United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan; Case #13-12892
Hon. Patrick J. Duggan
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Opinion Not Available 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Nature and Scope of PPI Benefits (Property Damage and Loss of Use) [§3121(1)]
Irrelevancy of Fault [§3121(2)]
Calculation of PPI Benefits [§3121(3)]
Priority Rules for Payment of PPI Benefits [§3125]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this written Opinion concerning an insurer’s subrogation claim, Federal Judge Patrick J. Duggan ruled that defendant insurer was obligated to pay property protection insurance (PPI) benefits when a limousine that it insured caught fire and damaged a commercial garage that was insured by plaintiff. Although the limousine was parked in the garage at the time of the fire, Judge Duggan held the vehicle was still “involved” in the accident to trigger benefits because it retained its “singular transportational function” pursuant to MCL 500.3121(1).
Plaintiff paid for damage to the commercial garage that was caused by the limousine fire, and then brought this action as a subrogee of its insured, seeking PPI benefits from defendant.
In ruling that defendant was responsible for coverage, Judge Duggan said the damage to the garage arose out of the “ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” under §3121(1), even though the limousine had been parked in the garage for three days prior to the fire. The judge said:
“[T]his Court disagrees that the property damage at issue herein did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle under the analysis set forth in McKenzie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 458 Mich. 214, 580 N.W.2d 424 (1998). This case is unlike those circumstances identified in McKenzie as rare instances ‘when a motor vehicle is used for other purposes, e.g., as a housing facility of sorts, as an advertising display (such as at a car dealership), as a foundation for construction equipment, as a mobile public library, or perhaps even when a car is on display at a museum.’ … The white limousine involved in this case is not fairly characterized as a dual-purpose vehicle and there is therefore no need to distinguish its use as a motor vehicle from any other possible use. … Indeed, the white limousine was used for the very purpose of transporting clients from one place to another.”
According to Judge Duggan, the fact that the limousine was parked at the time of the fire did not take away from its “singular transportational function.” The judge said:
“Here, it is without question that the vehicle was being used for transportational purposes. As a matter of logic, parking is a necessarily corollary of motoring. Parking, then, ‘is closely related to the transportational function of a vehicle[.]’”
In this case, defendant could not show that the limousine was not “involved” in the accident, Judge Duggan said:
“The requisite causal nexus between the vehicle and the property damage surely exists in this case and the ‘association between’ the vehicle and the property damage is far from ‘remote[.]’”
Therefore, Judge Duggan granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages.
