Michigan Supreme Court; Docket Nos. 65385 and 65753; Published
Opinion by J. Coleman; (with All Concurring Except J. Kavanagh Who Concurred in Part and Dissented in Part; J. Riley Took No Part in the Decision)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 415 Mich 483; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Serious Impairment of Body Function Definition (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Objective Manifestation Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Important Body Function Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
General Ability / Normal Life Element of Serious Impairment (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
Determining Serious Impairment of Body Function as a Matter of Law (Cassidy Era – 1983-1986) [§3135(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In the most important no-fault case since Shavers v Attorney General, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a 5-1 decision by Justice Mary Coleman, articulated significant guidelines regarding summary judgment treatment of the tort threshold requirement of "serious impairment of body function" set form in §3135 of the Act. In according trial courts much greater latitude in granting summary judgment on the thresh — old issue, either in favor of or against a plaintiff, the Court held:
"Therefore, we conclude that the meaning of 'serious impairment of body function is a matter to be determined by statutory construction. We hold that when there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff & injuries, the question of serious impairment of body function shall be decided as a matter of law by the court. Likewise, if there is a factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the threshold requirement of §3135 has been met."
The Court did not discuss those particular cases where there might be a material "factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries," nor did it attempt to elaborate on what situations such a factual dispute may arise. Apparently, the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiffs, Leo Cassidy and Barbara Hermann, were sufficiently uncontroverted so that such discussion was felt unnecessary. The Court, candidly noting that it was not speaking to what would happen in those cases where there was a dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries, stated.
"On this appeal, no party has argued that factual disputes material to the determination of serious impairment of body function should be determined without a jury. It is a question not necessary to the resolution of the present cases. Consequently, we do not intend to intimate any view on the issue."
In reaching its holding that the phrase "serious impairment of body function" is one requiring judicial definition as opposed to presenting a fact question for the jury, the Court specifically repudiated its previous position on this issue set forth in Advisory Opinion Re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294,389 Mich 441 (1973). In that 1973 opinion, the Supreme Court wrote that threshold questions were "within the exclusive province of the trier of fact," except where interpretation approaches or breaches permissible limits, in which case, determination by the trial court is appropriate. In rejecting the approach taken in the Advisory Opinion, the Court noted that advisory opinions were not "precedentially binding in the same sense as a decision of the Court after hearing on the merits." With regard to the statement made in the Advisory Opinion, the Court characterized it as "a statement without discussion and based on assumptions about trial procedure in trials that had not yet occurred."
The Court cited three reasons in support of its conclusion that the threshold was a proper subject of judicial interpretation. First, the Court stated that the threshold phrase was not a commonly used term such as "intoxication." Second, the Court noted that if a jury trial were necessary in all threshold cases, then one of the objectives of the No-Fault Act, to reduce automobile litigation, would be thwarted. Third, the Court felt that statutory construction by trial courts would promote greater uniformity in application of the no-fault threshold.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision is that it did not define the phrase "serious impairment of body function.” Rather, the Court noted it was doing no more than providing an interpretation that addresses the significant aspects of the cases presently before us." In avoiding a specific definition, the Court observed that the threshold phrase was "not susceptible of a single definition that will determine the outcome in all cases." Accordingly, the Court held that "absent specifics from the legislature, its character will of necessity have to develop on a case-by-case basis. As more cases are decided, it should become clear what types of injuries are of sufficient gravity to meet the threshold."
The Court then went on to discuss the specific threshold issue presented in the two cases before it and whether summary disposition of the issue was appropriate. Plaintiff, Leo Cassidy, suffered a complete break of two bones in his lower right leg. He was hospitalized for 18 days, wore four casts for seven months, suffered from dizzy spells forcing him to use a walker instead of crutches during recuperation, and complained of leg pain one and a half years after the accident. Cassidy's own physician testified that the fractures had completely healed, that there was no significant residual damage and that Cassidy had returned to normal following the accident.
A defense physician was not able to find any reason for continuing pain. Plaintiff, Barbara Hermann, received injuries much less severe than Mr. Cassidy in both intensity and duration. She sustained a bump on her head which cleared up in one month, bruises on both knees which cleared up in two months but caused no pain or problem, and neck and back pains requiring nine doctor visits in the immediate one month period following the accident. Hermann was off work for one month and had no problems with any of her injuries after two months from the accident date.
As to plaintiff Cassidy, the Supreme Court held his injury did amount to a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law, and thus reversed the trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the threshold question. As to plaintiff Hermann, the Court held that her injuries did not amount to a serious impairment of body function, and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant.
In reaching its conclusions regarding the two threshold issues presented, the Court made certain observations about the parameters of the no-fault threshold, some of which are perhaps dicta and of unclear future precedential effect. Among other things, the Supreme Court noted:
In determining "seriousness of the injury" required to satisfy the threshold, the Court stated, the "threshold should be considered in conjunction with the other threshold requirements for a tort action for noneconomic loss, namely, death and permanent serious disfigurement. The legislature clearly did not intend to erect two significant obstacles to a tort action for noneconomic loss and one quite insignificant obstacle."
In determining the type of body function which need be impaired, the Court rejected both the arguments that the impairment must be of the entire body function, versus the notion that the impairment of any body function is sufficient The Court stated, "On the one hand, if any body function were to be considered the intended meaning, arguably a serious impairment of the use of the little finger would meet the threshold requirement. On the other hand, if an impairment had to be of the entire body function, then arguably only life threatening injuries would satisfy the requirement We believe that neither of these options accurately effect the legislative intent and that impairment of body function is better understood as referring to important body functions."
In analyzing the severity of the impairment involved in Leo Cassidy's case, the Court indicated that the outcome was not determined by the specific lifestyle requirements of the plaintiff. To this effect, the Court stated, "Walking is an important body function that for Leo Cassidy was impaired by his broken bones. This conclusion is not affected one way or another by the fact that Leo Cassidy is a potato farmer who must be on his feet for long hours. We believe that the legislature intended an objective standard that looks to the effect of an injury on the person's general ability to live a normal life. Walking is an important body function, the serious impairment of which constitutes the 'serious impairment of body function.'"As to aspects of proof the Court wrote that the threshold phrase "demonstrates the legislative intent to predicate recovery for noneconomic loss on objectively manifested injuries. Recovery for pain and suffering is not predicated on serious pain and suffering, but on injuries that affect the functioning of the body. Leo Cassidy's injuries were not general aches and pains, but rather two broken bones. Thus, his injuries fall within the classification of 'impairment of body function.'"
As to the permanency of injury, the Court agreed with prior Court of Appeals decisions that "an injury need not be permanent to be serious. Permanency is, nevertheless, relevant."
As for tort claims for economic loss in excess of no-fault benefits, the Court observed, "The traditional tort remedy was left intact."
Justice Thomas G. Kavanagh dissented in part. He stated that "the question of whether the threshold has been met may be decided as a matter of law where reasonable persons would not reach different conclusions on the seriousness of an injury. Otherwise, a question is presented for the trier of fact." Justice Kavanagh went on to say that it is not proper for the Supreme Court to limit "'available causes of action' because the Michigan legislature 'chose a rather amorphous standard'." he concluded that Leo Cassidy's injuries were a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law and that plaintiff, Barbara Hermann's, injuries should have been submitted to the jury for determination because reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not they constituted threshold injuries.
[Author's Comment: This decision, in many ways, raises more questions than it answers. Some of those which immediately come to mind are; (1) What is the "legal definition" of serious impairment of body function? (2) What is a "factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries? (3) What role does the trier of fact perform if there is a "factual dispute as to the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries”? (4) How many of the Supreme Court's "observations" regarding the threshold are definitional elements or "dicta" which were unnecessary to decide the specific issues presented in the case at bar?
It appears that the practical effect of this decision will be to promote a whole new round of trial court and appellate court decisions which will attempt to fashion some kind of legal definition of the phrase "serious impairment of body function." It is uncertain at this point whether or not this approach will, in fact, promote greater "uniformity" in the application of the no-fault threshold and instill greater stability in automobile negligence litigation, or have the opposite effect]
