Genesee County Circuit Court; Docket No. 81 -63350-CK
Judge Judith A. Fullerton
Official Reporter Citation: Not Applicable; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
Coordination with Other Health and Accident Disability Insurance [§3109a]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this written Opinion, Judge Fullerton held that the defendant no-fault insurer in this case could not coordinate ''total and permanent disability benefits" received under an employment provided life insurance policy with no-fault work loss benefits.
The plaintiff in this case sustained disabling injuries in an automobile accident. Plaintiff was insured under a group life insurance policy through his employment which provided that if plaintiff became totally and permanently disabled from employment as a result of bodily injury or disease, plaintiff had the right to elect to have the amount of his life insurance paid to him in monthly installments. Furthermore, the plaintiff in this case was insured under a coordinated work loss provision in his no-fault policy with defendant Dairyland which provided that the no-fault work loss benefit was coordinated with "the provisions of any other insurance, service, benefit or reimbursement plan providing similar direct benefits, without regard to fault, for bodily injuries sustained as a result of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle."
Judge Fullerton held that this coordination of benefits language in defendant's policy did not permit a coordination with the life insurance benefits for two reasons. First, the benefits were not for "work loss." The Court noted that the life insurance benefits would continue to be paid on a monthly basis without regard to whether or not plaintiff would otherwise have had a job (i.e., for instance, the monthly life insurance benefits continue even though the plaintiff’s plant is shut down). Second, the Court held that the language of the coordinated benefits clause of defendant's policy only permitted coordination with other policies which "specifically and expressly provide benefits for automobile related injury." The plaintiff’s life insurance benefits were not payable under such a policy and, thus, were not proper subjects of coordination.
In light of the fact that the Court based its holding on an interpretation of the insurance policy, it was not necessary for the Court to consider the broader question of whether or not it would be statutorily permitted under §3109a to permit such coordination under policy language which clearly sanctioned such coordination.
