Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #317779; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Saad, and Hoekstra; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to No-Fault PIP Benefits: Bodily Injury Requirement [§3105(1)]
Disqualification for Intentionally Suffered Injury [§3105(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving whether plaintiff intended to injure himself within the meaning of MCL 500.3105(4) while exiting the passenger side of a slow-moving van, the Court of Appeals held that summary disposition was improperly granted for plaintiff because the evidence created a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff subjectively intended to injure himself upon exiting the van.
Plaintiff and his former girlfriend, Ashley MacDermaid, left a party together in a van driven by MacDermaid. Shortly thereafter, the two began to argue. At some point during the argument, MacDermaid stopped the van and asked plaintiff to get out. Plaintiff then attempted to do so. Either at the same time or shortly thereafter, MacDermaid began driving away in the van. When she did so, plaintiff had not fully exited the vehicle, and plaintiff subsequently hit the ground, sustaining serious head injuries as the van was moving away at a slow rate of speed. Plaintiff suffered severe cognitive and physical injuries requiring lifelong care. Plaintiff filed a claim for no-fault benefits, which defendant Auto Club Group denied, on the alleged basis that his injuries were intentionally inflicted under §3105(4). Plaintiff brought this action for benefits and moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted after concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff’s injuries were accidental. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding a question of fact existed on this issue.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals said a question existed about whether plaintiff intended to injure himself. The court explained:
“[T]he parties do not dispute whether plaintiff intended to leap from the moving vehicle; his act was plainly intentional. The only issue is whether he subjectively intended for injury to result from his intentional act. Relevant to this issue, in evaluating an individual’s intent, the actor’s subjective intent need not be shown by direct evidence of the actor’s state of mind. … Rather, intent may be inferred from the facts. … The evidence presented shows that, leading up to the incident, plaintiff had engaged in a heated disagreement with MacDermaid, during which he appeared quite upset, to the extent that he ‘was just full out yelling.’ … As a result, MacDermaid stopped the vehicle and gave plaintiff an opportunity to exit the van; in fact, she asked him to do so. But, rather than heed this request and exit safely, plaintiff waited until the van resumed moving and then he leapt out. The link between injury and intentionally leaping from a moving vehicle is plain, and taking such action may be regarded as indicative of an intent to cause injury. … This seems particularly true when, according to MacDermaid’s description, plaintiff also made no effort to forestall the injury attendant to leaping from a moving vehicle by, for instance, tucking and rolling.”
Based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, finding there was a question about whether plaintiff suffered an “accidental bodily injury” entitling him to PIP benefits under §3105(1).
