Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 121822; Published
Per Curiam; 4-3(Justices Cavanagh, Kelly and Weaver dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 469 Mich. 524, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Compulsory Insurance Requirements for Owners or Registrants of Motor Vehicles Required to Be Registered [3101(1)]
Definition of Owner [3101(2)(h)]
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [3113(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Exclusions from Uninsured Motorist Benefits
CASE SUMMARY:
In this per curiam opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the definition of an “owner” of a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i) is satisfied where a person has the right to use a motor vehicle for a period of greater than 30 days, even though the person has not had actual use of the vehicle for 30 days prior to the accident. Having determined that the injured person was the “owner” of a motor vehicle which was not insured as required by MCL 500.3101 or MCL 500.3103, the Supreme Court held that he was disqualified from receiving personal protection insurance benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b) and also disqualified from receiving uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to the language of the policy.
Plaintiff’s decedent had purchased a pickup truck from a friend five days prior to the motor vehicle accident. He made a downpayment on the purchase and a promise to pay the remainder at a later date. He took possession of the vehicle, but the title was not signed over because of the incomplete payment. The vehicle was not insured at the time of the accident, however, decedent was living with his grandfather at the time of the accident, who had a policy covering his own vehicles. As a relative residing in the same household, decedent could potentially have obtained PIP benefits under his grandfather’s policy pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1).
In reversing the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ conclusions that the decedent was covered by his grandfather’s policies for both personal protection insurance and uninsured motorist coverage, the Supreme Court interpreted the definition of “owner” as contained in §3101(2)(g)(i) which defines an owner as including:
“A person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.”
The insurance company declined coverage under §3113(b) of the No-Fault Act which precludes owners of uninsured vehicles from receiving personal protection insurance benefits. The insurance company also denied a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the provisions of its policy.
In its decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning in Ringewold v Bos, 200 Mich App 131; 503 NW2d 716 (1993), which construed virtually identical language defining owner in MCL 257.37. In Ringewold, the Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary that a person actually have used the vehicle for a 30 day period before a finding may be made that the person is the owner. Rather, the focus must be on the nature of the person’s right to use the vehicle. The Supreme Court held that nothing in the plain language of §3101(2)(g)(i) requires that a person have actually used the vehicle or that the person has commenced using the vehicle at least 30 days before the accident occurred. The statute merely contemplates a situation in which the person is renting or using a vehicle for a period that is greater than 30 days. Therefore, if the lease or other arrangement for use of the vehicle is such that the right of use will extend beyond 30 days, that person is the “owner” from the inception of the arrangement, regardless of whether a 30 day period has expired.
In overruling the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis of the lower court that it was permissible to interpret identical language differently because of the differing purposes of the statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals had reasoned that MCL 257.37, the owner’s liability section of the Motor Vehicle Code, was intended to place liability on the person who had ultimate control of the vehicle, whereas the purpose of the no-fault statute was to assure that persons injured in motor vehicle accidents received prompt and adequate reparation for injuries. The Supreme Court held that courts are not free to manipulate interpretations of statutes to accommodate their own views of the overall purpose of the legislation.
The Supreme Court also held that in addition to qualifying as an owner under §3101(2)(g)(i), the decedent also qualified as an owner under §3101(2)(g)(iii). That provision would define an owner as “a person who has the immediate right of possession of a motor vehicle under an installment sale contract.” The court held that the commonly understood meaning of the undefined phrase “installment sale contract” would include the arrangement between the decedent and his friend from whom he was purchasing the vehicle. The phrase “installment sale contract” does not require a writing nor does it require a sale at retail.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the decedent’s estate was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the defendant’s policy. The policy provided that it did not pay uninsured motorist benefits for bodily injury sustained by an insured while occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle that is “owned by” that insured which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. Decedent was an insured because he was residing with his grandfather, the policyholder. However, the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered by the policy, and coverage would thus be excluded if the decedent owned the vehicle. The policy did not define the term “owner” or “owned.” The Supreme Court referred to dictionary definitions of owners and held that “possession, control, and dominion are among the primary features of ownership.” The court held that the decedent had possession and control of the vehicle, as well as dominion and authority over the vehicle, and, thus, would commonly be understood to have “owned” it at the time of the accident. The fact that the entire purchase price had not yet been paid and that the technical transfer of title had not yet occurred are not dispositive.
In his dissent, Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justices Kelly and Weaver, concurred in the court’s holding with respect to the personal protection insurance benefits. However, Justice Cavanagh dissented with respect to the analysis regarding the uninsured motorist benefits. He reasoned that the commonly used meanings of “owned” and “ownership,” may contain additional features not contemplated by the majority in its use of the definitional phrases of “possession, control, and dominion.” Other lay dictionary definitions include concepts of “legal or rightful title.” Although it is clear that the decedent possessed and controlled the vehicle, it is equally clear that decedent did not have title to the vehicle. To the extent that the term “owner” is ambiguous in the uninsured motorist portion of the policy, such ambiguity should be strictly construed against the insurer in favor of coverage. Therefore, Justice Cavanagh would conclude that the uninsured motorist benefits are available.
