Michigan Supreme Court; Docket #126899; Published
Opinion by Justice Young; 4-3 (Justices Cavanagh, Kelly, and Weaver dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 473 Mich. 562, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 opinion by Justice Young, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled long-standing precedent when it held the one-year statute of limitation contained in MCL 500.3145(1) cannot be tolled by filing a claim for benefits when the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that a claimant “may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” Moreover, despite overruling 19 years of precedent, the Court determined this holding would have retroactive effect.
The plaintiff’s son in this case sustained a traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff cared for him after his discharge from the hospital and received first party benefits from defendant for home health services from October 20, 2000 to February 14, 2001. On February 14, 2001, defendant received a physician’s prescription stating the insured no longer required close supervision. Therefore, defendant discontinued payment for home health services beginning February 15, 2001. Nonetheless, plaintiff continued to provide her son services, including driving him to and from school and to doctor appointments. On October 7, 2002, defendant wrote plaintiff a letter in which it formally denied home health care benefits. Plaintiff filed a complaint on November 12, 2002, claiming she was entitled to benefits under Lewis v DAIIE [Item No 936]. The trial court agreed, and rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff was precluded from seeking benefits for the nine-month period from February 15, 2001 to November 12, 2001 under MCL 500.3145(1).
On defendant’s by-pass application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court ruled defendant was entitled to summary disposition to the extent plaintiff’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitation contained in §3145(1). In holding that the court in Lewis improperly imposed judicial tolling onto the no-fault statute, Justice Young explained the statute clearly and unambiguously provided that a claim cannot be made for a loss which was incurred more than one year before the date of the action. Therefore, he added, because the holding in Lewis violated the statutory directive and almost 100 years of precedent, it was overruled. In this regard, Justice Young stated:
“No member of this Court disputes that §3145(1) clearly and unambiguously states that a claimant ‘may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.’ Because the Lewis rule contravenes this plain statutory directive and ignores almost a century of contrary precedent, it is hereby overruled.”
In addition, the Supreme Court gave this decision retroactive effect. In so ruling, Justice Young explained:
“Moreover, because this case does not fall into that limited category of decisions in which prospective application is justified, we give our decision retroactive effect for this and pending cases in which a Lewis challenge has been preserved.”
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelley, dissented, and pointed out judicial tolling is an important mechanism in which unjust results can be avoided. Further, judicial tolling needs no statutory basis, therefore, the majority’s zealous adherence to statutory language is unnecessary. In this regard, Justice Cavanagh declared:
“Contrary to the majority’s refusal to recognize as much, equitable tolling is a time-honored, purposeful, and carefully crafted rule of equity that is employed when rare but compelling circumstances so justify its use. In Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), the latest case to fall prey to the majority’s chopping block, this Court employed this important mechanism for critical and justifiable equitable reasons that the current majority carelessly relegates to oblivion under an overwrought—and unnecessary—cloak of textualism. What the majority unfortunately fails to recognize is that judicial tolling needs no basis in statutory language. It is an equitable measure. Thus, the majority’s ardent devotion to the strict language of the statute is admirable, but really quite misplaced. As a result, the majority unnecessarily ties the judiciary’s hands from importing measures of equity in situations that require it. Because I believe that the judicial tolling rule established in Lewis was well-reasoned and necessary, and because the majority has not established a persuasive reason for disregarding twenty years of stare decisis, I respectfully dissent.”
In her dissent, Justice Weaver stated that although she disagrees with the holding in Lewis, because it has been the settled law for 19 years, under the doctrine of stare decisis, it should not be overruled. Moreover, even if the majority should decide to overrule Lewis, the ruling should be given prospective application.
[Author’s Note: This decision was mistakenly omitted from previous supplements and is now included in this supplement to insure completeness.]
