Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 57274; Published
Judges Brennan, Riley, and Payant; Unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 118 Mich App 712; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Determination of Domicile [§3114(1)]
Resident Relatives [§3114(1)]
Exception to General Priority for Non-Occupants [§3115(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
This case involved a priority dispute between two no-fault carriers arising out of a motorcycle-truck accident Prudential insured the truck involved in the accident and Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company insured the motorcyclist's father, with whom the motorcyclist allegedly resided at the time of the accident The Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the basis that the motorcyclist had admitted domicile in his father's household at the time of the accident The Court held that Prudential's liability is not determined solely by what the plaintiff alleges to be his domicile, but is rather contingent upon what the jury finds as to the liability of Preferred Risk. If Preferred Risk prevails on its assertion that plaintiff was not domiciled in his father's home, plaintiff’s admissions as to his residency will have no relevance and Prudential will become responsible under the non-occupant provisions of §3115(1). Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Workman v DAIIE (item number 143), the Court said that other factors besides a person's subjective or declared intent as to domicile must be considered.
In the second aspect of this opinion, the Court held that although it may appear to be an equitable thing to do, a trial court has no authority in priority disputes such as this to order both insurance companies to pay benefits pending the outcome of who bears ultimate responsibility. In order for such relief to be granted, the legislature would have to authorize it in the No-Fault Act. To this effect, the Court stated, "Without such legislative enactment, the courts cannot order either or both insurance companies to pay benefits on general notions of equity. Should plaintiff ultimately prevail, he will be permitted to recover interest on any overdue benefits under §3142. If it should be determined that the insurer ultimately found responsible has unreasonably refused to pay the claim, plaintiff might be awarded attorney fees under §3148."
[Author's Comment: The second holding in this case mat a Court has no authority to order the sharing of payments between two carriers in priority disputes, seems contrary to the Court of Appeals decision in Kalin v DAIIE (item number 494). In the Kalin case, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that two insurance companies were guilty of an unreasonable refusal to pay benefits when they did not share payment responsibility pending final outcome of the litigation. The Kalin panel stated, "A claimant who is clearly entitled to no-fault benefits should not be forced to hire an attorney merely because the circumstances of his accident create problems of priority among insurers." The perplexing aspect of the decision in Brown is that Judge Dorothy Comstock Riley was a member of both the Kalin and Brown panels and both were unanimous opinions.]
