Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 327572; Unpublished
Judges Beckering, Cavanagh and Gadola; Non-unanimous, Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Majority Opinion; Link to Dissent 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year-Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this non-unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff-medical provider's claim for no-fault benefits was not barred by the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), because the method for calculating "one year" under §3145(1) for purposes of filing an action for PIP benefits is computed the same way as "one year" for purposes of limiting the recovery of those PIP benefits.
From August 2 to August 5, 2013, plaintiff Henry Ford Macomb treated a driver for his auto accident injuries and, as a result, incurred more than $44,000 in medical fees. Both the driver and the vehicle were uninsured, so plaintiff submitted a no-fault claim to the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan. Before the MACP assigned the claim to an insurer, plaintiff filed suit against the MACP on Monday, August 4, 2014. Of significance was the fact that August 2, 2014 – one year after plaintiff incurred its medical costs -- fell on a Saturday. The MACP assigned the claim to defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange, which did not dispute the claim was timely filed within one year pursuant to §3145(1). Farmers paid for medical services rendered August 4 and August 5, 2013 but filed a motion for summary disposition regarding the services rendered August 2 and August 3, 2013, asserting it did not have to pay for these dates under the one-year-back rule in §3145(1), since the complaint was filed August 4, 2014. Plaintiff maintained that, under MCR 1.108(1), the one-year-back rule extended to the "next business day," since August 2, 2014, fell on a Saturday and the complaint had been timely filed for the purposes of recovering benefits on August 2 and August 3, 2013. Defendant argued the one-year-back rule was a limitation on damages provision and not a statute of limitations, and therefore MCR 1.108(1) did not operate to toll the rule. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied Farmers' motion for summary disposition.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Farmers argument that the one-year-back rule in §3145(1) cannot be extended by MCR 1.108(1).
In so holding, the Court examined the language of §3145(1), noting it is a "damages-limiting provision." The Court also explained that, while an action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than one year after a loss has been incurred, §3145(1) nevertheless limits recovery to "those losses incurred within the one year preceding the filing of the action." The Court further pointed out that, while §3145(1) requires a trial court to calculate time, it does not set forth how that time is to be calculated.
The Court of Appeals then cited MCR 1.108(1), which says in part:
"Computing a period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by court order, or by statute, the following rules apply: (1) The day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not included. The last day of the period is included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is closed pursuant to court order; in that event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the court is closed pursuant to court order. ..."
In this case, while one year from August 2, 2013, was August 2, 2014, the Court of Appeals noted it was "undisputed" that August 2, 2014, fell on a Saturday and, as a result, pursuant to MCR 1.108(1), the calculation of the year extended to August 4, 2014 – which was the Monday after August 2, 2014, and the day that plaintiff filed this suit. Therefore, the Court held the trial court properly ruled the one-year-back rule did not bar plaintiff from recovering PIP benefits for medical services provided on August 2 and August 3, 2013.
The Court of Appeals further rejected Farmers' argument that a different result was required under the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 476 Mich 55 (2006), overruled by Regents of Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289 (2010), reinstated by Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich 200 (2012).
According to the Court of Appeals, the Cameron Court concluded that, because the one-year-back rule was not a statute of limitations, and MCL 600.5851(1) specifically said that it tolled statutes of limitation, the tolling provision in §5851(1) did not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of §3145(1).
The Court of Appeals held that Cameron differed from the present case and stated:
"Defendant urges us to follow Cameron and conclude that MCR 1.108 cannot toll the one-year-back rule because the latter is not a statute of limitations. We decline to do so because the trial court was not using MCR 1.108 to 'toll' the one-year-back rule, as characterized by defendant. It was using MCR 1.108 to calculate what constitutes '1 year' for purposes of MCL 500.3145(1). Cameron is distinguishable from the instant case in that it did not even address how to calculate '1 year.' Moreover, MCR 1.108 does not specifically state that it applies only to statutes of limitation. Relative to the instant matter, it states that it should be consulted to compute 'a period of time prescribed or allowed ... by statute[,]' and the Supreme Court has indicated that MCR 1.108(1) should be consulted where a given statute does not provide directions for the computation of a given time period. ... MCL 500.3145(1) is just such a statute."
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found the trial court did not err in denying Farmers' summary disposition motion on the ground that the one-year-back rule did not bar plaintiff's claim for PIP benefits.
Judge Gadola, in a separate dissenting opinion, said the one-year-back rule in §3145(1) precluded plaintiff's recovery for PIP benefits before August 4, 2013. The judge wrote:
"[A] plain reading of MCL 500.3145(1) compels me to conclude that, because plaintiff did not file its complaint until August 4, 2014, its recovery was limited to losses incurred on or after August 4, 2013, i.e., one year back from the date the lawsuit was filed. ... MCR 1.108 is not applicable to this case and the majority's proposed application of the court rule would violate the separation of powers doctrine outlined in the Michigan Constitution. The majority's analysis overlooks the fact that the portion of the statute at issue in this case is not the forward-looking statute of limitations, but rather the backward-looking limitation on damages, i.e., the one-year-back rule, contained in the final sentence of MCL 500.3145(1). ... The one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) concerns a matter of substantive law, rather than procedure. In my opinion, application of MCR 1.108 in the manner proposed by the majority would violate the separation of powers doctrine because it would apply the court rule in a way that impermissibly modifies the plain language of the substantive law."
