Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 64040; Published
Opinion by J. Levin; 4-3 (with J. Williams, J. Coleman, and Fitzgerald Dissenting)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 414 Mich 139; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Exclusion for Vehicles Considered Parked [§3106(1)]
Disqualification for Uninsured Owners or Registrants of Involved Motor Vehicles or Motorcycles [§3113(b)]
Determination of Involved Vehicle [§3113]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this 4-3 Opinion by Justice Levin, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals (item number 238) and held that plaintiff was entitled to recover no-fault benefits for injuries suffered when he was struck by an automobile when he was pumping gasoline at a self service station into a vehicle owned by him which was uninsured. Plaintiff Heard was pinned between his uninsured vehicle and the vehicle which struck him. The Court of Appeals denied benefits in a 2-1 opinion pursuant to the disqualification provisions of §3113(b) which state that a person is not entitled to recover no-fault benefits if the person was the owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle "involved in the accident."
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and held that Heard's uninsured motor vehicle was not "involved in the accident" and thus Heard is not disqualified by §3113(b). The Court noted that the disqualification of an uninsured owner of a motor vehicle from entitlement to no-fault benefits is not absolute. Disqualification only applies where the uninsured vehicle is "involved" in the accident. However, the owner of an uninsured vehicle is entitled to no-fault benefits if his uninsured vehicle is not involved in the accident.
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the majority concluded that a parked vehicle is not "involved in the accident" for purposes of the disqualification section, unless one of the three exceptions to the parked vehicle provisions of §3106 is applicable. In this regard, the Court stated:
"We reverse and remand for trial because we are of the opinion that a parked vehicle is not 'involved in the accident' unless one of the exceptions of the parked vehicle provisions (§3106) is applicable. Those exceptions spell out when a parked vehicle is deemed to be in use as a motor vehicle; each exception pertains to injuries related to the character of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle characteristics which make it unlike other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents. . . . At the time of the accident, Heard's vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle; rather, it was like other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents."
The majority also noted that the mere presence of a "causal relationship" between the accident and Heard's vehicle does not resolve the question of whether that vehicle is "involved" for purposes of the Act. The Court stated, "Whether a vehicle is 'involved' cannot be determined by abstract reasoning or resort to dictionary definitions. It depends on the meaning derived from the purpose and structure of the No-Fault Act While there will generally (perhaps always) be some causal relationship between the loss incurred and a 'vehicle involved in the accident,' it does not follow that whenever there is any causal relationship the vehicle is 'involved.' 'But for' causal analysis would 'involve' a vehicle which drops off a member of a car pool who, after he reaches the curb, is struck crossing the street; a vehicle which runs out of gas where a person who was an occupant is struck walking along the highway to a service station; and a vehicle left in a parking lot where a person who was an occupant is struck crossing the street. . . . We are persuaded, however, on examination of the No-Fault Act as a whole, that disqualification for benefits as the distribution of losses between insurance carriers (which depends in some circumstances on the meaning given the term 'vehicle involved in the accident') were not meant to depend on such adventitious circumstances."
The above analysis resulted in a very important conclusion in footnote 15. There, the majority specifically disapproved of the Court of Appeals holding in Gutierrez v Dairyland Insurance Company (item number 454), which involved a very similar fact situation and held that both vehicles were involved in the accident. The only real difference between the two cases was that the person pinned in Gutierrez was a service station attendant who was not covered by a no-fault policy and the question was whether the insurer of the parked vehicle was required to contribute to the payment of PIP benefits.
Finally, the majority considered whether or not the Supreme Court opinion in Miller v Auto-Owners (item number 431) required a different result. In that case, the Court held that where an individual is performing maintenance on a vehicle, he is entitled to no-fault benefits regardless of whether or not the vehicle was deemed to be parked. The majority stated that Heard's injury did not arise from the maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. The only vehicle being used as a motor vehicle at the time of Heard's accident was the vehicle which struck Heard. The majority stated, "Heard's vehicle was a tree or pole for purposes of the No-Fault Act."
Justice Williams dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justice Fitzgerald. The dissenters argued that Heard was maintaining a vehicle at the time of the accident and thus the vehicle was "involved" in the accident.
[Author's Comment: From the analysis employed by the majority, it seems that the following are true; (1) the concept of "involved", at least as used in the disqualification provisions of §3113, is narrower man the concept of "arising out of" as that phrase is used in §3105, and (2) a parked vehicle is not "involved" in an accident unless one of the three subsections of §3106 are satisfied. Furthermore, the fact that the majority did not consider Heard to be "occupying" his vehicle at the time he was pumping gas into it, may be a suggestion that the Court is backing off the more liberal interpretation of "occupancy" as that has been interpreted in the pre-no-fault case of Nickerson v Citizens, and which has been employed in a few no-fault cases.]
