Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 248315; Published
Judges Fitzgerald, Bandstra, and Schuette; unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 263 Mich. App. 95, Link to Opinion
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitations
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published opinion by Judge Bandstra, the Court of Appeals held that the saving provision of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), MCL 600.5851(1), which tolls statutes of limitations as to infants or insane persons, does not apply to the one-year back rule of the No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3145(1), for claims arising after that statute was amended in 1993.
Daniel Cameron, a minor, sustained a closed head injury when struck by an automobile while riding a bicycle. Plaintiffs, his co-guardians, brought an action seeking payment of PIP benefits. Auto Club refused certain benefits based upon the provisions of §3145(1) which limits recovery of PIP benefits to those occurring within one year prior to the filing of the complaint.
The Court of Appeals concluded that since the effective date of a 1993 amendment to the RJA, the general saving provision of the RJA does not apply to actions commenced under the No-Fault Act. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim was subject to the limitation of 3145(1) as to their minor child.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon the history of statutory changes to the RJA. The court noted that in 1975, when the Michigan Supreme Court held that the RJA saving provision applied to actions brought under other statutes, the RJA saving provision referred to “any action.” However, in 1993, the Legislature amended MCL 600.5851(1) by changing the phrase “any action” to “an action under this Act.” Auto Club argued that this change in the wording of the RJA tolling provision from “any action” to “an action under this Act,” limits the application of the saving provision to actions brought under the RJA only. In adopting this interpretation of the 1993 amendment, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that the decision in Professional Rehabilitation Associates v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 228 Mich App 167; 577 NW2d 909 (1998), had interpreted the 1993 amendment as not changing the application of the saving provision to no-fault actions. The court stated that the 1993 version of the statute was not at issue in Professional Rehabilitation, but rather, the pre-1993 version was the properly applicable statute in that case.
The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that, because the RJA generally governs judicial procedure, all actions essentially arise “under the RJA.” The court held that this interpretation would render the change in wording in the RJA as meaningless.
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that application of the RJA saving provision to the no-fault statute was consistent with the legislative intent and the best public policy.
Judge Fitzgerald, in his concurrence, noted that before the 1993 amendment, courts consistently held that the general saving provision of the RJA applied to all causes of action created by Michigan statutes, even when the statute creating the right contains its own limitation period. Judge Fitzgerald stated that he did not believe the Legislature intended this result and urges the Legislature to amend §5851(1).