Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 327292; Unpublished
Judges Jansen, O’Connell and Riordan; Unanimous, Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving plaintiff’s claim for first-party no-fault benefits, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erroneously granted summary disposition for State Farm because:
1) plaintiff offered documentary evidence that demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact;
2) the trial court failed to view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff;
3) the trial court’s decision was based on erroneous legal and factual determinations; and
4) the trial court improperly made credibility and factual determinations that were within the province of the jury.
Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck from behind while at a complete stop on I-96 during rush-hour traffic. While she did not sustain any cuts or bruises, was able to exit her vehicle and never lost consciousness, she claimed that, at the moment of impact, she felt “excruciating pain” from her head to her neck. Plaintiff refused an ambulance, but then drove herself to the emergency room after the accident, in light of the pain she was experiencing. In the week post-accident, plaintiff sought emergency medical treatment three times. In the weeks and months that followed, she sought treatment from: 1) Dr. Johnstone, her primary care physician who was board certified in internal medicine; 2) Dr. Jennifer Doble, who was board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation, with a subspecialty in traumatic brain injury and rehab after trauma; 3) Dr. Daniel Singer, a board certified neurologist; and 4) Dr. Richard Klein, DDS. Plaintiff was diagnosed with various medical conditions, which doctors believed were caused by the auto accident, including: mild traumatic brain injury; post-concussive syndrome; migraine headaches; knots, swelling, and spasms in her neck and trapezius muscle; increased anxiety; and a temporomandibular disorder. Plaintiff was prescribed medication, physical and occupational therapy, replacement services and attendant care. It was also recommended that plaintiff suspend her employment as a music teacher. When State Farm, plaintiff’s no-fault insurer, denied a claim for PIP benefits, plaintiff filed this action.
State Farm moved for summary disposition, asserting plaintiff could not show that her injuries were caused by, or connected to, the auto accident and that plaintiff’s injuries were related to former conditions unrelated to the accident. Plaintiff responded by offering deposition testimony from her treating physicians, as well as numerous medical records. The trial court ultimately granted State Farm’s motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact that the auto accident caused her injuries or aggravated pre-existing conditions.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiff offered sufficient evidence on the issue of causation and finding that whether State Farm is liable was a question of fact. The Court observed:
“After thoroughly reviewing published and unpublished Michigan case law, we find no basis for concluding that plaintiff was required to proffer evidence showing objective manifestations of her injuries in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation for purposes of MCL 500.3105. Instead, we conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the medical records, reports, and deposition testimony of plaintiff’s treating doctors, which were based on plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain as well as the doctors’ objective observations, support finding that the accident may have caused various injuries that resulted in reasonable and necessary medical expenses and other PIP benefits.”
According to the Court, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a question of fact as to whether her headaches and brain-related injuries arose from the accident. Pointing to the testimony of Dr. Doble, the Court said the doctor “expressly confirmed” that it was more likely than not that plaintiff’s mild TBI and migraine headaches were related to the accident. As for Dr. Johnstone’s testimony, the Court said the doctor made a diagnosis of post-concussive syndrome upon examining plaintiff after the accident. Regarding this testimony, the Court stated:
“This evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether head-related injuries arose out of the accident. Given the significant evidence regarding the intensity of plaintiff’s headaches after the accident, as well as the fact that plaintiff did not report headaches during her appointments with Johnstone prior to the collision, the isolated medical records indicating that plaintiff reported headaches in the three years prior to the accident do not establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s headaches — or the exacerbation of her headaches — were unrelated to the accident.”
Looking again to the testimony of Dr. Doble and Dr. Johnstone, the Court of Appeals further held the evidence presented a genuine issue about whether plaintiff’s neck and shoulder injuries arose out of the accident. The Court said:
“[T]he objective observations of plaintiff’s treating doctors, as well as their opinions that these conditions arose out of the motor vehicle accident at issue, demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s spasms and muscle-related injuries continued after April 2013 and were caused by the accident.”
Likewise, Dr. Klein provided a detailed explanation as to why he believed that plaintiff’s TMD was related to the accident, thereby creating a genuine issue of fact, the Court of Appeals held.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded:
“Although the IME reports contradicted the findings of plaintiff’s treating doctors and suggested that plaintiff was exaggerating or misstating her symptoms in order to achieve personal gain, this evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact that may be properly resolved at trial. Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was improper.”
