Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #259663; Unpublished
Judges White, Fitzgerald, and Talbot; 2-1 (Judge White dissenting); per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Cancellation and Rescission of Insurance Policies
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam opinion decided without oral argument, the Court of Appeals found that defendant insurer was liable for its insured’s personal injury protection benefits because the notice cancelling the insurance policy was effective two days after the accident at issue occurred. Therefore, on the day of the accident, the policy was in effect.
The insurance beneficiary in this matter was injured while driving his girlfriend’s car which was insured by plaintiff. Plaintiff initially provided the injured person’s PIP benefits, but brought this action to shift the burden to defendant, the insurer with whom the injured person had a no-fault policy. Defendant argued it was not liable for benefits because the injured person’s mother cancelled the policy on May 15, 2001, ten days before the accident occurred. The trial court granted plaintiff summary disposition, finding defendant liable for benefits because the effective date of the cancellation was May 27, 2001, two days after the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that because the cancellation was effective May 27, 2001, the policy was still in effect on the date of the accident. In addition, the court noted the defendant provided no evidence the injured person’s mother had authority to cancel the policy on his behalf. In this regard, the court stated:
“Farmers points to a transaction summary referring to the policy in question, but listing the primary insured as Nancy DeWitte. This document is dated May 15, 2001, and says ‘VEHICLE CANCELLED AS OF 05/15/2001,’ but also lists an ‘EFF DATE’ of ‘05/27/2001.’ The only way for the latter to mean anything is to take the canceled-as-of date as indicating when certain administrative action was taken, and to take the effective date as the one upon which the policy actually was to become inoperative. Assuming, without deciding, that the transaction summary properly lists Nancy DeWitte as one entitled to cancel the policy in question, it nonetheless indicates cancellation two days after the accident in question.
But Farmers’ theory that Nancy DeWitte was authorized to cancel her son’s policy is more problematic. . . . Farmers . . . points to no evidence to show that Nancy DeWitte indeed exercised Jeffrey DeWitte’s power of attorney, or otherwise had an agency relationship with her son, such as would give her authority to cancel on his behalf an insurance policy upon which he was the sole named insured.
Because the existence of a policy of no-fault insurance between defendant DeWitte and Farmers is clearly established, but Farmers failed to produce evidence to show that, before the accident in question, it had cancelled that policy for want of premiums, or that Nancy DeWitte was entitled to cancel Jeffrey DeWitte’s insurance on his behalf, Farmers has failed to show that an issue of material fact exists for jury resolution. The trial court properly granted summary disposition to plaintiff.”
