Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 243201; Published
Judges Whitbeck, Hoekstra, and Donofrio; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 259 Mich App 705, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Motor Vehicle (ORVs and ATVs) [3101(2)(g)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals held that an off-road vehicle (ORV) is a motor vehicle under §3101(2)(e) of the No-Fault Act for purposes of determining priority of payment for injuries sustained when the injured party’s ORV collided with a State owned truck while the ORV was being operated on Eisen Trail, a public highway in Cheboygan County.
The issue in the case was whether the ORV should be considered a “motor vehicle” at the time of the accident for purposes of determining priority for payment. MCL 500.3101(2)(e) defines “motor vehicle” as:
“A vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for operation upon a public highway by power other than muscular power which has more than 2 wheels. . . .”
The State, as owner of the vehicle which was struck by the ORV, contended that the injured person was injured while “an occupant of a motor vehicle” within the meaning of §3101(2)(e) of the statute. Allstate, which had been assigned the claim by the Assigned Claims Facility, contended that the ORV was not a “motor vehicle” as defined in §3101(2)(e) and, therefore, the injured person was injured “while not an occupant of a motor vehicle.” Allstate contended, therefore, that §3115(1)(a) established priority with the State as insurer of the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident.
In rejecting Allstate’s argument, the Court of Appeals held that nothing in §3101(2)(e) indicated that the inquiry should extend into an examination of the reason or purpose for the vehicle being at a particular location. Rather, the plain language of the provision indicates that the place of operation, i.e., the location where the vehicle is operated, is the sole factor to be addressed in deciding whether a vehicle was “operated . . . upon a public highway.” In other words, when a vehicle is operated on a public highway, regardless of the vehicle operator’s intent, it is a “motor vehicle” under the No-Fault Act. Therefore, the Court of Appeals rejected Allstate’s contention that the ORV operator’s intent was to use the Eisen Trail only to continue riding on state-maintained ORV trails. The court rejected the contention by Allstate that the definition of a motor vehicle should be interpreted to include only those vehicles operating upon and traveling upon a public highway as a public highway, not those incidentally crossing the public highway.
Because the bodily injury was sustained while the injured person was “an occupant of a motor vehicle” as defined by the statute, the applicable priority payment provision of the No-Fault Act was §3114(4), which provides that a person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident “while an occupant of a motor vehicle” shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
(a) the insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied;
(b) the insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.
Because the injured person was an occupant of a motor vehicle, the court held that the priority provisions of §3115(1), which would apply to a person suffering accidental bodily injury “while not an occupant of a motor vehicle” did not apply in this instance, and Allstate was, therefore, obligated to pay the PIP benefits.
