Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 82113; Published
Judges Cavanagh, Brickley, Boyle, and Archer; 4-3; (Judge Levin and Riley Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 433 Mich 208; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Uninsured Motorist Coverage in General
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 split decision, the Michigan Supreme Court found the policy of no-fault automobile insurance at issue to be ambiguous as to whether uninsured motorist coverage was provided to the insured for the death of her non-resident spouse. Mary DeLaGarza's husband was killed while changing a tire on the side of the road by an uninsured motorist. She sought uninsured motorist benefits under her policy pursuant to the following clause:
"We will, pay for bodily injury which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. Bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle."
Mrs. DeLaGarza contended that since she would be entitled to recover damages against the uninsured motorist under the wrongful death act, uninsured motorist benefits were payable under the policy. The insurer claimed the above language provided coverage only for damages sustained by an "insured person," and since the deceased did not reside in the same household with his wife, he was not an "insured person" as defined by the policy.
The Supreme Court found the policy language to be ambiguous as to whether coverage was provided when a person sustaining bodily injury was not an "insured person” under the policy. Under the well established rules of insurance contract interpretation, the court construed the policy in favor of the insured and in favor of coverage. Mrs. DeLaGarza, the insured person under the policy was legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured driver under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of her estranged husband. Therefore, the court held that the insurer was obligated to provide uninsured motorist coverage, even though the injured party was not an insured person under the policy.
The court was not persuaded by the insurer's contention that uninsured motorist coverage was intended to apply only where the bodily injury was sustained by an insured person. The court held that the insurance company had to bear the burden of its confusing language and its failure to make clear the extent of non-liability under the policy.
Justice Levin dissented. He would hold that coverage is available only if the injured party is an insured person under the policy. Justice Riley wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Griffith, which stated that the policy was not ambiguous and precluded coverage for the claim presented.
