Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #316643; Unpublished
Judges Riordan, Cavanagh, and Talbot; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Applicability of Comparative Fault to Noneconomic Loss Claims [§3135(2)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous unpublished per curiam Opinion involving a bicycle-vehicle accident and the bicyclist’s claim for noneconomic loss, the Court of Appeals held the bicyclist was more than 50 percent at fault as a matter of law, and his claim was therefore barred under MCL 500.3135(2) because he pulled out in front of the vehicle while proceeding in the wrong direction.
Defendant, Daniel Snider, was driving a vehicle owned by his parents when he collided with plaintiff’s bicycle. Defendant was waiting for oncoming traffic to pass by when, at the same time traffic cleared, plaintiff attempted to drive his bicycle around the front of the vehicle. Thus, when defendant attempted to pull into the roadway, he struck plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action for noneconomic damages. Defendant moved for summary disposition, asserting plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault and was precluded from recovering damages under §3135(2). Plaintiff alleged defendant failed to yield the right of way and had violated MCL 257.652. The trial court granted defendant’s summary disposition motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding there was no genuine issue regarding plaintiff’s comparative fault. The court said:
“The record evidence established that Daniel came to a full stop and waited for the oncoming, one-way, northbound traffic to clear before attempting to pull out onto the road. Plaintiff testified that, when he was 60 feet away, he saw Daniel’s vehicle stopped and waiting for traffic to clear. Plaintiff also testified that he did not drive his bicycle onto the roadway; rather, he drove his bicycle in a southbound direction across the apron of the parking lot exit and directly in front of Daniel’s vehicle. Thus, Daniel yielded ‘the right of way to vehicles approaching on the highway’ and only attempted to pull out onto the road when the traffic cleared.”
Even if defendant had violated MCL 257.652 by failing to yield the right of way, the Court of Appeals said that such a violation created only a prima facie case from which a jury could draw “an inference” of negligence. The court stated:
“[E]ven if Daniel violated the statute by failing to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff, he had an adequate excuse under the facts and circumstances of this case. In brief, plaintiff darted unexpectedly in front of Daniel’s vehicle. … Thus, any presumption of negligence by Daniel is sufficiently rebutted.”
Regarding the argument that §3135(2)(b) precluded plaintiff from recovering damages, the Court of Appeals agreed and said reasonable minds could not differ in finding that plaintiff was “substantially more at fault” than defendant for the accident.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims.
