Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #284580; Unpublished
Judges Hoekstra, Bandstra, and Servitto; unanimous; per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Resident Relatives [3114(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed partial summary disposition for plaintiff, finding that the adult daughter of defendant’s insureds lived with the insureds at the time of the fatal motor vehicle accident and, therefore, defendant was required to defend a third-party action against the daughter.
Defendant AAA/ACIA insured Roxanna Tolar’s parents. At the time of the fatal accident, Tolar had recently moved from Louisiana to Michigan. She moved in with her parents, the insureds, while she was waiting for an apartment of her own to become available. On the day of the accident, Tolar was staying with her sister, while her sister’s husband was out-of-town, in order to care for her sister’s children. Tolar borrowed her sister’s vehicle and was involved in the fatal accident. The decedent’s estate filed an action for wrongful death in which Tolar was a named defendant. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s partial motion for summary disposition, finding that AAA/ACIA was the responsible insurer.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Tolar was a young adult in transition and relied on two cases to determine her domicile: Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) and Dairyland Insurance Company v Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 123 Mich App 675; 333 NW2d 322 (1983). Under Workman, the court first noted that Tolar’s subjective or declared intent favored a finding that she was not a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident because she intended to move into an apartment of her own. The second factor, concerning the formality of the relationship between the person and the member of the insured’s household, did “not disfavor” finding that Tolar resided in her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Although there was no formal relationship regarding residency, Tolar was allowed to use her parents’ home at will. In addition, she utilized the parental relationship for no-cost housing, utilities, food, and transportation. The third factor from Workman pertaining to whether the claimant lived in the same house as the insureds favored a finding that Tolar resided with her parents at the time of the accident. Further, the fourth Workman factor favored that Tolar lived with her parents at the time of the accident, because she had only limited access to “another place of lodging.” Although she occasionally stayed with her sister, she stayed with her sister when she was providing child care and she only stayed with her sister when her sister’s husband was absent. And, although she stayed with a friend, she only stayed with the friend once.
Turning to the Dairyland decision, the court noted that Tolar had her mail sent to her parents’ home and kept some of her personal possessions at their home. Although she kept most of her belongings in a storage facility, the items she did not place in storage were kept at her parents’ home. Further, Tolar listed her parents’ address as her address on bank, rental, and employment documents. She also told the police at the scene of the accident that her address was her parents’ address. Conversely, the fourth and fifth Dairyland factors weigh in favor of finding that Tolar did not reside in her parents’ home: Tolar did not have a separate room at her parents’ home and her parents did not provide direct financial support.
Although some of the factors from Workman and Dairyland favored a finding that Tolar did not live with her parents, most of the factors weighed in favor of a finding that Tolar resided with her parents. As the Supreme Court explained in Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228; 72 NW2d 206 (1897), “[e]very person must have a domicile somewhere” and “very slight circumstances must often decide the question.” Therefore, balancing the facts of Tolar’s life, the Court of Appeals determined that Tolar resided with her parents on the date of the accident and was, therefore, covered under the parents’ liability policy. In this regard, the court stated:
“We note that the first factor for consideration as set forth in Workman, supra, subjective or declared intent, favors a finding that Roxana [sic] was not a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna ultimately intended to move into an apartment of her own in Michigan. Prior to arranging this she was not without a residence. She primarily lived at her parents’ home and expected to stay there until she moved. However, her plan was to move into the apartment as soon as it was ready, and this occurred during the time she was staying with her sister to help with child-care, nine days after the accident.
The second Workman factor, concerning the ‘formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the insured’s household,’ does not disfavor a finding that Roxana [sic] was a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Although there was only an informal relationship between Roxanna and her parents, that relationship allowed her to freely use her parents’ home at will. Further, she was able to utilize the parental relationship for no-cost housing, and also for utilities, food, and transportation. . .
The third Workman factor, pertaining to whether the claimant lives in the same house or upon the same premises as the insureds, favors a finding that Roxana [sic] was a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna resided in the same house and on the same premises with her parents during the period she was staying with them.
Likewise, the fourth Workman factor also favors a finding that Roxana [sic] was a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna had only limited access to ‘another place of lodging.’ As noted, she was able to stay with her sister, primarily to help with child-care, only when her sister’s husband was absent. She also stayed with a friend at least once in the nearly two months between arriving in Michigan and obtaining her apartment. . . .
Turning to the additional factors for consideration identified by this Court in Dairyland, supra, we note that, . . . Roxanna . . . chose to have her address changed to her parents’ home and received her mail there. . . .
The next Dairyland factor also slightly favors a finding that Roxanna was a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna maintained some of her personal possessions at her parents’ home. While she stored most of her belongings and kept only what was necessary with her, those belongings she did not place in storage, including a slow cooker and blankets, were kept at her parents’ home. She also kept her cat at her parents’ home. . . .
The third Dairyland factor likewise favors a finding that Roxana [sic] was a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna listed her parents’ address as her own on bank, rental, and employment documents. She also identified her parents’ address as her own to the police at the scene of her accident.
Conversely, the fourth Dairyland factor weights slightly in favor of a finding that Roxana [sic] was not a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Roxanna did not have a separate room at her parents’ home; that home has only a single bedroom. . . .
Finally, the last Dairyland factor also favors a finding that Roxana [sic] was not a resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident. Even though she did not pay rent, and received food, utilities, and transportation as needed, Roxanna did not receive direct financial support from her parents.
When determining Roxanna’s place of resident, we are required to weigh and balance each of the aforementioned factors against one another; no one factor is determinative and it is error to give any one factor special weight. . . . [A]s our Supreme court has explained, ‘[e]very person must have a domicile somewhere’ and ‘very slight circumstances must often decide the question.’ Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228, 230; 72 NW2d 206 (1897).
[B]alancing the entire circumstances of Roxanna’s life, we conclude that the undisputed facts presented weigh in favor of a determination that Roxanna resided at her parents’ home on August 9, 2005. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that she was a resident relative according to her parents’ insurance policy at the time of the automobile accident involving plaintiff’s decedent.”
