Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket #314427; Published
Judges Wilder, Saad, and K. F. Kelly; Unanimous; Opinion by Judge Wilder; Per Curium
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Survivor’s Loss Benefits [§3108]
Resident Relatives [§3114(1)]
Exception for Occupants [§3114(4)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous published per curiam Opinion involving survivor’s loss benefits under MCL 500.3108 in a case on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff widower was not entitled to survivor’s loss benefits because: 1) neither the decedent nor plaintiff had obtained a no-fault policy on the vehicle involved in the accident, and 2) coverage from defendant insurer, which insured the decedent’s parents, was unavailable because plaintiff and the decedent were not named insureds on the policy.
Plaintiff was the widower of Stephanie Stone, who died while driving a vehicle that she owned. Neither plaintiff nor Stephanie had an insurance policy on the vehicle. Prior to the accident, Stephanie’s parents had added the vehicle to their no-fault policy with defendant, Auto-Owners. Although Stephanie did not live with her parents, plaintiff and Stephanie were listed as drivers on the policy. As Stephanie’s widower, plaintiff sought survivor’s loss benefits under the policy with defendant. During deposition, Stephanie’s mother indicated she thought she would be receiving a new policy in plaintiff’s and Stephanie’s name, and that Stephanie paid defendant a six-month premium to cover the vehicle, which defendant had accepted. Defendant moved for summary disposition, which the trial court denied. The trial court construed the policy against defendant, finding it had accepted premiums from Stephanie and knew that she did not live with her parents when it issued the policy.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals said there was no dispute that, at the time of the accident, Stephanie was not living with her parents and that the policy only named Stephanie’s parents as the “insureds.” The court said:
“As this Court has held, the ‘person named in the policy’ under MCL 500. 3114(1) is synonymous with the ‘named insured,’ and persons designated merely as drivers under a policy (such as plaintiff and Stephanie) are neither named insureds nor ‘person[s] named in the policy.’ … Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3114(1).”
Regarding plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to survivor’s loss benefits, the Court of Appeals said:
“MCL 500.3114(4) applies where the injured person is not covered by his or her own insurance or the insurance of a relative domiciled in the same household under MCL 500.3114(1), and permits the injured person to seek benefits no-fault insurers of others, including the vehicle’s owner, registrant, or operator. Here, however, plaintiff argues that Stephanie would have been entitled to benefits under MCL 500.3114(4) because she was the owner, registrant, and operator of the Taurus at the time of the accident causing her death, and defendant was her insurer under the policy. This Court has held that even if the owner, registrant, or operator of a vehicle is not a named insured under a policy, the named insured’s insurer may also constitute an ‘insurer’ of the owner, registrant, or operator under MCL 500.3114(4) if the policy expands the definition of ‘insured person’ beyond the named insured so as to include such persons.”
The Court of Appeals emphasized that plaintiff did not point to any policy language expanding the meaning of “insured” to include Stephanie. As a result, the court concluded:
“[B]ecause plaintiff has failed to identify policy language evidencing an intent to include Stephanie as an insured, plaintiff is not entitled to survivor’s loss benefits under MCL 500.3114(1) or (4).”
The Court of Appeals further rejected plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to benefits because: 1) a new policy in Stephanie’s name was requested; 2) defendant had accepted a premium payment; and 3) defendant knew that Stephanie did not live with her parents. According to the court, plaintiff did not plead an estoppel theory, argue the contract was ambiguous, or seek reformation of the contract. The court added:
“Even if he had, he could not prevail because he and Stephanie were not parties to the insurance contract.”
Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case for an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
