Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 77-2705; Published
Judges T. M. Burns, Kaufman, and Bashara; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 85 Mich App 185; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Pre-Cassidy Era – 1973-1982) [§3135(1)]
Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Uninsured Tortfeasors [§3135(3)(b)]
Evidentiary Issues [§3135]
Trial Procedure Issues [§3135]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals made two significant rulings regarding the trial procedure of a no-fault claim. First, the Court held that because of the ban on injecting insurance into a trial (MCLA 500.3030), an inquiry as to whether the defendant was insured (which is relevant to the defendant's limited tort immunity) must be addressed to the Court and is not a proper question for jury determination. As part of its holding on this issue, the Court read the Supreme Court's opinion in Shavers v Attorney General (item number 85) as holding that the no-fault statute "has not abolished tort immunity if the other vehicle is uninsured." The Court recognized that there has been some dispute as to the extent of an uninsured tortfeasor's immunity.
Second, the Court held that although the phrase "serious impairment of body function" need not be defined by a trial court in its instructions to the jury, the instruction given by the trial court in this case was not improper. The instruction which was approved by the Court of Appeals apparently was drawn from Brown v Metropolitan Life, 65 Mich 306 (1887) and stated:
"If the impairment is of a permanent nature, it must certainly be a serious one and if it is merely temporary and to pass away without serious results, it cannot well be said to render the person unsound in her general health. However, an impairment need not be permanent to be serious. The word serious is not generally used to signify a dangerous condition but rather to define a grave, important or weighty trouble."
If an instruction is given, it must not be "more limited than the statutory phrase" nor should it "detract from the statute or invade the province of the jury."
