Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 241250; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Gage and Kelly; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [3101(2)(h)]
Scope of Mandated Coverages [3131(1)]
Limits of Liablity Insurance [3131(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals upheld grant of summary disposition on a coverage issue concerning an exclusion in defendant insurance company’s residual liability coverage which would exclude coverage for bodily injury resulting from a relative’s use of a vehicle, other than a covered vehicle, owned by a person who resided with the policyholder.
In this case, the accident was caused while Philip Sanborn was plowing his driveway and killed his 4-year-old stepson. Philip’s wife, the child’s mother, was insured under a policy with Progressive. The policy provided coverage for bodily injury for which an insured person was legally responsible. Philip was an insured person, as he was a relative of the policyholder. However, the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries resulting from a relative’s use of a vehicle, other than a covered vehicle, owned by a person who resided with the policyholder. The vehicle involved was not a vehicle listed on the declaration sheet as a covered vehicle under the policy. The determining issue in this case was whether or not the vehicle was “owned” by Philip Sanborn.
The vehicle at issue was a Chevy Blazer titled to Philip’s employer, Ross Duford. Philip worked with Duford plowing snow. The evidence was undisputed that Philip kept the vehicle at his home during the winter, except on rare occasions when another driver needed to use it for snow plowing. Philip was entitled to use the vehicle for personal reasons at any time, other than when he was engaged in snow plowing. Duford did not restrict Philip Sanborn’s use of the Blazer for his own purposes, other than to require that the use be within reason. Sanborn acknowledged that on occasion he used the Blazer to run personal errands.
The Court of Appeals held that under these facts, Philip Sanborn was deemed to be an “owner” of the Blazer based upon policy language that defined an owner as a person who, with respect to a vehicle, had the use of the vehicle for a period greater than 30 days. Defendant relied upon this policy language and the provisions of MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i) which likewise defines owner as a person having the use of a vehicle for a period greater than 30 days.
In upholding the trial court determination excluding coverage, the Court of Appeals held that ownership follows from proprietary or possessory usage of a vehicle, as opposed to merely incidental usage under the direction of or with the permission of another. The fact that Philip Sanborn did not hold legal title to the Blazer is not dispositive of whether he may be considered an owner of the vehicle under MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i). Therefore, there being no disputed issues of fact, the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Progressive was affirmed.
