Michigan Supreme Court; Docket No. 69790; Published
Opinion by J. Boyle; 7-0 (with C.J Williams Concurring with J. Levin)
Official Michigan Reporter Citation: 421 Mich 571; Link to Opinion 
STATUTORY INDEXING:
One-Year Back Rule Limitation [§3145(1)]
Tolling of Limitations Upon Submission of Claim [§3145]
TOPICAL INDEXING:
Not Applicable
CASE SUMMARY:
In this Opinion by Justice Boyle, the Supreme Court dealt with tolling the one-year statute of limitations contained in §3145 of the act Although the court did not specifically approve of the "tolling rule" set forth in Richards v American Fellowship (Item No. 101), it did decide how "Richards tolling" is to be administered. The court held that assuming the one-year-back rule may properly be tolled pursuant to Richards, tolling would not begin until a claim for specific benefits is submitted to the insurance company. The general notice of injury given by plaintiff in this case was insufficient to trigger tolling.
Justice Boyle noted that tolling arguably would be appropriate to avoid penalizing an insured for the time an insurer uses to assess its liability. Further, it would encourage insurers to promptly make such an assessment and to notify the insured of the decision, thereby guaranteeing that an insured would have a full year in which to bring suit However, Justice Boyle also pointed out that tolling is a departure from the limitation period proscribed by the legislature and must be narrowly tailored to present abuse, while preserving the legislative scheme. Therefore, if one-year-back tolling is to exist, it requires an event sufficient to trigger tolling, i.e., a claim for specific benefits. In this case, the plaintiff’s report of injury to his employer's workers' comp company (which was also the no-fault company) was insufficient to toll the one-year-back rule. It should be noted, however, that plaintiff’s claim for workers' comp filed within one year of injury was "conceded" to be sufficient notice of injury to the no-fault insurer to satisfy the one-year notice rule set forth in Section 3145 of the act.
Justice Boyle also noted in Footnote 6 that the court did not intend to foreclose the possibility of a single claim triggering both workers' comp and no-fault liabilities under circumstances not before the court. She stated, for instance, that a different result might be reached on grounds of estoppel, where, for example, an employee requests "whatever benefits" the employee is entitled to from an employer and the employer misrepresents or conceals the availability of certain benefits.
Justice Levin and Chief Justice Williams concurred separately, stating that in their opinion, it is questionable whether a self-insured employer or an insurer providing both no-fault and workers' comp coverage could be justified in paying only workers' comp benefits on the grounds that the injured worker sought only workers' comp benefits, at least where the employer or insurer knows whether the claim arises out of an automobile accident. Such insurance companies who are wearing "two hats" should be on notice that an injured employee is entitled to both workers' comp and no-fault benefits.
