Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 62962; Published
Opinion by Justice Ryan; (With Justice Levin, Coleman, and Kavanagh Concurring and Dissenting in Part)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 410 Mich 538; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Nature of Survivor’s Loss Benefits [§3108(1)]
Calculation of Survivor’s Loss Benefits and Maximums [§3108(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In an Opinion by Justice Ryan, the Supreme Court rendered several significant holdings regarding the scope and computation of no-fault survivor's loss benefits under §3108 of the Act. The Court ruled as follows:
1. Survivor's loss benefits are not limited to lost wages or lost income. Rather, these benefits "should include the value of tangible things other than, and in addition to wages and salary. The dollar value of such items as employer provided health insurance coverage, pensions, disability benefits and other tangible things of economic value that are lost to the surviving dependents by reason of the insured's death must be taken into account. It is apparent then, that in many cases, the total amount of 'contributions of tangible things of economic value' will exceed v/age or salary income." Justice Ryan noted that there is nothing in the language of §3108 that suggests that the benefits payable are limited only to wages. Justice Ryan noted, "In today's complex economic system, the tangible things of economic value which persons contribute to the support of their dependents include hospital and medical insurance benefits, disability coverage, pensions, investment income, annuity income, and other benefits. Had it been the intent of the legislature to limit survivor's benefits to the sum equal to what eligible dependents would have received from wages and salary alone, it could be expected to have said so. It chose instead the far broader category of contributions of tangible things of economic value' which, on its face, suggests the inclusion of benefits derived for family support from other and different sources." Justice Ryan reviewed relevant legislative history regarding no-fault survivor's loss benefits and commented that, "It appears the legislature's use of the language 'contributions or tangible things of economic value' is §3108 indicates an intent that survivor's loss benefits should at least roughly correspond to economic loss damages recoverable under our Wrongful Death Act. MCLA 600.2922."
2. The Court held that the aggregate figure reached with respect to "contributions of tangible things of economic value" should be reduced by the amount of taxes that would have been paid by the deceased. In this respect, the Court of Appeals was reversed. However, it appears from the majority's opinion that it is only that aspect of the survivor's loss benefits that constitutes taxable items that can be offset by the amount the decedent — would have paid in taxes. Justice Ryan stated, "A" has been discussed in Part 2, survivor's loss benefits encompass the value of items apart from, and in addition to, wage and salary income. In many instances, items that will be included in survivor's loss benefits will have nontaxable origins. In some cases, the survivor's loss may involve only nontaxable items. . .We find that the language of §3108 establishes that the legislature intended that the amount of survivor's loss benefits should reflect an adjustment made for taxes that the decedent would have paid on taxable items included in the §3108 benefit calculation."
3. The Court held that the calculation of survivor's loss benefits should not take into consideration a "personal consumption factors relating to personal expenses of the deceased that are avoided by reason of his death. With respect to this issue, the Court of Appeals was reversed. Justice Ryan noted that there are at least two persuasive indications that indicate that the legislature did not intend such a "consumption factors to be deducted in calculating no-fault survivor's loss benefits. First is the legislative history of §3108. Justice Ryan noted that one of the alternative bills being considered at the time of the passage of the No-Fault Act contained express language permitting a setoff for expenses avoided by the decedent's death. Obviously, the statute which was ultimately enacted was written without this clause. The second reason militating against permitting a personal consumption factor is that it would produce administrative delays and factual disputes "that would interfere with achievement of the goal of expeditious compensation of damages suffered in motor vehicle accidents. . . . Calculation, in every case, of a 'consumption factor' attributable to the decedent's personal expenses would be inconsistent with the declared legislative purpose of expeditious settlement of survivor's claims without complex factual controversy."
4. The Court ruled that No-Fault Act contemplates that the remarriage of a decedent's surviving spouse is an event which requires reduction in survivor's loss benefits due to the remaining surviving dependants in an amount equal to the amount of contributions of tangible things of economic value which would have been provided by the deceased at the time of death, solely for the benefit of the disqualified dependant The Court provided very specific guidelines for this readjustment based upon remarriage of the spouse in the following passage:
"The relevant provisions indicate that the proper method of adjusting survivor's loss benefits to reflect the termination of a survivor's dependency status is to recalculate the amount of contributions of tangible things of economic value that the remaining dependents would have received for support from the deceased at the time of his death. That is, the aggregate of survivor's loss benefits being paid for the benefit of all of the decedent's survivors prior to the disqualification of one of them should be reduced only by the amount equal to the contributions of tangible things of economic value that the deceased would have made solely for the benefit of the disqualified dependent. Contributions which benefit the family unit as a whole, as opposed to the disqualified dependant only, would not be affected. For example, the contributions that the deceased would have made toward the family's shelter in the way of house payments or rent, property taxes, household utility costs, the family car and similar expenses which do not inure to the sole benefit of the disqualified dependent should not be adjusted. Further, the adjustment should be made with reference to the aggregate of contributions of tangible things of economic value at the time of the deceased's death — before application o£ the §3108 ceiling. Thus, in a case where the initial determination of survivor's loss was an amount in excess of the §3108 ceilings, and the amount of benefits payable was therefore reduced to the statutory maximum, it will be necessary to determine whether the latter disqualification of one of the dependents would result in a reduction of total original survivor's loss to an amount below the applicable statutory maximum. If not, the insurer would continue to be liable for the statutory maximum after determination of the survivor's dependency status."
Justice Levin concurred in part and dissented in part He would concur with the majority regarding the requirement of an adjustment for taxes and the requirement of recomputing survivor's benefits upon remarriage of the surviving spouse. He would not address the question of the inclusion in survivor's loss benefits of items other than wages because the plaintiff did not present evidence on the point Finally, he would dissent from the Court's holding that no setoff for personal consumption should be permitted. Justice Levin was joined by Chief Justice Mary Coleman and Justice Kavanagh.
