Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #315820; Unpublished
Judges Murray, Donofrio, and Borrello; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Definition of Owner [§3101(2)(h)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving plaintiff, a passenger in a vehicle, the Court of Appeals held that Auto-Owners was obligated to pay PIP benefits under MCL 500.3101(2)(h) pursuant to an insurance policy it had issued to plaintiff’s parents, although they were not the title owners of the vehicle, because the parents had use of the vehicle for more than 30 days and, therefore, were constructive owners.
The vehicle in which plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident was titled in the name of her niece. Although the niece did not have no-fault insurance on the vehicle, plaintiff’s parents, the Morrises, had added the vehicle to their no-fault policy with defendant, Auto-Owners. Plaintiff received PIP benefits through the policy with defendant, but defendant stopped paying, claiming plaintiff’s parents were not the owners of the vehicle. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for coverage. In the meantime, defendant received a hospital bill for $38,000 and denied payment. A case evaluation panel awarded plaintiff $65,000, which was accepted, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Sparrow Hospital, which had issued the bill, filed a claim seeking payment. Defendant argued that Sparrow’s claim was barred by the acceptance of the case evaluation award and also alleged that it did not insure the owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff maintained that defendant did insure the owner of the vehicle. The trial court held that defendant insured the vehicle’s owner and the case went to trial, where a jury found in favor of plaintiff and Sparrow. Thereafter, Sparrow and defendant settled the unpaid bill.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s parents were the owners of the vehicle, even though the vehicle was not titled in their name, and that defendant was responsible for benefits. The court said:
“[T]he trial court examined whether the Morrises were ‘owners’ under MCL 500.3101(2)(h)(i), i.e., whether they had the use of the vehicle for a period greater than 30 days. Here, Mary Morris and Purchase’s niece, Connie Robinson, both testified that at the time of the accident the vehicle belonged to the Morrises, not Robinson. It was also undisputed that the vehicle was kept at the Morrises residence, they had the only set of keys, they considered the vehicle theirs, Mary Morris used the vehicle for short trips, Robinson had to ask permission every time she wanted to use the vehicle, and the Morrises never had to ask permission to use the vehicle. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Morrises were owners of the vehicle as defined by the statute.”
According to the Court of Appeals, defendant’s arguments were “misplaced.” The court explained:
“First, Auto-Owners argues that because the Morrises had other vehicles there is circumstantial evidence that they were not owners of the vehicle in the accident. However, it is axiomatic that an individual can be an owner of more than one vehicle at a time and Auto-Owners has cited no authority to the contrary. Second, Auto-Owners asserts that Robinson was the owner of the vehicle because she repaired the vehicle after the accident, obtained insurance after the accident, sold the vehicle after the accident, and kept the proceeds after the accident. However, as all of those occurrences happened after the accident they are not dispositive as to who owned the vehicle at the time of the accident, which is the relevant time period.”
Regarding defendant’s claim that it was unlawful for plaintiff’s parents to use or own the vehicle because the immobilization statute prevented the transfer of the vehicle to them, the Court of Appeals said:
“[E]ven if we were to assume that the immobilization statute made it unlawful for the Morrises to use the vehicle, MCL 500.3101(2)(h)(i) does not provide that the individuals must have ‘lawful’ use of the vehicle; it only states that the individual must have ‘the use’ of the vehicle ‘for a period that is greater than 30 days.’”
Therefore, the Court of Appeals held the trial court properly granted summary disposition to plaintiff.
