Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 58890; Unpublished
Judges Kaufman, Brennan, and Beasley; Unanimous; Per Curiam
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Entitlement to PIP Benefits: Arising Out of / Causation Requirement [§3105(1)]
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Exception for Unreasonably Parked Vehicles [§3106(1)(a)]
Exception for Permanently Mounted Equipment Use [§3106(1)(b)]
Exception for Entering Into or Alighting From [§3106(1)(c)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous per curiam Opinion, the Court of Appeals denied no-fault benefits to plaintiff on the basis that his injury did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle pursuant to §3105(1) of the Act. Plaintiff in this case was building an addition to his home. During construction, he utilized a motor vehicle van as part of a makeshift scaffolding device which enabled plaintiff to reach the roof of his home. Just prior to the accident, plaintiff had stepped off the ladder and into the van where he picked up some shingles and other material and then exited the van via the passenger door. As he was doing this, he placed his boot on a piece of wood laying on the driveway and severely injured his leg.
The Court of Appeals held that in order for the injury to be compensable, there must first be a sufficient causal nexus between the injury and the use of the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle pursuant to §3105(1). Assuming this exists, the injury must then fall into one of the three favored subsections of §3106 dealing with parked vehicles. The Court then analyzed each of the three parked vehicle exceptions and found none applied to this case. The Court summarily rejected plaintiff’s contentions that the injury fell under §3106(a) dealing with unreasonably parked vehicles and §3106(b) dealing with injuries arising as a result of direct physical contact with permanently mounted vehicle equipment. As to the "alighting from" exception contained in §3106(c), the Court found this to be inapplicable because plaintiff was not alighting from a vehicle that was being used as a motor vehicle at the time of the injury. Rather, the van was being used "as part of a jerry-rigged scaffold." Thus, the injury was not foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. The Court concluded, "Stated alternatively, the injury did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. MCLA 500.3105(1)."
