Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #259060, #259338, and #259848; Unpublished
Judges Murphy, O’Connell, and Murray; 2-1 (Judge Murray concurring in part and dissenting in part); per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitations
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that its decision in Cameron v ACIA [RB #2473], in which it held the insanity saving provision does not operate to toll the No-Fault Act’s one-year limitations period for notification and recovery of personal protection insurance benefits, should have retroactive application. In so ruling, the court determined that Cameron did not establish a new principle of law despite long-standing judicial decisions to the contrary. In this regard, the court stated:
“Regarding the initial question whether we should apply Cameron retroactively to these cases, in Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 696; 641 NW2d 219 (2002), our Supreme Court provided three factors and one threshold question to apply before limiting a case to prospective application. The threshold question is ‘whether the decision clearly established a new principle of law.’ . . . This question is complicated by the fact that Cameron did not claim that it was establishing new law, but claimed to interpret a legislative change that was implemented more than a decade earlier. It is axiomatic that if the Legislature changes a law, then application of the change should not begin when the judiciary first recognizes the change, but when the Legislature intended to effectuate the change. Nevertheless, a drastic shift in the judiciary’s longstanding misinterpretation of a statute might necessitate limiting the application of the new, and presumably correct, judicial interpretation. . . . In this case, however, the only other plausible interpretation of 1993 PA 78 occurred in Professional Rehabilitation Assoc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 228 Mich App 167, 175-176; 577 NW2d 909 (1998), and the case did not address the effect of the amendment at all. In fact, as Cameron, supra at 101-102, correctly points out, Professional Rehabilitation should not have relied on the amended version of MCL 600.5851, because 1993 PA 78 was not effective until after the plaintiffs’ cause of action in Professional Rehabilitation had accrued. Therefore, Cameron does not represent a break from any solid, longstanding interpretation found in Professional Rehabilitation or elsewhere, so the designation of its rule as a new principle of law is a dubious one. However, the most persuasive argument for applying Cameron retroactively derives from Cameron itself. Cameron concludes that, ‘since the effective date of the 1993 amendment, the general saving provision of the RJA does not apply to actions commenced under the no-fault act.’ . . . Although we may fundamentally disagree with it, this pronouncement leaves no rational doubt that the Court in Cameron decided, and accordingly declared, that courts should retroactively apply the new interpretation. We are bound, for now, by that legal conclusion.”
Judge Murphy, concurring in part, wrote separately to express his opinion that Cameron was properly decided.
