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Gallagher v Northland Farms, LLC; (COA-UNP, 7/14/2015; RB #3440)

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Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #321976; Unpublished  
Judges O’Connell, Owens, and M.J. Kelly; Unanimous; Per Curiam  
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion   


STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Loading/Unloading [§3106(1)(b)]
Parked Motor Vehicles; Workers Comp Exclusion [§3106]
Exclusion for Parked Vehicles Covered by Workers Comp [§3106(2)]

TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable  


CASE SUMMARY:
In this unpublished per curiam Opinion involving a plaintiff who was struck by falling boards when opening the trailer door of a parked delivery truck, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s no-fault insurers were not obligated to pay PIP benefits, because the injuries were not the result of physical contact with the property that was being unloaded from the vehicle pursuant to MCL 500.3106(1)(b).

Plaintiff was injured when board being used as make-shift shelving fell and struck him as he opened the trailer door of his delivery truck. Plaintiff sought PIP benefits from defendants Farm Bureau and Bristol West, but his claims were denied. Plaintiff brought this action against Farm Bureau and Bristol West seeking coverage. Farm Bureau and Bristol West moved for summary disposition, contending the semi-truck was parked and none of the parked vehicle exceptions applied. Plaintiff, however, argued he was entitled to benefits because opening the trailer doors was part of the “process of unloading the truck” within the meaning of §3106(1)(b). Plaintiff also claimed that he had to open the doors to enter the trailer and, therefore, this was part of the process of “entering the vehicle” under §3106(1)(c). The trial court granted the insurers’ motion for summary disposition. On appeal, plaintiff argued his injuries were compensable under §3106(1)(b), given that he was in the process of unloading the vehicle and the trailer door was permanently mounted equipment.

The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s arguments, reiterating that compensability under §3106(1)(b) turns on whether the injuries resulted from physical contact with the property being unloaded.

The Court of Appeals observed that under the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381 (2011), “constituent parts of the vehicle itself” are not considered “permanently mounted equipment.” Pursuant to Frazier, the court said this meant the trailer doors were not equipment that was permanently mounted.

The Court of Appeals then held that plaintiff did not suffer any injuries as a result of coming into “physical contact” with the property actually being unloaded from the truck. Rather, the court pointed out that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by boards that fell and struck him on the head. The court reasoned:

“Because the injured person must be in ‘physical contact’ with the property while the property is ‘being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle,’ … this Court has repeatedly held that this exception does not apply to acts which are merely preparatory to the act of lifting or lowering property onto or from the vehicle. … By providing that the injury must occur during the lifting or lowering of the property, the Legislature plainly limited the exception to that specific phase of the loading or unloading process. … The act of opening the trailer’s doors is — in the broadest sense — part of the unloading process. But it does not itself involve ‘physical contact’ with property ‘being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.’ … Although property that falls from a trailer is in some sense ‘being … lowered,’ we conclude that the Legislature’s requirement that the injury directly arise from contact with property that is ‘being … lowered from the vehicle’ requires that the lowering process be initiated by some actor and that the contact be with the property actually being unloaded.”

The Court of Appeals further noted that plaintiff did not reiterate on appeal his claim that the “entering into or alighting from” provision in §3106(1)(c) applied, or the “dangerously parked vehicles” provision in §3106(1)(a) applied.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court properly granted summary disposition for Farm Bureau and Bristol West.


Michigan auto accident attorney Stephen Sinas is the lead editor of the appellate case summaries published on this site regarding the Michigan auto insurance law. To learn more about how Stephen Sinas and how the Sinas Dramis Law Firm can help you if you have been injured in a Michigan auto accident, visit SinasDramis.com.

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