Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #286499; Unpublished
Judges Hoekstra, Bandstra, and Servitto; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitaiton [3145(1)]
Allowable Expenses for Conservatorships and Guardianships [3107(1)(a)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s determination that even though a conservator performed his services more than one year before filing his petition for payment, the fees for his services had not been incurred until the court approved them and, therefore, were not barred by the one-year-back rule contained in MCL 500.3145. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Order finding that even though the petitioner failed to provide a detailed invoice for his services, the trial court properly awarded conservator fees.
In finding that the one-year-back rule applied to this case, the court first noted that the Supreme Court has defined “incurred” as:
“‘Incurred means’ “[t]o become liable or subject to, [especially] because of one’s own actions.” Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476, 484; 673 NW2d 739 (2003), quoting Webster’s II New College Dictionary (2001). ‘Liable’ is defined as ‘legally responsible[.]’ Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). Generally, one becomes liable for the payment of services once those services have been rendered. . . . [Community Resource Consultants, Inc. v Progressive Michigan Ins Co, 480 Mich 1097, 1098; 745 NW2d 123 (2008) (dealing with medical expenses).]”
Therefore, based upon the foregoing definition, the court concluded that the conservator fees were incurred when the services were rendered, not when the fees for the services were approved. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court improperly refused to apply the one-year-back rule. In this regard, the court stated:
“Applying the ‘general rule’ to this case, petitioner’s conservator fees were incurred when the services were rendered, not when the probate court approved them. Therefore, the probate court erred in refusing to apply the one-year-back rule to this case.”
The court then rejected the petitioner’s argument that it was not liable for the costs of conservator fees because petitioner failed to provide a detailed invoice for his services. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that for an item to be an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107, the following must be met: “(1) the expense must have been incurred; (2) the expense must have been for a product, service, or accommodation reasonably necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation; and (3) the amount of the expense must have been reasonable. . . .”
In this case, the court noted that the second and third requirements were at issue in this case. As to the second requirement, the court noted that it had previously held that fees for a guardian or conservator that was appointed as a result of an incapacity arising out of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident are allowable expenses. As to the third requirement, the court determined that the trial court properly awarded conservator fees even though petitioner failed to present detailed evidence to support his claim. Although the claim was not as detailed as the respondent would have liked, petitioner outlined the types of services he rendered as well as provided an estimate of the time he spent rendering these services. This was sufficient to support the fees requested. In this regard, the court stated:
“At issue here are the second and third requirements established in Nassar, supra. As to the second, this Court has held that the fees associated with a guardian or conservator being appointed as a result of an incapacity arising out of injuries sustained in an automobile accident are allowable expenses under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Heinz v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 214 Mich App 195, 197-198; 543 NW2d 4 (1995). . . .
With respect to the third requirement, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding conservator fees despite petitioner’s failure to present detailed evidence in support of his claim. While the claim was not as detailed as respondent would have liked, the memorandum of services provided by petitioner did outline the types of services he rendered to the estate during the period in question, as well as estimate the time he spent each month rendering these services. All of this appeared to be consistent with the day-to-day duties generally rendered by a conservator. We do not conclude that the trial court erred in considering this to be sufficient evidence to support the fees requested.”
