Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #321721; Published
Judges Talbot, Wilder, and Fort Hood; Unanimous; Opinion by Judge Wilder
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 312 Mich App 259 (2015); Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Personal Protection Insurance (PIP) Benefits Entitlement [§3105]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Loading/Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published Opinion by Judge Wilder, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits for a leg injury he sustained while attempting to move a gun safe with his truck, because the injury “arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” within the meaning of MCL 500.3105.
Plaintiff and his wife attempted to move a 1,500-pound gun safe located in their garage by tying it to their pickup truck. While the court was not explicitly clear, it appears that plaintiff’s wife advanced the truck forward at a slow rate of speed with the safe tied to it, while plaintiff guided the safe along as it was being dragged across the concrete driveway. At some point, the safe became unstable when the truck hit an uneven portion of concrete. The safe tipped over and landed on plaintiff’s leg, crushing it and requiring amputation of the leg below the knee. The court noted there was a factual discrepancy between plaintiff’s wife’s account of the events and plaintiff’s account of the events, but the court said the discrepancy was irrelevant for purposes of deciding the case. State Farm, plaintiff’s insurer, denied plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits, asserting plaintiff did not provide reasonable proof of coverage. Plaintiff then filed this action seeking coverage. The trial court ruled the injury occurred while the truck was being used as a motor vehicle, and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $75,000.
The Court of Appeals agreed that plaintiff was entitled to benefits, holding his injury “arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” In so finding, the court said:
“[I]t is undisputed that the insured truck was being driven for purposes of moving the safe. As noted in McKenzie [v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214 (1998)], ‘moving motor vehicles are quite obviously engaged in a transportational function.’ While defendant attempts to limit the importance of this statement, it is clear that in the case at bar, the truck was moving for the purpose of transporting or conveying the safe from one location to another when the injury occurred. Thus, ‘the requisite nexus between the injury and transportation function of the motor vehicle’ is present.”
The Court of Appeals explained that plaintiff’s injury resulted from the force of the vehicle hitting uneven concrete, causing the safe to fall onto plaintiff’s leg. In this regard, the court compared the case to Smith v Community Service Ins Co, 114 Mich App 310 (1982), and said:
“[P]laintiff’s injury resulted from the force of the motor vehicle hitting uneven concrete causing the safe to fall over and onto plaintiff’s leg. Whether the safe was inside the bed of the truck or being pulled by a rope from the back of the truck at the time the safe fell over, the truck ‘was the instrumentality of plaintiff’s injury.’ … Driving a truck to transport something is ‘consistent with its inherent nature and in accordance with its intended purpose.’ … Although the particular method used to transport the safe, i.e., dragging, may not have been contemplated, the use of a truck to transport something is a normal use. Thus, the injury occurred while the truck was being used as a motor vehicle. … It is normal and foreseeable to use a truck, attached with a trailer hitch, to move heavy objects. Accordingly, plaintiff’s injury was closely related to the transportational function of the vehicle and, therefore, arose out of the operation, ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle.’”
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits.
