroski’s PIP benefits. Auto-Owners waited approximately one year after Tabroski was injured in a motorcycle-versus-motor vehicle accident to pay Tabroski’s PIP benefits, based on its adjuster’s belief that the burden of proof was on Tabroski to prove that she was not a constructive owner of the motorcycle involved in the accident, which she was traveling on as a passenger at the time. The Court of Appeals noted that “the law places the burden on defendant to justify a delay in coverage,” and that there was never any evidence to suggest that Tabroski was a constructive owner of the motorcycle.
Home-Owners Ins Co v AMCO Ins Co (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4529)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant AMCO Insurance Company’s (“AMCO”) motion for summary disposition, in which AMCO sought reimbursement from Plaintiff Home-Owners Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) for the amount it paid to settle the tort claim of Jerry Wineland. The Court of Appeals held that a no-action clause in Home-Owners’ policy was not enforceable under the particular circumstances present in the case and that AMCO was not barred from proceeding with its action for reimbursement. The Court did, however, remand for a determination of whether AMCO settled with Wineland in good faith, as well as a determination of whether the settlement amount was reasonable.
King, et al v Select Specialists, LLC, et al (COA – PUB 1/19/2023; RB #4528)
In this unanimous, published decision authored by Judge Yates, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiffs Tiffany Lachell King’s and Emanuel King, III’s claims for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”), as well as Emanuel King’s auto negligence action against Defendant Mary Ann Page. The Court of Appeals then reversed that portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Tiffany King’s auto negligence action against Page. With respect to the Kings’ claims against the MAIPF, the Court of Appeals held that both Tiffany and Emanuel were barred from recovering PIP benefits relative to the subject accident by MCL 500.3113(b). Both were Michigan residents at the time of the accident, and both were “owners” the vehicle involved, however, neither had in effect the security required by sections 3101 or 3103 of the No-Fault Act at the time of the accident. With respect to Emanuel King’s claim against Page, the Court of Appeals held that King was barred from recovery in tort by MCL 500.3135(2)(c), because he constructively owned and was operating an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident. With respect to Tiffany King’s claim against Page, the Court held that she was so barred because she was merely a passenger in the uninsured vehicle at the time of the accident.
Davis, Sr, et al v MetLife Ins Co, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4532)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Joseph Davis, Sr.’s action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendants MetLife Insurance Company (“MetLife”) and the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (“MAIPF”). The Court of Appeals held that there was no question of fact that Davis had taken the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident “unlawfully” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), and that he was therefore barred from recovering PIP benefits under the vehicle’s owner’s No-Fault policy with MetLife. The Court of Appeals further held that because Davis was barred from recovering PIP benefits under the MetLife policy by MCL 500.3113(a), he was also barred from recovering PIP benefits from the MAIPF by MCL 500.3173.
Farm Bureau v Meadows, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4525)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Defendant Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Pioneer”) motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Insurance Company’s (“Farm Bureau”) reimbursement action against it. The Court of Appeals held that the equities weighed in favor of rescinding the subject Pioneer insurance policy, even as to the claim of an innocent third party thereunder.
Craig v Wegienka, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4527)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Ethan Tyler Craig’s auto negligence action against Defendant Timothy Lee Wegienka. The Court of Appeals held that Craig failed to present sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether Wegienka’s conduct was the cause in fact of the subject motor vehicle-versus-pedestrian collision.
Jenkins v McCarver, et al (COA – UNP 1/12/2023; RB #4526)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary disposition order dismissing Plaintiff Johnna Jenkins’s (Personal Representative of the Estate of James Jenkins) action for no-fault PIP benefits against Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”). The Court of Appeals held that a question of fact existed as to whether James Jenkins was a constructive owner of the uninsured motorcycle he was operating at the time of the subject accident, such as would preclude him from receiving PIP benefits for the injuries he sustained in the accident pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b).
Howard, et al v LM Gen Ins Co, et al (COA – PUB 1/12/2023; RB #4524)
In this unanimous, published, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant LM General Insurance Company’s (“LM”) motion for summary disposition, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Melvina Howard’s action for no-fault PIP benefits and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. With respect to Howard’s claim for PIP benefits, the Court of Appeals held that LM could not rescind Howard’s policy and deny her claim thereunder based on misrepresentations Howard’s coinsured made regarding a vehicle that was not involved in the accident and was added to the policy approximately only after its original procurement. With respect to Howard’s claim for UIM benefits, the Court held that although LM could deny coverage as to all insureds based on the misrepresentations of only one insured, it could not do so in this case, because the policy’s antifraud provision only allowed for voidance of the policy if the misrepresentation was of a “material fact or circumstance.” In this case, the Court found, Howard’s coinsured’s misrepresentation was not material to Howard’s claim.
Saucillo v City of Detroit, et al (COA – UNP 1/19/2023; RB #4534)
In this unanimous, unpublished, per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant City of Detroit’s motion for summary disposition, in which it sought dismissal of Plaintiff Jacqueline Saucillo’s auto negligence action. The Court of Appeals held that Saucillo presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact as to whether a City of Detroit bus driver was negligent in his operation of the bus Saucillo was traveling on at the time of her injuries.
