Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #237317; Unpublished
Judges Jansen, Kelly and Fort Hood; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented plaintiff from suing defendant State Farm for no fault PIP benefits where plaintiff had previously lost a jury trial in a third-party tort liability claim against State Farm’s insured in which plaintiff sought damages for serious impairment of body function, but where the jury entered a no cause of action against plaintiff for the reason that plaintiff had not sustained any injury. The court ruled that the jury’s finding that plaintiff had not sustained an injury in the third-party suit, prevented the plaintiff from subsequently suing defendant State Farm for no-fault PIP benefits, because State Farm was in “privity of contract” with the defendant tortfeasor in the third-party case, inasmuch as State Farm was the indemnitor (insurer) of that defendant and would have been bound by any judgment entered in the third-party action. In addition, the issue of whether plaintiff sustained an injury was “fully and fairly litigated in the third-party action,” wherein the jury answered the question in the negative. Therefore, “The trial court correctly found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the relitigation of this issue in the instant case, and properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition”
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STATUTORY
INDEXING:
Not
applicable
TOPICAL
INDEXING:
Collateral
Estoppel and Res Judicata
In this unanimous unpublished per
curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel prevented plaintiff from suing defendant State Farm for no‑fault PIP
benefits where plaintiff had previously lost a jury trial in a third-party tort
liability claim against State Farm’s insured in which plaintiff sought damages
for serious impairment of body function, but where the jury entered a no cause
of action against plaintiff for the reason that plaintiff had not sustained any
injury. The court ruled that the jury’s
finding that plaintiff had not sustained an injury in the third-party suit,
prevented the plaintiff from subsequently suing defendant State Farm for
no-fault PIP benefits, because State Farm was in “privity of contract”
with the defendant tortfeasor in the third-party case, inasmuch as State Farm
was the indemnitor (insurer) of that defendant and would have been bound by any
judgment entered in the third-party action.
In addition, the issue of whether plaintiff sustained an injury was “fully
and fairly litigated in the third-party action,” wherein the jury answered
the question in the negative. Therefore,
“The trial court correctly found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
precluded the relitigation of this issue in the instant case, and properly
granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition”
2373. Burke,
et al v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association and Auto Club Group Insurance
Company, et al v Michigan Educational Employees Mutual Insurance Company;
Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 227123; April 15, 2003; Judges Griffin,
Gage and Meter; MTLA File No. OP-1668-3.
STATUTORY
INDEXING:
MCL
500.3104
Reimbursement
of Member Claims
TOPICAL
INDEXING:
Not
applicable
In this unanimous unpublished per
curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the Michigan Insurance
Commissioner had “primary jurisdiction” in this circuit court lawsuit
against the Catastrophic Claims Association alleging that the Association and
its member companies breached fiduciary duties to policyholders by issuing a
refund in the amount of $180 per vehicle from a surplus remitted by the
Association to the member insurance companies.
The plaintiffs argued that the amount of the refund was disproportionate
because it did not take into account the pro rata contribution of each
policyholder to the surplus that was being remitted. The circuit court lawsuit alleged a class
action. The circuit court ruled that the
Insurance Commissioner should have primary jurisdiction over this case, because
it “would focus the parties’ arguments on the correct nature of the refunds
and the legal and factual reasoning behind the manner in which the refunds were
rewarded. A judicial determination at
this point, without deferring to the primary jurisdiction of the Commissioner,
would allow the circuit court to decide the matter without the benefit of the
Commissioner’s review of the facts and law in this case. The court would have to proceed without the
benefit of the Commissioner’s analysis of how a ruling adverse to defendants in
the instant case would affect the statutory operations of the MCCA and the
ultimate return of future surplus assessments to policyholders. Thus, this case does not involve basic issues
that courts address on a regular basis and that are within the conventional
experiences of judges. We are convinced
that the Commissioner is best equipped to review the particular facts and laws
at issue in this case and to best anticipate the effect of a ruling adverse to
defendants. . . . Accordingly, we
conclude that the Commissioner had primary jurisdiction over this case.”
2374. Wertheimer
v Walker, et al; Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 238686; April 15,
2003; Judges Jansen, Kelly and Fort Hood; MTLA File No. OP-1671-2.
STATUTORY
INDEXING:
MCL
500.3135
Noneconomic
Loss Liability for Serious Impairment of Body Function Threshold (Definition)
[3135(1)]
Objective
Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
Important
Body Function Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
General
Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
TOPICAL
INDEXING:
Not
applicable
In this unanimous unpublished per
curiam opinion decided without oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed
summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim of serious
impairment of body function. Plaintiff's
injuries consisted primarily of soft tissue cervical injuries that the court
described as follows: “The evidence showed that plaintiff had muscle spasms,
which are objective manifestations of injury. . . . In addition, x-rays showed
disc space narrowing at C4-C5 and C5-C6 and an MRI showed disc bulges at C4-C5
and C5-C6. These are also objective
manifestations of injury. . . . Although plaintiff's x-rays showed the same condition
before the accident, her doctors stated that the conditions were related to the
accident, thus creating a question of fact.
The injuries affected plaintiff's ability to move her neck and shoulder,
which are important body functions. The
injury was not extensive and required no treatment other than medication and
physical therapy. According to one
doctor, plaintiff's physical condition was completely normal by February 2001,
so the only residual impairment is unexplained pain. However, plaintiff was disabled from working
for ten months and had difficulty doing housework and yard work. Such evidence was sufficient to create a
question of fact whether plaintiff's injuries were serious.”
