Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #313413; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Jansen, and Shapiro; 2-1 (Judge Shapiro concurring); Non-unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
Link to Concurrence
On 3/31/2015, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered that the appeal in this case be held in abeyance pending the decision in Hodge v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co; Link to Order
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Allowable Expenses for Attendant Care [§3107(1)(a)]
Allowable Expenses: Claims by Service Providers [§3107(1)(a)]
Work Loss Benefits: Nature of the Benefit [§3107(1)(b)]
Replacement Service Expense Benefits: Nature of the Benefit [§3107(1)(c)]
Service Providers as Payees §[3112]
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
Penalty Attorney Fees for Service Providers [§3148]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 2-1 unpublished per curiam Opinion (with Judge Shapiro concurring), the Court of Appeals held that a $25,000 district court judgment entered following an award of PIP benefits and attorney fees in excess of this amount was void, because the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim, given the amounts in controversy.
Plaintiff LaShawn Redmond was injured in a car accident. Defendant State Farm initially paid benefits, but stopped. Plaintiff-Redmond filed an action seeking benefits in the 36th District Court. Meanwhile, Plaintiff-Destinee’s Transportation, plaintiff-Redmond’s transportation services provider, also filed an action against State Farm in 36th District Court. After a consolidated trial, a jury awarded plaintiff-Redmond $72,543.68 for PIP benefits and penalty interest, and awarded plaintiff-Destinee’s Transportation $8,750.68 for transportation services provided to plaintiff-Redmond. The district court then concluded that both plaintiffs were entitled to penalty attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1) in the amount of $113,600 for plaintiff-Redmond and $28,000 for plaintiff-Destinee’s Transportation. Recognizing the $25,000 jurisdictional limitation applicable to district courts, the district court awarded a judgment in the amount of $25,000 for plaintiff-Redmond, and a judgment for $8,750.68 for plaintiff-Destinee’s Transportation.
After concluding that both claims could have been brought in a single action, the Court of Appeals held the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over both plaintiffs’ claims because, when consolidated, these claims exceeded the district court’s $25,000 jurisdictional limit.
In this regard, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
“Because there is virtual identity between Destinee’s Transportation’s claims and Redmond’s claims such that they all could have been brought in a single action involving a single judgment, and because these separately filed actions were consolidated in the district court, just as in Moody, we likewise conclude that these claims were merged for the purposes of determining the amount in controversy …. Therefore, the entire judgment, including Destinee’s Transportation’s claims, is void for want of subject matter jurisdiction because it was clear before the jury made its factual findings that the consolidated claims exceeded the district court’s $25,000 jurisdictional limit. … We reverse the circuit court’s opinion and order to the extent that it concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Destinee’s Transportation’s claims, and we vacate the district court’s judgment regarding these claims and order regarding Destinee’s Transportation’s attorney fees because they are void. … [T]he entire judgment … is void for want of subject matter jurisdiction because it was clear before the jury made its factual findings that the consolidated claims exceeded the district court’s $25,000 jurisdictional limit.”
In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted the district court should have either dismissed or transferred the case to circuit court. The court said:
“[T]he district court knew the amount in controversy exceeded its jurisdictional limit before the jury made its factual findings, as was the case in Moody. … Thus, the district court was required to dismiss Redmond’s complaint or transfer the matter to the circuit court, and its failure to do so renders its judgments void for want of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Judge Shapiro, in a separate concurrence, agreed with the result, but noted the majority should not have relied on the “flawed” reasoning of Moody, et al. v Home Owners Ins Co, 304 Mich App 415 (2014).
