Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #312702; Published
Judges Wilder, Fitzgerald, and Markey; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
Link to Order
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year-Notice Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
One-Year-Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
Obligation of Claimant to Make Timely Claim to the Assigned Claims Facility [§3174]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Revised Judicature Act – Tolling of Statutes of Limitations (MCL 600.5851- 600.5856)
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam Opinion involving an action to recover benefits for an unborn child injured in an automobile accident, the Court of Appeals held: 1) plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1) because the minority tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) applied to keep the no-fault claim from being summarily dismissed, and 2) the one-year-back rule in §3145(1) applies to a plaintiff seeking PIP benefits under an assigned claims plan.
Plaintiff India Thomas was an unborn child who suffered a brain injury in an automobile accident. There was no identifiable insurer and the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility (MACF) assigned the claim to defendant, Citizens Insurance Company. Citizens denied benefits, asserting the claim was time-barred by §3145(1) and MCL 500.3174. Plaintiff filed this action for benefits. The trial court denied Citizens’ motion for summary disposition and granted partial summary disposition for plaintiff. The trial court ruled: 1) §3145(1)’s one-year statute of limitations was tolled by MCL 600.5851(1), and 2) the one-year-back rule in §3145(1) did not apply because §3174 did not contain such a rule.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Citizens argued that plaintiff could not maintain an action because, under §3174, written notice of the injury was not given to MACF within one year of the accident. The Court of Appeals disagreed and said:
“[Citizens] is correct that the first sentence of MCL 500.3174 contains a notice provision, but it only required plaintiff to notify the MACF of the claim ‘within the time that would have been allowed for filing an action for [PIP] benefits if identifiable coverage applicable to the claim had been in effect.’ … The third sentence limits the time in which a plaintiff could bring an action for PIP benefits, stating that it ‘shall not be commenced more than 30 days after receipt of notice of the assignment or the last date on which the action could have been commenced against an insurer of identifiable coverage applicable to the claim, whichever is later.’ Thus, plaintiff timely notified the MACF of her claim and timely filed her action if she accomplished both within the time that would have been allowed for her to file an action if identifiable coverage had been available.”
According to the Court of Appeals, §3145(1) governed the time that would have been allowed to file an action if identifiable coverage had been available. The court stated:
“Notably, MCL 500.3145(1) does not require a claimant to give written notice of injury if an action is commenced within one year of the accident. And if MCL 600.5851(1) tolled the one-year statute of limitation for filing an action for PIP benefits, plaintiff’s deadline to notify the MACF of her claim under MCL 500.3174 would be tolled to the same extent.”
The Court of Appeals explained the issue was whether §5851(1) applied to an action for PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act. The court said:
“Defendant argues that MCL 600.5851(1) cannot be invoked in an action under the no-fault act because under a 1993 amendment, the statute was expressly limited to actions ‘under this act,’ meaning the RJA, and an action under the no-fault act is not under the RJA. … In Klida v Braman, 278 Mich App 60; 748 NW2d 244 (2008), this Court decided the meaning of the phrase ‘under this act’ after a lengthy discussion and analysis. The Court concluded that all civil actions are brought ‘under the RJA,’ whether based on statute, common law, or contract, and MCL 600.5851(1) is applicable to such actions. … Accordingly, because there is no dispute that plaintiff’s action is a civil action, the minority/insanity tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851(1) are applicable.”
Regarding whether the minority tolling provisions in §5851(1) applied to the one-year statute of limitations and the one-year-back rule in §3145(1), the Court of Appeals reasoned:
“… ‘MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for commencing an action ….’ Accordingly, the first sentence is considered a ‘statute of limitations,’ to which MCL 600.5851(1) applies. … However, MCL 500.3145(1) also contains a limitation on ‘the period for which benefits may be recovered.’ … Specifically, the third sentence of MCL 500.3145(1) provides that a claimant ‘may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.’ MCL 500.3145(1). This limitation on damages is commonly referred to as the ‘one-year-back rule.’ … Unlike the statute of limitations, the one-year-back rule is not subject to the minority/insanity tolling provisions of MCL 600.5851(1). …The trial court nevertheless ruled that MCL 500.3145(1)’s one-year-back rule did not apply to a plaintiff seeking PIP benefits under an assigned claims plan because MCL 500.3174 does not contain a one-year-back rule.”
Citizens relied on Bronson Methodist Hospital v Allstate Ins Co, 286 Mich App 219 (2009), to assert the trial court had erred. But plaintiff argued that Bronson Methodist Hospital did not actually decide whether the one-year-back rule applied to claims under an assigned claims plan because the parties implicitly assumed that it applied. The Court of Appeals said:
“Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, we conclude that Bronson squarely decided this issue. …The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s ‘omission of language in MCL 500.3174 extending the recovery limitation was intentional’ and, therefore, ‘recovery of benefits remains subject to the one-year-back rule.’ …Thus, the Court explicitly held that ‘MCL 500.3174 does not extend the recovery limitation found in MCL 500.3145(1) because the language used by the Legislature in MCL 500.3174 unambiguously describes only an extension of the statute of limitations period.’ … Thus, the trial court erred by not applying the one-year-back rule on the basis of MCL 500.3174.”
