Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #263803; Unpublished
Judges Hoekstra, Wilder, and Zahra; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Kreiner Era - 1996-2010 [3135(7)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment [3135(7)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion decided without oral argument after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kreiner v Fischer [RB #2428] interpreting the statutory definition of serious body function, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition on plaintiff’s claim for non-economic losses. The plaintiff in this case suffered compressed discs and soft tissue strains in her neck, shoulders and back. Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication, received chiropractic treatment for several months, and physical therapy. In finding that plaintiff failed to establish that her injuries affected her general ability to lead her normal life, the Court of Appeals noted that although plaintiff has been unable to return to her landscaping job, eight weeks after her injury she was released to her job as a restaurant employee and allowed to resume light housekeeping. And, although plaintiff complained of pain while riding in a car, playing tennis, riding her bike, playing with her nieces, dancing and swimming, she had no doctor-imposed restrictions. In this regard, the court stated:
“[A] board certified physician in physical medicine and rehabilitation . . . diagnosed chronic cervical strain from whiplash and recommended pain medication, physical therapy, and a lower extremity aerobics program. . . . Application of the five Kreiner factors to the facts of this case leads us to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of an important body function. Plaintiff suffered compressed discs and soft tissue strains in her neck, shoulders, and back. Although plaintiff’s treating physician concluded plaintiff was not able to return to her position as a landscaper, within eight weeks of the accident plaintiff’s treating physician released her to perform light housekeeping and her restaurant employment. On appeal, plaintiff has not identified any physician-imposed restrictions on her employment. Both the ‘type and length of treatment required’ was limited. After plaintiff’s initial examination and treatments for mild neck strain, she primarily treated with a chiropractor from June to October 2001, and thereafter she received some physical therapy. Plaintiff required no surgery. Although pain medication was prescribed, plaintiff did not use it because of its side effects and is apparently able to manage her pain without it. Regarding ‘the duration of the impairment,’ plaintiff continues to complain of pain associated with her work and some avocational activities, like reading, car trips, tennis, skiing, mountain bicycling, playing with her nieces, dancing, and swimming. Plaintiff also complains of numbness associated with reading and riding in a car. No physician has restricted her from pursuing these activities. Generally, subjective complaints of pain do not constitute an objectively manifested condition and cannot establish the existence of a serious impairment of a body function. . . . Also, self-imposed limitations are typically not sufficient to create a serious impairment of a body function. . . . Regarding ‘the extent of any residual impairment,’ we note that plaintiff continues to complain of pain and numbness. But Dr. Gast’s final impression of plaintiff’s condition consisted only of myofacial pain and tenderness at the end points of plaintiff’s cervical range of motion. . . . In sum, the evidence does not show that plaintiff’s injuries affected her general ability to lead her normal life. Consequently, upon de novo review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of an important body function. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition.”
