Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #264002; Unpublished
Judges White, Jansen, and Wilder; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Miscellaneous Provisions
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition for defendant-trucking company, holding that defendant’s unrebutted evidence that its employee suffered a fatal heart attack before the collision was an intervening act which relieved defendant from tort liability under the Owners Liability Act. The plaintiff in this case was injured in a multi-vehicle accident on I-94. The accident occurred when defendant’s employee, who was driving a tractor-trailer westbound on I-94, suddenly crossed the median and hit a tanker truck. The tractor-trailer then hit the semi plaintiff was driving after which both vehicles were engulfed in flames. An autopsy revealed that defendant’s employee died from a heart attack immediately before the accident occurred. The timing of the employee’s death was supported by the absence of carbon monoxide in the driver’s blood and the lack of any soot in the airways. Plaintiff filed this action under the Owners Liability Act, MCL 257.4041. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, reasoning the heart attack constituted a sudden emergency.
The Court of Appeals first rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court considered inadmissible evidence when it decided defendant’s motion for summary disposition. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the autopsy report and the police report which contained witness reports that they did not see any brake lights or skid marks indicating that defendant’s employee attempted to brake before the accident occurred. Although the Court of Appeals noted the police report was not properly authenticated, it also noted the trial court did not reference the police report in its opinion.
The court next turned to the issue regarding whether the trial court improperly made findings of fact when it determined the sudden emergency doctrine was applicable to this case in order to overcome plaintiff’s assertion that crossing the median constitutes negligence per se. In this regard, plaintiff argued the trial court made a finding of fact that defendant’s employee was dead when he crossed the median. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the superceding act, that the driver had a heart attack, was not a question for the jury, but a question of law. In this regard, the court stated:
“An intervening cause relieves a defendant from liability unless the intervening act was reasonably foreseeable. . . . The issues of proximate cause and superseding or intervening cause in a negligence action are generally questions of fact for the jury. . . . However, where the facts bearing on proximate cause are not disputed and if reasonable minds could not differ, then the issue is one of law. . . . In this case, the trial court essentially determined that Powell’s heart attack was unforeseeable, thus constituting an intervening cause. We find no error. Defendant presented substantive evidence that Powell passed his health physicals in 2001 and 2003, and that he was certified to drive trucks for defendant. In contrast, plaintiff failed to present any evidence other than an unsupported claim from which a reasonable factfinder could infer Powell’s heart attack was foreseeable.”
Finally, the court considered plaintiff’s argument that it presented an alternative explanation for the accident, i.e., that defendant’s employee may have fallen asleep before he crossed the median and had the heart attack upon waking. In rejecting this argument, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the medical examiner’s conclusions. Moreover, it found plaintiff’s explanation was speculative. In so finding, the court declared:
“Plaintiff’s theory that Powell fell asleep before he crossed the median, while arguably possible, is nonetheless speculative without supporting substantive evidence. . . . In this case, the trial court properly determined that plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact that defendant’s negligence caused his injuries. Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to support an inference that Powell was asleep when he crossed the median to refute defendant’s evidence that Powell was dead within five seconds of crossing the center median. Because the submitted evidence supports a reasonable inference of an intervening heart attack, we conclude plaintiff’s claims are ‘[m]ere conclusory allegations . . . devoid of detail,’ and insufficient to satisfy the obligation of a party opposing a motion for summary disposition. . . . Under the circumstances, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.”
