Genesee County Circuit Court; Docket No. 81 -478-AV
Judge Robert M. Ransom
Official Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Wage Loss for Temporarily Unemployed Persons / Qualifications [§3107a]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Legislative Purpose and Intent
CASE SUMMARY:
In this written opinion, Judge Ransom reversed the decision of the Genesee County District Court summarized in item number 424. The issue before the Court was whether plaintiff was "temporarily unemployed" within the meaning of §3107a of the No-Fault Act, and thus entitled to recover work loss benefits.
The plaintiff in this case had been employed as a cook at the McDonald Drive-In during his junior and senior years in high school. Upon graduation, he left his parents' home and continued employment with McDonald working full time. Approximately ten months after his graduation, he was fired by McDonalds without the potential of returning to work. Six weeks later he suffered disabling injuries in an automobile accident During the six weeks preceding the accident, plaintiff made several attempts to secure employment by making job applications at various establishments in his community. In addition, during the same six week period, he did odd jobs for his father to pick up "a little change." He received no job offers during this time.
The trial court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to recover no-fault benefits as a temporarily unemployed person because he could not prove that "but for" the accident he would have been successful in finding employment. In support of this conclusion, the trial judge took judicial notice of the high unemployment rate in plaintiff’s community at the time of the accident and found that for that reason, plaintiff was unable to secure work.
In this appeal to the circuit bench, Judge Ransom reversed the trial court's opinion and found, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was "temporarily unemployed" within the meaning of §3107a. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ransom rejected the notion that §3107a imposes a "but for" standard on those seeking to recover work loss benefits as "temporarily unemployed" persons. Judge Ransom analyzed several prior Court of Appeals decisions dealing with this section of the Act and noted that these cases did not require that the accident victim prove he or she would have found employment but for the accident. The language in §3107a that it is "subject to the provisions of §3107(b)," is intended to allow recovery of work loss benefits based upon what an injured person would have actually earned if the person could prove that he would have found a job and would have earned a specific income through such employment In that situation, the injured person would not be limited to benefits based upon the last full month of employment, which is the measure of damages referred to in §3107a.
In further support of his conclusion, Judge Ransom cited appellate authority for the proposition that the No-Fault Act is remedial in nature and thus should be liberally construed in favor of those who are to be benefited by the statute.
Finally, Judge Ransom wrote that the determination of when one is "temporarily unemployed" within the meaning of the statute is probably a question of statutory construction which is best decided as an issue of law by the court In support of this concept, Judge Ransom cited the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court in the recent case of Cassidy v McGovern which ruled that, for the most part, questions dealing with the threshold injury issue are questions of law. However, Judge Ransom held that the resolution of this issue was not necessary to the court's determination in the case at bar as the court found the plaintiff was "temporarily unemployed" as a matter of law since no reasonable minds could differ. In support of this conclusion, Judge Ransom observed that, "plaintiffs expressed intent to resume immediate employment was supported by his efforts in that regard as well as the circumstances of living independent of his parents. Further, ... the testimony was uncontroverted that plaintiff had part-time employment doing odd jobs for his father. He was minimally entitled to work loss benefits for loss of his part-time income. Plaintiff was aggressively seeking employment but was hindered by the high rate of unemployment in the Flint area. The trial court took judicial notice that Flint's unemployment rate had been 'one of the nation's highest for the past year at 20% to 25%' with the advent of disability arising from injuries, sustained in the automobile accident, plaintiff could no longer pursue employment Given these circumstances, plaintiff may well be unable to establish with any degree of certainty, when employment would have resumed. Consistent with the remedial nature of the statute, and the philosophy of the appellate courts that the No-Fault Act should be interpreted so as to encourage ease of administration, this court concludes that, upon the facts herein, plaintiff’s work loss benefits commence from the date of injury."
