Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #314733; Unpublished
Judges Sawyer, Meter, and Fort Hood; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
Link to Order
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Involved Vehicle [§3115]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
Recoupment Between Equal Priority Insurers [§3115(2)]
Non-Stacking of PIP Benefits [§3115(3)]
Nature and Scope of PPI Benefits (Property Damage and Loss of Use) [§3121(1)]
Irrelevancy of Fault [§3121(2)]
General Rule of Priority [§3125]
Determination of Involved Vehicle [§3125]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving a dispute among no-fault insurers that provided coverage on vehicles that were involved in back-to-back accidents, the Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to MCL 500.3115 and MCL 500.3125, the insurer of the vehicle in the second accident was not entitled to reimbursement from the insurers of the vehicles in the first accident for benefits it had paid because the vehicles in the first accident were not “actively involved” in the second accident, which was the accident that actually caused the injuries.
Two motor vehicle accidents occurred one after the other on I-75. In the first accident, a vehicle insured by USAA Insurance Company hit a semi insured by Northland Insurance Company, rolling over in the middle of the highway. As a result, several drivers pulled to the side and stopped, including Raymond Beebe, who was driving a truck insured by State Farm. The second accident involved a Jeep Cherokee driven by Michael McBride and insured by plaintiff, Auto Club Group Insurance Company. When McBride saw the accident, he applied his brakes but continued to slide, striking Beebe’s truck. McBride’s vehicle then slid into three pedestrians standing along the guardrail. After the accidents, plaintiff paid PIP benefits to the injured pedestrians, but afterward filed declaratory judgment and reimbursement actions against defendants, State Farm, Northland, and USAA. Plaintiff claimed these insurers were liable for paying a pro-rata share of the benefits to the pedestrians because they insured the other vehicles involved in the crash. The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants.
In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals explained that, under §3115, it is the insurer of the owner, registrant, and operator of a vehicle “involved” in the accident that is typically responsible for benefits. In this case, the issue was whether the vehicles that collided in the first accident were also “involved” in the second collision, in which the nearby pedestrians were injured, the court noted. Citing Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22 (1955), the Court of Appeals said:
“[W]e hold that for a vehicle to be considered ‘involved in the accident’ under §3125, the motor vehicle, being operated or used as a motor vehicle, must actively, as opposed to passively, contribute to the accident. Showing a mere ‘but for’ connection between the operation or use of the motor vehicle and the damages is not enough to establish that the vehicle is ‘involved in the accident,’ nor is fault a relevant consideration in the determination whether a vehicle is ‘involved in an accident.’ Finally, … the concept of being ‘involved in the accident’ under §3125 encompasses a broader causal nexus between the use of the vehicle and the damage than what is required under §3125(1) to show that the damage arose out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.”
In Turner, there was a single series of events that led to the “active involvement” of all the vehicles in the accident. However, in the present case, the Court of Appeals said there were “two separate” events:
“The first crash left the disabled vehicle in the road and the second accident lead to the injury of the pedestrians. According to several witnesses, these two events were separated by a few minutes and a space of between fifty to one hundred yards. In keeping with the fact that there was no active link between the two separate accidents, we can look to McBride’s own admission that the two accidents were separated by separate lanes of four to five cars. Under the Turner test, the trial court correctly concluded that there were two separate accidents: the first between the Northland insured vehicle and the USAA vehicle and the second between the State Farm vehicle and plaintiff’s insured vehicle.”
Regarding plaintiff’s argument that physical contact and fault are irrelevant when determining whether a vehicle is involved in an accident, the Court of Appeals noted that a mere “but for” connection is not enough for “active involvement.” The court said plaintiff’s argument that the second accident would not have happened without the first merely established “‘but for’ causation.”
While several witnesses offered statements about how quickly the second accident occurred after the first, the Court of Appeal said “these simple connections” were insufficient to establish the involvement of the vehicles that defendants insured.
The court concluded:
“The fact that several other vehicles were able to stop and avoid the initial motor vehicle accident shows that the second accident was caused by McBride’s inability to stop, rather than the presence of the vehicle from the first accident rolled over in the road. That is, the second accident was caused by McBride’s failure to observe the basic speed law and maintain a safe, assured distance ahead.”
