United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan; Docket No. 8-72473; Unpublished
Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr.
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this written Opinion dealing with the parked vehicle provisions of §3106 of the no-fault statute, Judge Guy held that a plaintiff service station worker who was insured when a disconnected car battery exploded, was not entitled to no-fault benefits. At the time of the injury, the battery had been removed from the automobile and placed on a wooden skid where it was connected to a charger. When plaintiff attempted to disconnect the battery it exploded causing plaintiff’s injury.
The first question was whether or not the vehicle was "parked" so as to bring into play the provisions of §3106. The Court reasoned that the accident did involve a "parked vehicle" in that the battery had been removed from the vehicle well before it exploded and thus the vehicle was stopped and inoperable.
The Court noted that the word "parked" as used in the Michigan no-fault act is not defined in the statute nor in any specific appellate court decision. Accordingly, the Court felt that the word "parked" should be defined according to its common and ordinary meaning. The Court stated that the definition of "parking" as used in the Motor Vehicle Code (MCLA 25738) is not applicable to the no-fault statute. The reason is that the Motor Vehicle Code definition of parking exempts vehicles that are loading and unloading. The Court noted that this makes it patently inapplicable to §3106 which includes situations where the injury was incurred in the loading or unloading process.
In addition, Judge Guy rejected the definition of "parked" used by Ingham County Circuit Judge Jack Warren in the case of Miller v Auto-Owners (item number 82). In the Miller decision, Judge Warren adopted a three-part definition of "parked" which included "the act of leaving the vehicle." Judge Guy also felt that this definition was irreconcilable with the provisions of §3106 in that §3106 specifically includes situations where the injured person is "occupying" the vehicle §3106(c)1.
After holding that the injuries involved in this case grew out of a "parked vehicle" situation, Judge Guy then had to determine whether or not the plaintiff’s injuries fell within §3106(b) as contended by the plaintiff. Judge Guy held that this section was not applicable in that the plaintiff’s injury was not the direct result of physical contact with permanently mounted vehicle equipment while the equipment was being operated or used. In this case, the battery had been disconnected and was not functioning. Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under §3106(b) of the statute, and summary judgment was granted for defendant
