Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #267105; Unpublished
Judges Meter, Hoekstra, and Markey; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [3101(2)(h)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Motor Vehicle Code (Civil Liability of Owner)
Motor Vehicle Code (Definition of Owner)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals found that where defendant-Finney, dba C&K Mufflers, did not possess or have control over the vehicle that struck and severely injured plaintiff, it did not “own” the vehicle. However, because defendant allowed the vehicle to be illegally driven with a temporary license plate issued to C&K Mufflers, defendant was estopped from arguing that it was not liable for the plaintiff’s injuries under MCL 257.401. Moreover, since defendant did not actually own the vehicle, its insurer, Secura, was liable under its commercial general liability policy, despite the owned vehicle exclusion contained in the policy.
The plaintiff in this case was rendered quadriplegic when she was hit by a 1988 Jeep driven by defendant Rinelle Simpson. Simpson had been loaned the Jeep by its owner, Shaun Dando, who obtained the Jeep from defendant in exchange for installing a hot water heater. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was being illegally driven with an “in transit” license plate issued to C&K Mufflers. The trial court found Simpson and defendant liable for plaintiff’s injuries and entered a $3.3 million writ of garnishment against Secura, defendant’s commercial liability insurer. Secura argued that it was not liable because the policy contained an owned vehicle exclusion. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that under Twichell v MIC General Insurance Company, 469 Mich 524 (2004) [RB #2426], the commonly understood meaning of the word “owner,” must be used to determine ownership. Under Twichell, the word owner refers to possession, control and dominion. At the time of the accident, defendant did not have possession, control or ownership of the Jeep and could not be considered an owner of the Jeep. However, because it illegally allowed the Jeep to be driven with an in transit license plate, it was estopped from claiming that it did not own the Jeep for purposes of MCL 257.401. Moreover, because defendant did not own the Jeep, Secura was liable under its business owners liability policy. In this regard, the court declared:
“In Twichell, our Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the undefined term ‘owner’ used in an automobile insurance policy. The Court referred to several dictionary definitions and concluded ‘that possession, control, and dominion are among the primary features of ownership.’ . . . Our de novo review of the record here convinces us that the trial court correctly applied this commonly understood meaning of the term ‘owner’ to the undisputed facts to conclude that Dando was the owner of the Jeep at the time of the accident, and Finney was not. Further, although not necessary to our construction of the policy term at issue, we find no logical of legal inconsistency between the trial court’s ruling that Finney was liable under the owners liability statute, MCL 257.401, and its subsequent ruling that Finney was not, at the time of the accident, in fact, the ‘owner’ of the Jeep according to the commonly understood meaning of that term. The record is clear; the trial court never factually found that Finney was the owner of the Jeep at the time of the accident. Rather, the court reached the legal conclusion that Finney, because he permitted the illegal use of the license plate assigned by the Secretary of State to Maxi Muffler, was estopped to assert that he was not the owner of the Jeep for purposes of MCL 257.401. As explained in Weiland [v Kenney, 385 Mich 654 (1971)], the illegal use of a license plate is false evidence of ownership, which gives rise to estoppel. . . . Moreover, . . . because Finney was not the owner of the Jeep at the time of the accident . . . coverage under Secura’s general liability policy was not excluded by §B(g) of the businessowners liability coverage form.”
