Michigan Court of Appeals; Docket No. 53580; Published
Judges Danhof, Gillis, and Branson; Unanimous
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 112 Mich App 468; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
Tolling of Limitations Upon Submission Of Claim [§3145]
Tolling of Limitations for Estoppel [§3145]
Reasonable Proof Standard [§3142(1)]
Requirement That Benefits Were Unreasonably Delayed or Denied [§3148(1)]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Equitable Estoppel
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this unanimous Opinion by Chief Judge Danhof dealing with tolling the statute of limitation provisions of §3145(1), this panel of the Court of Appeals rejected the analysis employed in Richards v American Fellowship (item number 101) in preference to the decisions in Aldrich v Auto-Owners (item number 403) and Allstate v Frankenmuth Mutual (item number 464). The Court stated, "We disagree with the analysis of §3145 (1) found in Richards and hold that the running of the limitations period is not automatically tolled between the time the insured gives notice of its claim and the insurer denies liability. We find that the correct construction of §3145(1) is to be found in Aldrich v Auto-Owners and Allstate Insurance v Frankenmuth Mutual. . . . Application of Aldrich and Allstate to the instant case requires a finding that, since some payments had already been made to plaintiff by defendant, plaintiff had the right to commence an action anytime within one year after the most recent allowable expense incurred. However, plaintiff’s recovery should have been limited to only those losses incurred within one year prior to the date on which this action was commenced.
After disposing of the Richards tolling issue, the Court went on to suggest that there may be another way to toll the one year limitation provisions of §3145(1). The plaintiff in this case alleged that he did not commence his action timely because he had been induced by defendant's claims agents to refrain from commencing a suit. Plaintiff did so to his detriment. Accordingly, plaintiff alleged that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply. Due to the fact that the trial court did not consider this doctrine, the Court of Appeals remanded for specific consideration of that issue. In so holding, the Court stated:
"However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry in this issue. As noted above, in response to defendant's motion for accelerated judgment, plaintiff asserted that defendant deliberately induced plaintiff not to commence his action until after the limitations period had run. Because of this, plaintiff argued that defendant was estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense. Since the trial court relied on Richards, it did not address the merits of plaintiff s estoppel argument.
Therefore, we remand to the trial court for consideration whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to the facts of the instant case. We do not express any view on the merits of plaintiff’s estoppel claim."
In addition to the above holdings, the Court also affirmed the trial court's determination that plaintiff was not entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees under §3148 because of a bona fide factual uncertainty. In addition, the trial court's refusal to award interest under §3142 was also affirmed on the basis that plaintiff did not present reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of his losses.
