Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket # 324991; Unpublished
Judges Gleicher, Murphy, and Owens; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Evidentiary Issues
Uninsured Motorist Benefits in Motorcycle Accidents
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a motorcyclist’s action for uninsured motorist benefits should not have been summarily dismissed, because questions remained about the circumstances of the accident and a jury must determine whether the motorcyclist was eligible for benefits under the hit-and-run provisions of his insurance policies.
Plaintiff was ejected from his motorcycle when he struck a 4x6 piece of lumber that allegedly fell from a truck that was driving a few cars ahead of him. The truck did not stop when plaintiff’s accident occurred. Plaintiff had a motorcycle policy with Progressive and a vehicle policy with defendant State Farm. Progressive’s policy provided: “’Uninsured motor vehicle’ means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type: … d. that is a hit-and-run vehicle whose owner or operator cannot be identified and which strikes (i) you or a relative; (ii) a vehicle that you or a relative are occupying; or (iii) a covered motorcycle.” State Farm’s policy provided: “A ‘hit-and-run’ land motor vehicle or motorcycle the owner and driver of which remain unknown and which strikes a. the insured; or b. the vehicle the insured is occupying and causes bodily injury to the insured.” Progressive denied benefits, asserting the accident was not a “hit and run.” State Farm also denied coverage, claiming Progressive had priority to pay and there was no evidence connecting the piece of lumber with any truck that left the scene of the accident. Plaintiff filed suit against both Progressive and State Farm. The trial court granted the insurers’ motions for summary disposition, finding that no evidence connected the lumber with another motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling, finding that a jury could reasonably infer that the lumber fell from the truck, which did not stop at the scene of the accident.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted the deposition testimony of one witness, who said no lumber fell from the truck, and another witness, who said she saw a piece of lumber on the truck “get jarred loose and fall or flip,” but never actually saw it fall into the roadway.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals said a jury could reasonably infer that the piece of lumber was in the roadway for only a few seconds and, therefore, could have fallen from the truck that did not stop. In this regard, the court concluded:
“[I]t is reasonable to infer that the large piece of wood fell from the commercial truck pulling a trailer occupied by an excavator, or fell from another motor vehicle. This inference is far more sensible than any other explanation offered for the wood’s sudden presence on the road. Ultimately, it will be for the jury to decide whether the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it mandate coverage. The jury may well reject Danhof’s position. However, neither this Court nor the circuit court may dismiss this case before its time.”
