Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 121968; Published; per curiam
Per Curiam; Unanimous; Judge Markman concurring
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 470 Mich. 28, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Liability for Intentionally Caused Harm [3135(3)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the exception to tort liability immunity for property damage contained in §3135(3), which retains liability for “intentionally caused harm to persons or property,” was not satisfied by evidence of “willful and wanton conduct only.”
The defendant, York, became intoxicated at a Christmas party, and while driving home, collided with an ambulance causing property damage. The ambulance was insured by American Alternative, which paid for the damage, and then sought reimbursement from York. York asserted the tort immunity provisions of §3135(3), which abolishes tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within the state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by §3101 was in effect. The trial court, having determined that York’s conduct was “willful and wanton” ruled that such conduct was equivalent to “intentional conduct” and, therefore, under §3135(3)(a), York was stripped of his immunity by reason of that statute which contains an exception for “intentionally caused harm to persons or property.”
The Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court, pointed out that the statute makes no reference to “willful and wanton” conduct as part of the exception. While much intentional conduct is willful and wanton, not all willful and wanton conduct is intentional. In this case, while there is evidence that York was intoxicated, there was none to support a finding that he actually intended to collide with the ambulance and cause damage to it. Thus, under the language of the statute, because York did not intend to cause damage to the ambulance, he remained immune from suit.
Justice Markman, in concurring with the majority, felt that the analysis was inadequate because it failed to address the principle argument of plaintiff that “intentionally caused harm” is defined in the statute by implication in its second sentence as including harm that is “substantially certain” to occur.
