Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 60938; Unpublished
Judges Cynar, MacKenzie, and Walsh
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: Not Applicable: Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Loss of Consortium Claims [§3135]
Trial Procedure Issues [§3135]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
This decision is the latest appellate pronouncement in this important case. In item number 315, the Court of Appeals rendered two holdings. First, that loss of consortium was no longer a viable cause of action under no-fault Second, that in order to recover noneconomic losses in the future, a plaintiff must prove a continuing threshold injury. A third issue dealing with the allegedly improper introduction of insurance on voir dire was not resolved. In item number 430, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the consortium issue. However, the Supreme Court declined to decide the continuing threshold issue. As to the question of improper voir dire, that issue was remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution. An Application for Rehearing was denied by the Supreme Court in item number 534.
On remand (the instant case), the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no improper injection of insurance during the voir dire. Accordingly, no error was found regarding that issue. However, as to the ultimate disposition of the case, the Court of Appeals held, "The verdict as to Marie Rusinek's damages (loss of consortium) is affirmed, and the cause remanded to the trial court for retrial of Eugene Rusinek's damages."
[Author's Comment: It is submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding Marie Rusinek's verdict is totally inconsistent with its previous holding on the issue of continuing threshold. The claims of both Marie Rusinek and Eugene Rusinek are for noneconomic losses, with Marie Rusinek's claim being derivative of Eugenes. It makes no sense to require Eugene Rusinek to prove a continuing threshold and not impose the same requirement on Marie Rusinek's claim for loss of consortium. Thus, the latest pronouncement by the Court of Appeals on the issue of continuing threshold appears, at least in part, to repudiate its prior decision. In dealing with this conflict, it should be noted that another panel of the Court of Appeals in Warner v Brigham (item number 195) held, "Once the threshold is crossed, the parties step from the purely statutory land of no-fault back into the common law, with all its virtues and shortcomings."]
