Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #287279; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Markey, and Borrello; unanimous, per curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not applicable, Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Uninsured Motorist Benefits: Notice and Statute of Limitations for Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam opinion, decided without oral argument, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court Order granting plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits, finding that plaintiff failed to properly provide notice of the claim within the time limits provided by the policy.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court improperly granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration after it had granted defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits, finding that plaintiff had failed to provide notice or file suit within the contractually determined time limits.
In reversing, the court determined that the trial court improperly found that defendant was required to show actual prejudice in order to rely on its contractual notice and limitations period. Under the Rory v Continental Insurance Company, 473 Mich 457; 703 NW2d 23 (2005), the Supreme Court determined that a contractual limitations period contained in an insurance policy is governed by the same principles that are applicable to other contracts. Under Rory, there is no determination that an insurance company must be able to show prejudice in order to rely on its limitations or notice provisions. Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that Rory does not apply because her accident occurred three days before it was decided is unpersuasive. In this regard, the court stated:
“The trial court erred by concluding that defendant was required to show actual prejudice in order to rely on the contractual notice and limitations period. In Rory v Continental Insurance Company, 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005), the Court considered a contractual limitations period and determined that its enforceability was governed by the same principles that are applicable to other contracts. . . . Plaintiff does not offer any basis for concluding that requiring a demonstration of prejudice for enforcement of time limitations is consistent with principles that are applicable to contracts generally. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that Rory does not apply to her cause of action because her accident occurred three days before the decision; there is no basis for her to claim reliance on pre-Rory decisions. . . .”
