Michigan Supreme Court; Docket #127018
Opinion by Chief Justice Taylor; 4-3 (Justice Markman concurring; Justices Cavanagh and Weaver dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 476 Mich. 55, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitations
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 opinion by Chief Justice Taylor, the Michigan Supreme Court held the tolling provision of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5851(1), does not toll the one-year back rule contained in MCL 500.3145(1) because that provision does not limit when an action can be brought, it instead limits the amount of personal injury protection benefits a person may recover.
Daniel Cameron, a minor, sustained a closed head injury in 1996 when he was struck by an automobile while riding a bicycle. In 2002, Daniel’s parents brought an action seeking payment of PIP benefits from 1996 to 1999. Auto Club moved for summary disposition, arguing plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the one-year-back rule contained in MCL 500.3145(1). The circuit court denied the motion, and awarded plaintiffs benefits in the amount of $182,500. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that MCL 600.5851(1) does not operate to toll MCL 500.3145(1) because MCL 600.5851(1) only tolls actions brought under the RJA and no-fault actions are not brought under the RJA, but under the no-fault act.
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ result, it did not agree with its analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court explained that MCL 600.5851(1) controls when a minor or a person suffering from insanity may bring an action – it does not apply to damages once an action is brought. MCL 500.3145(1), however, is a statute which limits damages that can be recovered to one year back. In this regard, Chief Justice Taylor stated:
“By its unambiguous term, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may ‘make the entry or bring the action.’ It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has been brought. MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1). Thus, to be clear, the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1).”
Justice Markman concurred, but wrote separately to express certain reservations regarding this decision. First, Justice Markman expressed concern that as a consequence of this action, protections available under the tolling provision may become illusory. Second, this decision may result in under compensation to minors and insane persons. Third, this decision may impede the opportunity of minors and insane persons to be made whole. And finally, as a result of this decision it may be malpractice for an attorney to ever rely on the saving provision contained in the RJA.
Justice Cavanagh dissented and stated that this opinion was one more example of the insurance industry’s attempt to immunize itself from having to pay benefits to injured insureds. In this regard, Justice Cavanagh stated in part:
“This case is essentially the second installment of defendant’s attempt to further immunize itself and other insurers from having to pay benefits indisputedly owed to their insured – people who have diligently paid policy premiums with the expectation that, should they be injured, their insurer will reimburse them for all allowable expenses. While in Devillers [v Auto Club Insurance Ass’n] defendant targeted people who had not filed suit because of insurer delay, in this case, defendant targets infants and the legally incompetent.”
Justice Weaver dissented and explained that the majority’s analysis and holding are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of MCL 500.3145(1). Based on a reading of the statute in its entirety, Justice Weaver believed the one-year-back rule does not apply to this case and, therefore, plaintiffs can recover benefits which accrued more than one year before they filed suit.
Justice Kelley dissented and concurred with Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, but wrote separately to point out that the majority’s decision leads to an absurd result that should not be permitted.
