Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 320570; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Kelly, and Servitto; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (McCormick Era: 2010 – present) [§3135(5)]
Objective Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment (McCormick Era: 2010 - Present) [§3135(5)]
Evidentiary Issues [§3135]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that while plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that she suffered an “objectively manifested impairment” under MCL 500.3135, this claimed impairment did not affect plaintiff’s general ability to lead her normal life because the evidence failed to show that there was a “measurable difference between her normal life before and after the accident."
Plaintiff in this case was involved in a minor accident that did not result in significant damage to her vehicle. Plaintiff did not report the accident to law enforcement until five days later. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered various injuries as a result of the accident, including “a right ankle injury requiring surgery; aggravation of preexisting conditions, including arthritis and fibromyalgia; and ‘potential loss of future earning capacity.’” The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s claim for economic damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that she suffered “an objectively manifested impairment” as a result of the accident. For purposes of deciding the motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals noted the trial court accepted plaintiff's testimony and that of her podiatrist that her ankle injury was “caused by trauma suffered during the accident.”
In so holding, the Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff’s podiatrist testified that plaintiff's ankle “was injured by a traumatic event, and that the injury required surgery and hampered plaintiff's ability to walk . . . during her recovery,” and that this evidence “was sufficient to meet the first prong of the statute.”
The Court of Appeals further held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that she suffered an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function. In doing so, the Court noted:
“The ability to walk is generally considered to be an important body function, and this ability was important to plaintiff specifically, as she testified that she walked frequently for recreation prior to her injury. Although the extent of the effect of plaintiff's ankle injury on her walking habits is a matter of dispute between the parties, plaintiff established that her ankle surgery impeded her ability to walk during her recovery, and that she had to use a walking boot and a walker in order to walk. This evidence was sufficient to establish that plaintiff's impairment affected an important body function.”
However, the Court of Appeals went on to find as a matter of law that plaintiff’s claimed impairment did not affect her general ability to lead her normal life because the evidence did not show that there was a “measurable difference between her normal life before and after the accident."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that defense counsel presented a document in which plaintiff asserted have been “totally disabled” as a result of a previous accident around 1995. The Court said:
“Defendant also presented a questionnaire that plaintiff had filled out in 2001 in which she claimed that she was unable to walk for more than four blocks because of pain in her legs, and that she needed to stop every one to two minutes to rest because of her pain. In the same document, plaintiff also claimed to have ceased all of her recreational activities because of her pain. In addition, plaintiff had stated that although she was able to cook, wash dishes, and do laundry, these tasks took her '[f]orever' and she had to take ten minute breaks while doing them. In a document plaintiff filled out in July 2002, she claimed to be unable to work due to back pain that radiates into her legs and neck and to have suffered from the same since 1995. In a 2005 decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) concerning plaintiff's request for supplemental security income payments, the ALJ noted that plaintiff has arthritis in both knees and cannot kneel or stoop, has fibromyalgia, frequently feels exhausted and sick and has very little energy, has hand pain which she attributes to carpal tunnel syndrome and that plaintiff was unable to perform even a full range of sedentary work.”
The Court of Appeals further noted that plaintiff testified that, as a result of the accident, she was not participating in any recreational activities because she was “always sick” and had “isolated' herself.” In this regard, the Court said:
“Plaintiff also testified that she was unable to work as a result of her injuries from the accident. Regarding her abilities following the accident, plaintiff testified that she could walk on a treadmill for up to twenty minutes and perform some light household tasks, including some cleaning and light loads of laundry, grocery shopping, and basic cooking.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded:
“[P]laintiff's description of her life following the accident is not significantly different from her life in the years preceding the accident as demonstrated by the record. Her domestic and recreational activities are virtually the same, and she indicated that she had difficulty walking long before the accident occurred. Plaintiff was disabled and asserted that she was unable to work before the accident, as well as after it. The trial court did not err in finding that there was no appreciable difference in plaintiff's normal life before and after the automobile collision, and that plaintiff therefore was not entitled to recovery of noneconomic damages.”
