Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 63507; Published
Opinion by Justice Kavanagh; (With Justice Williams, Levin, and Moody Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 412 Mich 355; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Not Applicable
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Private Contract (Meaning and Intent)
CASE SUMMARY:
In an Opinion decided the same day as Ruuska (item number 487); the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Court of Appeals holding that an exclusionary clause in a pre-no-fault automobile insurance policy was not contrary to public policy and was not ambiguous.
Mary Raska had sought benefits for disability income available under a pre-no-fault automobile insurance policy insuring her under a "family" automobile policy. The injuries occurred while she was driving a dump truck owned by her husband, and insured under a separate "business" automobile policy.
The insurer of the family vehicles denied disability benefits on the basis of an exclusion for a named insured occupying an automobile owned by or furnished for the regular use of the named insured, other than one defined in the policy as an "owned automobile."
Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justices Fitzgerald, Ryan and Coleman, wrote that the exclusion was not contrary to any public policy and that the exclusion was clearly expressed in the "exclusions" portion of the policy.
Justice Williams, in a dissent joined by Justices Levin and Moody, wrote that the exclusion is invalid unless it could be shown that the Raskas knew of and understood the exclusions. The dissent felt that the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to give the parties an opportunity to show whether the plaintiff "reasonably expected" that her family policy provided coverage under the circumstances presented.
[Author's Comment: This affirms the result in item number 295.]
